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2ABSTRACT
This thesis is a constructivist defence of the foundations of rights. 
Rights are the product of a choice-situation between rational agents; that is, 
agents who seek the greatest share of certain basic goods but who also 
recognize that their deliberations are constrained by moral considerations. 
The conceptual character of rights as prerogatives to pursue one’s interests 
is a reflection of this construction procedure.
It is crucial to the argument that the goods over which agents 
deliberate be of equal intrinsic value, and this requires that we have a 
certain conception of rational agency and a defensible metaphysics of the 
self. Much of the thesis is concerned with exploring the problems associated 
with different conceptions of the self and self-interest. It is argued that 
language, or communicative competence, is central to the development of 
both self-consciousness and deliberative rationality, and this fact has 
significant implications for how  w e should conceive of the moral 
foundations of rights.
Constructivism stands opposed to intuitionism and utilitarianism 
and in Part I (after an initial conceptual analysis of rights) all three theories 
are discussed. Part II is devoted to a consideration of the nature of self- 
interest (or prudence) and the self (personal identity), whilst Part III 
advances a ’’solution” to the problems raised in Part n.
Writers whose work receives critical attention include Rawls, Hare, 
Nagel, Parfit, Searle, Habermas and Apel.
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6Introduction
This dissertation is concerned with the moral foundations of rights. 
More specifically, it seeks to defend a particular ethico-political theory: 
constructivism. Rights are the product of a moral choice procedure in 
which agents together "construct" the principles that will govern their 
relations one with another. Agents are bound by a moral sense but 
consistent with that they seek to achieve the greatest amount of those goods 
which facilitate the pursuit of their self-interest, such as a level of wealth, 
education, and freedom. Rights are then understood as the authoritative 
distribution of these goods.
The historical roots of constructivism can be traced to the practical 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant, whilst the theory has found its clearest 
contem porary statem ent in the work of John Rawls. Kantian 
constructivism entails the notion that the moral law can only be binding 
upon agents insofar as it has been arrived at independently of pre-existing 
desires—including moral desires. The foundations of moral principles, such 
as rights, are to be found in the only thing that is good without limitation: a 
pure will.
The claim that moral principles are co n stru c ted  rather than 
intuited is crucial to my defence of rights. As I shall argue, the possibility of 
a "moral rationality" is dependent upon a rejection of the theory that the 
ethical validity of rights must be self-evident. But if we are to eschew any 
appeal to intuitions it is incumbent upon us to explain how such 
substantial principles as rights are to be generated. What is dear is that the 
formal requirements of morality, such as the ability to universalize a
7person's moral claims, important though they are, will be insufficient to 
ground a system of rights.
What is required is a conception of the non-moral good; as rational 
agents in the moral choice situation we have as the object of our 
deliberations the allocation of various goods—primary goods—which taken 
together are essential to the formation of an individual's particular (non- 
moral) good. To avoid egoism~ie. the framing of the choice situation in 
terms of mutual advantage—we must assume that agents are constrained in 
their pursuit of their good by a moral sense, which is understood not as a 
commitment to substantial intuitions about moral goodness, but rather as 
the recognition of the formal qualities of any moral ought-statement: a 
moral-ought is a universalizable and overriding action-directive.
Constructivism can thus be said to have tw o fundamental 
elements: persons have a formal moral sense, and, they require certain 
instrumental goods if they are to further their interests. The task then is to 
combine in a coherent manner these two elements. A starting point is to 
say that the primary goods must be of equal value to all agents, but this is 
insufficient to reconcile the moral and the non-moral good, for we cannot 
wash out all traces of self-interest from the primary goods. People may 
"share" a need for certain goods but the sense of "sharing" is weak; we all 
seek a greater rather than a lesser share of these goods, thus creating a 
conflict between self-interest and morality. I believe, therefore, that the next 
step should be an analysis of the concept of "self-interest", and I claim that 
given a certain understanding of this concept there exists the possibility of a 
reconciliation of self-interest and morality (albeit at a highly abstract level) 
and consequently a vindication of the coherence of constructivism.
8What I shall claim is that self-interest should not be understood as 
merely desire-fulfilment, because desires are rooted in the present whereas 
the self endures through time. Self-interest should be understood as 
entailing at its highest level prudential reason; that is, if the agent is to be 
fully rational he must see his life as temporally-extended and give due 
weight to the desires that he might have alongside those he does have. 
Consequently, self-interest becomes a problem, for once we reject the desire- 
fulfilment theory we no longer have an immediate assurance of what our 
interests are or should be.
The problem of self-interest is at base ”the problem of the self'. As a 
prudential agent "I” am the ground of my projects; my ends are valuable 
relative to me. Yet in order for me to ground my ends I must have a 
conception of myself as separate from those ends. I must be capable of 
turning in on myself and becoming the reflexive object of my concern. But, 
as David Hume observed, there is no self to be observed behind one's 
perceptions. For constructivism the problem of the self is serious, for what 
w e must show is that the primary goods are of equal value for all agents 
and to do this we need to demonstrate that the conception of self-interest 
that I am advancing entails principles of rational will-formation that are 
unavoidable; a person who fails to act on the basis of prudential reason 
must be shown to be irrational
The inability to provide an adequate conception of the self has led 
several writers to express the view  (im plicitly or explicitly) that 
constructivism is fundamentally flawed. Derek Parfit and Michael Sandel 
have both, in rather different ways, maintained that the idea of ''standing 
back” from one's preferences and attempting to form a good is incoherent 
and ridiculous. Furthermore, I believe that this critique of the constructivist
9self in liberal theory has forced Rawls, and many of his defenders, to 
abandon the clearly Kantian basis of "justice as fairness" in favour of an 
intuitionist conception of the "foundations" of rights, and other principles. 
I believe this to be a serious mistake. The constructivist self is defensible if 
w e abandon the empiricist assumption that the subject qua subject (as 
opposed to the subject qua embodied being) must be observable. I shall 
argue that the subject can be said to exist as a necessary presupposition of a 
person's (that is, the observable human being's) interaction with his 
enviroment. Central to this argument is the idea that the ability to interact 
w ith one's envirom ent is dependent upon the acquisition of a 
communicative competence.
I shall maintain that subjects must be presupposed to exist prior to 
language and hence cannot be directly (empirically) observed, but that we 
become conscious of ourselves as subjects through the operation of a public 
language. If we reject the desire-fulfilment theory of self-interest then we 
must assume that the ability to form a good is dependent upon a reflective 
and critical rationality; that is, I recognize that I desire object X but my 
reason for wanting X cannot simply be that I desire X, but rather I must 
assume that I have the desire because X is desirable, and that claim is 
refutable and revisable, for its validity depends upon a state of the world 
and not a state of my mind.
The capacity to deliberate over which objects have value is 
dependent upon a public language, and that language must not be 
understood merely as a structure of formal rules and symbols (semantics) 
but rather as an activity  in which many of the underlying rules cannot be 
objectified or communicated (pragmatics). If language were merely 
semantics then the subject could not be revealed to itself through language.
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But when language is understood as having a complex structure then it can 
be seen that the self is both an object in, and a subject of, language. That this 
is so follows from the fact that we use language intentionally to fulfil our 
aims and other agents treat us as intentional agents (I shall develop this 
rather complicated argument in chapter 6 ).
It is this linguistically-based conception of the self that we should 
appeal to in the design of the moral choice-situation. I recognize that there 
are goods that I cannot do without if I am to achieve a prudential good, and 
amongst these goods is the good of social cooperation. That I must enter 
into cooperative relations with others follows from the communicative 
basis of prudential rationality. Whilst my ends are contingent in the sense 
that they are determined by my being a particular spatio-temporally situated 
self, I can only come to value those ends through participation in linguistic 
practices. Cooperation runs deep—to the ends I pursue and not merely the 
means I employ to achieve those ends. Indeed, if I am to be a fully rational 
prudential agent then I must engage in a continuous process of critical self­
reflection and as such I must recognize that the particular linguistic 
practices in which I participate are themselves limited. It is a presupposition 
of my communicative rationality that I shall only achieve a full conception 
of my good in an indefinite and unlimited community of interpretants; a 
communication community that transcends all particular language-games.
It follows that my commitment to social cooperation entails 
allegiance to a universal community in which there is undistorted 
communication between participants. Since such a community must be 
taken to be unrealizable it should be understood as a "regulative idea"; one 
which allows us to conform our behaviour to such moral principles as 
rights without the charge that it is irrational—from the standpoint of
11
prudence—to do so. The rational commitment to the indefinite community 
does not ground one's commitment to the morality of rights as such, but 
rather it grounds the primary goods and it is those goods which we 
deliberate over in the moral choice situation.
The dissertation is divided into three parts. Part I (chapters 1-3) 
begins with a conceptual analysis of rights; that is, a reconstruction of what 
is implicitly understood as a right, or a rights-practice. I discuss Bentham's 
"benefit theory" and Hart's "will theory", but favour a compromise 
position which I term the "autonomy account": rights allow either for the 
direct exercise of will or else for the long-term development of that capacity. 
In chapters 2 and 3 I discuss three second-order theories of rights. That 
means that we are no longer concerned with what rights are in material 
terms, but what reasons can be found for accepting the force of rights, ie. we 
are looking for an answer to the question: why should I constrain my 
interests in order to allow other people to pursue their interests. The three 
theories I discuss are intuitionism, constructivism and utilitarianism. Since 
this thesis should be understood to be a defence of constructivism my 
remarks regarding that theory (section 2.1) are introductory. The main aim 
is to provide a critique of the other two theories. I argue that neither 
intuitionism nor utilitarianism can explain the role of the autonomous self 
in rights.
Part II is concerned with the problems of constructivism. I argue 
that constructivism presupposes a certain metaphysics of the self (personal 
identity) and that as such any defender must confront Humeian scepticism  
concerning the existence and endurance of the self. I discuss the connection 
between prudence and personal identity and the contributions of Thomas 
Nagel and Derek Parfit to that debate.
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In Part HI I attempt to offer a solution to "the problem of the self' 
and in the process show how the dual appeal to morality and prudence in 
constructivism is coherent.
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PART I: THREE THEORIES OF RIGHTS.
Chapter 1 
Rights
This dissertation is concerned with the rational foundations oi rights. 
As I shall argue, rights facilitate the legitimate pursuit of self-interest whilst, 
at the same time, they entail constraints upon such a pursuit. To radonally 
ground a system of rights1 is to provide reasons for persons to sacrifice, or 
to forgo, their self-interested aims in the interests of others. This means that 
we are concerned with the validity of the reasons advanced for respecting 
rights, where those reasons do not involve merely the exercise of coercion2.
In Part One I shall discuss three theories that purport to provide such 
a basis for rights: intuitionism, constructivism, and utilitarianism. I believe 
that these are rival theories and I shall attempt to defend that claim in the 
course of this work. But it should be noted from the outset that these three 
theories are second-order theories that aim to explain first-order principles. 
First-order theorizing attempts to define the content of principles such as 
rights, whilst second-order theorizing is concerned to justify the application 
of those principles. In other words, theorizing of the first order should 
explain what rights are—their nature and structure—whilst second order 
theory concerns itself with the meta-ethical question of why we should
1A "system" can be defined as the totality of rights. My rights serve my interests, but 
they may incur disadvantages for others. As actors in a system or practice we are both right­
holders and duty-bearers. For a discussion of the idea of a rights-practice see FLATHMAN, 
chapter 1. The relationship between self-interest and morality in rights is central to this 
dissertation. For a discussion of the general tension between self-interest and morality, see 
CHAR VET (1), especially pp.81-6.
^Coercion is not incompatible with rationality but it must be, as it were, justified from the 
standpoint of reason. Clearly, the state holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion 
and therefore if rights do in fact involve coercion their grounding will be bound up with 
arguments as to why we should obey the state.
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accept that rights are morally binding. Both levels are explanatory, but the 
second-order is an analysis of the moral sense that gives rise to (or explains) 
a respect for rights. It is important to have a clear grasp of the distinction 
between these orders, for whilst I claim that constructivism provides the 
most adequate basis for rights, it is at least conceivable that constructivism 
could generate principles that are incompatible with rights. We might, for 
example, choose principles that involve maximizing the overall welfare of 
a society, rather than ensuring the autonomous pursual of individuals' 
projects. We would then be employing a non-utilitarian second-order 
theory to explain consequentialist first-order principles. But, alternatively, 
we could use a utilitarian ground-theory to justify rights, and in chapter 3 I 
shall discuss two such theories3.
Whilst these orders are logically distinct there are, nevertheless, 
causal relations between them. The character of rights will fit better with 
certain second-order moral theories than with others. Nevertheless, the 
argument is informal and, as such, it is difficult to provide a knock-down 
argument against, for example, utilitarianism as a justificatory (second 
order) theory. What we have to say is that one theory is more adequate to 
the task of justification than another, where adequacy cannot be a purely 
formal concept4. What must be avoided is a tendentious argument for 
conceptualizing rights in one way rather than another, such that rights are
3Those of HARDIN and HARE (2).
4I adopt the methodology of theory competition, whereby one theory is inductively, rather 
than deductively, held to be superior. Adequacy of a second-order theory will be, in part, 
determined by the first-order theory (the conceptual analysis) that I present in this chapter. 
So, for example, if as I argue, rights imply a conception of tire agent as "autonomous" or "self­
forming", then a second-order theory that stresses autonomy as a foundational concept in the 
generation of moral validity is likely to be more adequate to the task of grounding that first- 
order theory of rights. Of course, the suspicion is that we have intuitions about human 
autonomy that are basic and this explains both the first-order and the second-order. This is a 
charge that I am keen to resist.
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bound to fit better with constructivism than with intuitionism or 
utilitarianism.
I stress the distinction between a first-order and a second-order theory 
of rights in order to explain what the purpose of this chapter is, in contrast 
to chapters 2 and 3 .1 am concerned here to analyse the content and internal 
structure of rights. What do we mean when we talk of rights? Can there be 
a single concept? What is presupposed about the nature of the person who 
has rights? To avoid tailoring my conception of rights to constructivism I 
base my claims on the need to develop an account of rights that presents the 
practice as coherent, inclusive and non-redundant, ie. I appeal to formal 
principles in my conceptual analysis5. Coherence should be clear—different 
claims about rights must be mutually consistent. Inclusivity means that we 
have to account for the full range of different rights, that is, powers, 
liberties, claims and immunities. Non-redundancy entails the idea that 
rights must serve a purpose not fulfilled by any other principles, where this 
does not, of course, mean that rights cannot be fitted in with other 
principles to form a unified ethical regime (indeed, as I shall aigue in 
chapter 7 the support that rights provide for other ethico-political principles 
is one of the strongest arguments in favour of advancing rights as a 
fundamental principle of a rational society6).
I believe that a prerequisite for the moral grounding of rights is a 
clear conceptual grasp of their nature. But here we face a problem. As 
L.W.Sumner has argued, there is an increasing reliance upon rights in the 
settling of moral disputes, this being akin to an arms race7. If one party 
makes a claim to rights then other protagonists feel that they must counter
5By "formal", I mean theoretical principles that any reasonable theory must respect
6See section 7.4.
7SUMNER, pp.1-7.
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this with their own rights-claims. A consequence is that the value and 
coherence of rights is threatened. We appear to have problems connecting 
together the rights of, for example, children, with the rights of, say, traders 
in a free market, or to take another example, the rights of animals with the 
right to free speech. It is not so much that these rights conflict—although 
they may—but rather we are not sure that we are talking about the same 
general principle across the range of different usages. The range of usage is 
just too diverse.
It is this worry which leads me to attempt a reconstruction of the 
concept of a right. Whilst rights are not simple, atomic, or unitary in form, 
it might still be possible to find an underlying semantic core which binds 
them together into a system. I shall approach the concept of a right through 
the dassificatory system of Hohfeld8. Whilst this is an orthodox approach it 
is also justified on the grounds that Hohfeld7s work remains the clearest 
analysis of the different forms of rights. However, a difficulty with 
Hohfeld's work is that he never attempted to develop a theory which 
would explain the underlying unity of these different forms, beyond the 
assertion that they were all "legal advantages". In order to develop such a 
theory I shall critically consider the work of Bentham, Hart and a group of 
theorists who have developed what I term the "autonomy account" of 
r ig h ts9. I shall argue that the autonomy account offers the "best 
interpretation" of what it means to have a right.
In section 1.1 I outline Hohfeld’s scheme as a way of illustrating the 
complexity of the practice of rights. Hohfeld was concerned with legal rights 
but I don't intend it to be understood that my concern is exclusively with
8h o h f e l d .
9MacCORMICK (1M3); RAZ (4): RAZ (5), ch.7: WELLMAN (1) & (2).
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legal rights. It does, however, seem to me that rights are best approached— 
heuristically speaking—as a juridical concept, and as such I don't believe 
that Hohfeld's analysis can be improved upon10. In sections 1.2,1.3 and 1.4 I 
discuss three theories that attempt to provide an explanatory core to the 
diverse forms that Hohfeld set out—benefit theory, w ill theory and 
autonomy theory. Whereas Hohfeld was concerned to analyse rights w e can 
say that these three theories attempt to synthesize rights by showing how  
they form a single ethical practice. In section 1.5 I shall set out what I believe 
to be the implications of my conceptual analysis and how this will affect the 
question of the grounding of rights, that being the essential concern of this 
thesis.
1®There are many types of right—moral rights, legal rights, positive rights, human rights, 
natural rights. Since this is a work in political philosophy I think it makes sense to take 
legal rights as the model for a conceptual reconstruction of rights in general. Political 
philosophy is concerned, in large part, with explaining the individual's obligation to obey 
the state (including its legal institutions) and, therefore, those rights which are not 
themselves legal rights (ie. are "moral" or "normative" rights) can be interpreted as rights 
that ought to be entrenched in a legal system. "Legality" should be interpreted widely to 
include civil and criminal law and aspects of government policy.
18
1.1: The Complexity of Rights
There are several advantages in beginning with Hohfeld. Firstly, as a 
legal theorist his analysis is based upon a study of the actual practice of 
rights, ie. rights in a legal system, and this provides a basis from which to 
reconstruct the concept of a right(s). Secondly, he approached his subject 
matter independently of a commitment to a substantive moral theory. This 
means that certain rights are included in his scheme, such as immunities, 
that were excluded by, for example, Bentham11. The limitation of Hohfeld's 
approach is his failure to theorize beyond his "fundamental legal 
conceptions", and to develop a substantive theory of the content of rights, 
understood as a single system.
For Hohfeld there are four forms of rights but eight fundamental 
legal conceptions. The eight conceptions arise because Hohfeld regarded 
rights as relations, and there exist two types of relationship: correlation and 
o p p o sitio n 12. The jural opposite of a right is the legal position that is 
necessarily excluded by having a right, so one cannot, for example, have 
both a power and a liability with regard to the same action. The jural 
correlative is the legal position that is necessarily imposed upon another, 
eg. if I have a claim-right then somebody else (an individual or group) must 
have a duty. The four forms, and eight conceptions, can best be illustrated 
by reproducing Hohfeld's table13:
11Bentham excluded immunities because they were inconsistent with his utilitarian moral 
theory and imperativist legal model.
12HOHFELD, p.20.
13HOHFELD, p.22.
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jural claim
opposities: no-claim
clai privilege power im m unity
duty disability liability
jural claim
correlatives: duty
privilege power im m unity
no-claim liability disability
I have substituted the term "claim" for what Hohfeld referred to as a right. 
Hohfeld regarded all the four forms as rights, but a claim he regarded as a
the other forms and I think that it would be confusing to follow his practice 
in this respect.
Let us now consider the particular forms in the table. To possess a 
claim is to stand in a position to legitimately demand something from 
another. The other is under a duty to perform the demanded action. The 
clearest example is the generation of a claim-right as the result of a contract. 
If I have, for example, entered into an agreement with an airline company 
that they supply me with a seat on a particular aeroplane as a consequence 
of my purchasing a ticket from them, then I have a claim to that place on 
that aeroplane and they have a duty to supply it.
Claim-rights need not, however, be the product of a contract. I think 
that it is legitimate to say that the state has a duty to protect its citizens from 
(potential) breaches of the law, insofar as it is able to do so. That is, the 
police cannot be indifferent to those who are (potential) victims of crime. 
As a citizen I do not have a claim to personal protection15, but I can
right "proper"14. Yet he offers no justification for elevating a claim above
14HOHFELD, p.38.
15I do not normally have a claim to personal protection. Obviously, if I am the victim of 
specific threats to my life or property then I—as a citizen—can claim personal protection. But
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demand a prima facie equal "share" of the often indivisible protection 
provided by the state. The state is under a prima facie duty to provide this.
The claim to a level of protection must be distinguished from what 
the claim protects. My liberty to walk down the street without being 
assaulted is strengthened by having a claim-right to protection, but the 
liberty is distinct from the claim. Although the liberty may give rise 
"functionally" to the claim, ie. the claim functions to protect the liberty, 
there does not exist a logical relationship between the liberty and the claim, 
or its correlative duty. Nevertheless, this raises a problem for Hohfeld's 
scheme, the discussion of which will lead me into a consideration of the 
second form of rights: privileges (or liberties).
It has been argued that whilst a claim can stand on its own, a liberty is 
not in any meaningful sense self-subsistent. My having a liberty to do X 
entails, it is claimed, nothing more than that I am under no obligation not 
to do X, which means that I could be forced to do X whilst also having a 
liberty to do X16. The argument against liberties being rights is that they do 
not entail a duty on the part of another to refrain from making the "right­
holder" do what he doesn't wish to do, so my liberty-right to do X does not 
mean that another person is under a duty not to interfere with my doing X. 
All that is entailed on the part of the other is that he cannot claim that I am 
under a duty not to do X whilst accepting that I have a liberty-right to do X: 
liberties block duties. A world in which the only principles that are
this is not a special privilege, for all should be able to daim this protection under similar 
circumstances.
16See COHEN, p.9. See also DWORKIN (2), p.269. Dworkin argues that there can be no 
right to liberty since there must necessarily be a huge number of cases where other rights (or 
non-rights principles) override the right to liberty. We may, of course, have certain liberties 
protected, but these are not "pure" liberties but rather claim-rights or immunities.
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operative are liberties would be a world of (potentially) pure conflict17. If 
liberties do entail a "duty not to interfere" then it must be because there has 
been imposed upon others a duty corresponding to the claim-right of the 
right-holder and not his liberty. In other words, the liberty is a good that is 
secured through rights, rather than being a description of the structure of a 
right. Nevertheless, given that liberties preclude duties it may be the case 
that they are not meaningless in a world in which other types of right also 
exist. It is at this point that we need to note Hohfeld's terminology, for 
whereas I have rather casually talked of "liberties", as if they were 
interchangeable with "privileges", the latter term has a connotation lacking 
in the former18. A liberty seems just to entail that area of human conduct in 
which the law is silent, whereas a privilege implies a "gap" in the system of 
prohibitive laws. So, for example, there exists a general right to a good 
reputation which is legally protected by the power to go to law and sue for 
libel or slander should somebody make an unfounded and damaging attack. 
Yet there exist exceptions to this general right. In Britain, a Member of 
Parliament has the freedom to make allegations about others (who are not 
MPs) and the persons so accused have no claim against the MP not to so act, 
and they have no power to take that MP to law. But this is a rather special 
privilege, limited as it is to a small group of people, and, indeed, the MPs' 
privilege could be better described as an immunity that blocks the powers of 
others to take legal action. What we need is an example of a general 
privilege.
1 ^ Thomas Hobbes characterized the "state of nature" as a place where each person had a 
right to liberty, and although he didn't paint an attractive picture of this situation neither 
did he consider pure liberty-rights to be a meaningless concept. But perhaps the significance 
of Hobbesian liberties lies in their operation in political society, ie. after we have left the 
state of nature. Liberties are a necessary element of the bargaining process that we engage in 
to bring about political society (individuals must have something to bargain with). See, 
HOBBES, chs.13 & 14. MARSHALL argues (pp.231-2) that there can be no rights in the state 
of nature because there can be no rules of arbitration that could generate obligations. I agree 
with him insofar as this is a criticism of natural rights, but once we are in a political society 
then it is possible to abstract pure liberties from dainvrights.
18HOHFELD, p.45.
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An example of a general privilege would be the idea of being free to 
act within a private sphere. In a liberal society there exists the concept of a 
private space—often defined in terms of a physical space—in which a person 
may do things that would be prohibited outside of that space. The right to 
express inflammatory racist opinions19, or the right to engage in certain 
sexual acts, are privilege-rights. Everybody has a right to privacy but the 
action protected by that privilege is normally prohibited, ie. in the space 
which is not "private". Of course, the notion of a private sphere implies 
that there are claim-rights that protect the person in the enjoyment of it. 
But this seems to me to imply the notion that rights in practice are not 
simple and atomic, but complex and molecular20. This, however, is true of 
all the Hohfeldian forms and not just privileges.
The third form of a right is a power, A power is one's affirmative 
control over a given legal relation to another. To be that other is to stand in 
such a way as to be liable to have one's legal position changed. The act of 
marriage, as a civil legal procedure involves the (mutual) exercise of 
powers. The "contracting” parties, through their actions, alter their legal 
relationship to one another and also their legal relationship to those 
outside the contract. Nobody else can marry one of the parties unless 
powers of annulment are first used, and the parties gain taxation benefits 
and so alter their relationship to the state.
A power can be thought of as operating on a different level to a 
claim. This is because it is through the exercise of powers that many claim-
19Inflammatory radst opinions would not presumably be inflammatory within a private 
sphere, so it would be more accurate to say that such opinions would tend to cause violence if 
expressed in the public sphere.
20See chapter 1, footnote no.58.
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rights are created and extinguished. Hohfeld did not, however, make clear 
this distinction between the levels, and so it is uncertain what the 
relationship between powers and claims are within his scheme. This is, 
however, just one example of the general absence of a basic theory that 
could connect together the various forms.
Finally, to possess an immunity is to be in a position to resist the 
powers of others. Immunities exist, most often, where there are different 
levels of legal authority, such as a legislative authority that creates and 
destroys rights, and a judicial authority that upholds a written constitution. 
The immunities contained in a constitution exist to insulate the individual 
from the law-making powers of the legislature. These rights are often, 
misleadingly, referred to as ’’fundamental liberties” but must, in fact, be 
immunities, since liberties are not intrinsically resistant to alteration as a 
result of legislative action21. A legislature has the power to create or destroy 
liberties and claims, but not immunities; immunities "trump” powers.
As I have suggested, Hohfeld is an excellent starting point in the 
clarification of the concept of rights, but his analysis provides no guidance 
on the question of the unity of the scheme as a whole. After all, we can ask 
why Hohfeld groups the eight fundamental legal conceptions together? One 
line of response suggests itself quite quickly and it is that ownership in a 
thing entails a range of different types of rights. Take the example of the 
private ownership of a house, whilst we talk of person A's right to, or in, 
property X, as if he had a single right, this is, in fact, a cluster of Hohfeldian 
forms. A has exercised his powers through contract and acquired a title in 
the house. If he wishes to dispose of the property, ie. extinguish his claim-
21Immunities, like liberties, are parasitic upon the existence of other types of rights. In the 
case of immunities there must exist agents who have powers, such that immunities are 
essentially defensive "bulwarks" against the exercise of those powers.
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right to it, then he must once again exerdse his powers. A has a privilege to 
make alterations to the house which others lack. In buying, and hence 
exercising his powers, the owner acquires claims against others to refrain 
from interfering in the property. If the "right" to private property is 
entrenched in a charter of rights then A can be said to have immunities. 
This would protect A from, say, the introduction of legislation to seize the 
property in an arbitary way and without adequate compensation.
Karl Olivecrona has argued that rights have only two, relatively 
weak, functions. These he calls the "directive function" and the 
"informative function"22. He argues that rights are useful devices for 
gathering together disparate rules and requirements. As such they present 
themselves as relatively simple principles that can, so to speak, be easily 
digested. A's right to property X directs others to "keep out!" in a way that 
would not be possible if we had to list a series of different principles23. 
Rights can also inform. If A owns a house then we can assume that he has 
some control over that house. I know that I will need A's cooperation if I 
wish to buy the house. The right informs me in a way which a set of more 
complicated rules could not24.
I shall, contra Olivecrona, maintain that rights are more than 
convenient tags that guide and inform and yet are essentially redudble to a 
set of more complicated rules. In part, this requires a consideration of wider, 
non-conceptual, questions, but it also depends upon an analysis of the 
meaning of a right. To this end I shall consider three accounts that attempt 
to unify the disparate Hohfeldian forms: the benefit account, the will 
account, and the autonomy account. Benefit theory states that to have a
22OUVECRONA, pp.187-99.
23OLIVECRONA, pp.193-95.
^OLIVECRONA, p.194.
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right is to be the intended beneficiary of a legally-enforced duty. Will theory 
claims that to have a right one must be in a position to control the action of 
another by having the choice of either enforcing or else waiving the 
performance of a duty. Autonomy theory states that having a right 
involves, either, the direct exercise of one's legal powers, or else, being the 
intended beneficiary of a duty that if fulfilled would promote that capacity 
to exercise one's powers. I shall begin with a consideration of the benefit 
account (also known as the "interest account"), based upon an 
interpretation of the work of the leading benefit theorist: Jeremy 
Bentham25.
1.2: Benefit Account
Like Hohfeld, Bentham was concerned with "general jurisprudence": 
the reconstruction of the concept of a right as a general principle26. Again, 
like Hohfeld, he saw the genus of the concept of a right as a legal 
advantage27. But, unlike Hohfeld, he was much more explicit about the 
nature of this legal advantage. Bentham argued that to have a right was to 
be the beneficiary of another's legally-enforced duty. Furthermore, all 
duties, with two exceptions, entail rights28. We can say, therefore, that 
duties are primary and rights are secondary; rights are the consequence of
^Bentham’s discussion of the nature of rights is scattered across a variety of works, the most 
significant being BENTHAM (l)/(2). The reconstruction of Bentham’s theory was undertaken 
by H.L.A.Hart and his arguments are collected together in HART (3)(Chapter 8 "Legal 
Rights" is of particular relevance to the present discussion). Whilst Hart is critical of what 
he terms the benefit theory of rights, his reconstruction is I believe fair and sympathetic, 
and given the difficulties of piecing together Bentham’s argument I have largely followed 
Hart’s interpretation.
26HART (3), p.164.
27That is, a right is a beneficial enforced service. BENTHAM (1), ch.16, para.25; 
BENTHAM (2), p58.
28The two exceptions are self-regarding duties and duties that bring no benefit to anybody. 
BENTHAM (1), ch.16, para.25, footnote e2; BENTHAM (2), p.220.
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the fulfilment of a duty. This requires elaboration, and I follow Hart's 
reconstruction of Bentham's theory of rights. It should be borne in mind 
that what we are concerned with is how well the benefit theory accounts for 
the full range of Hohfeldian rights, so that a test of the adequacy of the 
theory is that all four forms can be fitted into a single unifying scheme.
First of all, we need to say something about the concept of a duty, for 
this is fundamental to the benefit account. Duties, argues Bentham, may 
require a "negative service" or a "positive service"29. The former is an 
abstention from a hurtful action, whilst the latter is a requirement to do 
something. As Lars Lindahl has argued, the prohibition on doing an act X is 
equivalent to the requirement to do Y. To be prohibited from doing X 
means that you are required not to do X, and to be required to do Y means 
that you are prohibited from not doing Y30. So Bentham's reduction of 
negative and positive services to a single type of duty is, I think, coherent.
Let us then begin with privileges. As I have argued these are 
problematical in that they do not correlate with any duties. For Bentham, 
privileges were based upon "active permissions", "inactive permissions", 
or upon "legal silence"31. We can ignore the third case for that is the idea of 
a privilege as simply the absence of a duty. The other two imply the notion 
of a sovereign permitting an action through a command. But in order for a 
privilege to be reducible to a duty it must entail a duty upon another. The 
duty on person A might be that he "should not impose an obligation to act" 
on person B (ie. B has a "duty not to interfere"), but since it is the case that 
only the sovereign can impose obligations this formulation must be false. It 
seems to me that the only possible reading of Bentham's privileges is that of
29BENTHAM (2), pp.58-9.
30LINDAHL, pp.8-11.
31 BENTHAM (1), concluding note, paras.3-7.
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the idea of duties being imposed which are correlative to claims and not 
privileges. My liberty to speak freely is protected by a claim-right not to be 
interfered with in the exercise of that liberty, and those claims are the 
product of a duty imposed upon another not to so interfere.
That privileges cannot correlate to duties is, I think, a demonstration 
of the inadequacy of unprotected liberty-rights, rather than of Bentham's 
account. As I have argued, privileges, in practice, presuppose a perimeter of 
claim-rights, and these claim-rights could arise from the imposition of a 
duty not to interfere with the privileges of others. However, even if we 
were to accept that liberties are problematical for all theories of rights, 
Bentham's treatment of the other Hohfeldian forms reveals serious 
weaknesses in his account conceived as a whole. The problem lies in 
Bentham's reduction of rights to duties. That claims correlate with duties is 
not controversial, but the notion that all rights presuppose duties and that 
having rights necessarily entails being the beneficiary of an enforced duty is 
objectionable for several reasons. Firstly, many people benefit from the 
performance of a duty even when they are not in tended  to so benefit. 
Secondly, there are many duties that involve benefits which are not 
enjoyed by identifiable groups or individuals, such that it is difficult to 
identify the right-holder even where people are intended to benefit. 
Thirdly, notwithstanding the exclusion of liberty-rights, there are rights that 
simply do not correlate with duties: powers and immunities.
The question of intentionality has been addressed by David Lyons32. 
He argues that if person A is owed $500 by person B, then A can only be said 
to have a right if he receives the benefit of $500 from B. If, however, he does 
receive it, then it may be the case that A's friends C, D and E will also
32LYONS (2), pp.175-6.
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benefit. In this case it is difficult to argue that C, D and E do not also have 
claim-rights against B to the $500. Lyons advocates a "qualified" benefit 
theory in which the right-holder is that person intended (by the sovereign) 
to benefit from the performance of the duty33. This allows for the possibility 
that there may be a failure on the part of the duty-bearer to fulfil his 
obligation. It also strengthens the imperative-legal basis of Bentham's 
theory by putting the stress upon the legislative intent independently of 
the unintended consequences of a command, ie. the fact that C, D and E 
might benefit.
However, this qualification has problematical implications for 
Bentham's reduction of rights to duties. I may benefit from the enforcement 
of a duty without being identifiable as the direct beneficiary of a duty. I 
benefit from the activities of the armed forces in deterring attacks on the 
country in which I live, and I benefit from the actions of the police in 
upholding the law within the boundaries of that country. But I am not the 
intended beneficiary of a duty, and the proof of this lies, I believe, in my 
inability to go to law and demand the performance of a duty to provide 
protection (except in very special cases involving a deliberate refusal to 
provide security34). Now, whilst it is true that Bentham excludes "self- 
regarding" duties and "non-beneficial" duties from being rights-correlated, 
the above duties are neither self-regarding nor useless35. Therefore, in order 
to accomodate these non-individuated benefits w e need to make a 
distinction between benefits enjoyed by specific individuals and benefits 
enjoyed by an unidentifiable number of people. Bentham does, in fact, 
make a distinction between group rights (benefits to a community) and
33LYONS (2), p.176.
34The point is that rights are not the only principles that are operative in a legal system.
35For Bentham's discussion of "self-regarding" and "other-regarding" duties see BENTHAM 
(2) pp.57, 294; BENTHAM (1), ch.16, para.25.
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individual rights (benefits to individuals)36. But group rights still involve 
identifiability, for w e intend it that a particular group of people will benefit. 
This still leaves a dass of "non-assignable" benefits to be accounted for, and 
my view  is that these do not involve rights but rather other moral 
prindples. In other words, there is a class of duties that are neither self- 
regarding nor correlative to rights and therefore Bentham's claim that all 
other-regarding duties correlate with rights is false; rights cannot be 
accounted for in terms of duties alone.
I think that what is required is a shift from a general benefit theory to 
the idea of rights as benefiting particular individuals (or groups). Rights 
must protect the interests of selves: self-interest. This means that rights 
cannot be secondary to duties but, at least, correlative to duties. A revised 
benefit theory would maintain that a person has fundamental interests 
which require protection and this provides the rationale for the imposition 
of duties. This must be the case if we are to explain intentionality, for 
intentionality assumes there are reasons for acting in certain ways towards 
the intended individual37.
This above formulation could then be rendered compatible with both 
Bentham's imperative legal theory and his utilitarian moral theory. Agency 
would still be vested in the sovereign who must command persons to 
respect the rights of others, where others are the recipients of the benefits 
derived from the performance of rights-based duties. A right-holder is, as it 
were, at the end of the causal chain as regards agency: he will receive 
benefits whether or not he desires them. This maintains the imperative
36Actually, Bentham talks about "assignable individuals" and "unassignable individuals", 
BENTHAM (1), ch.16, para.4; and, the "semi-public" area, BENTHAM (1), ch.16, para.13.
37For a philosophical (rather than legal) discussion of intentionality, see ANSCOMBE (2); 
SEARLE (3).
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model. The modified theory is compatible with utilitarianism if we assume 
an indirect form of utilitarianism, whereby individuals are permitted to 
pursue their self-interested aims, and rights exist to stabilize the expectation 
of future gains in return for cooperation38.
The difficulty is that in this modified benefit theory the right-holder 
is cast in the role of a recipient of benefits, rather than as an agent who 
creates and extinguishes duties in others. Therefore, what Bentham's theory 
cannot explain are powers. Bentham did discuss powers, but his discussion 
of Hohfeldian powers—the ability to change the legal position of another-is 
inadequate. As Hart argues such acts are not only permitted by the law but 
are recognized by the law as having certain legal consequences39. The 
sovereign ceases to be the sole legal agent, but rather he must accept the 
legally-binding will of other legal actors. Bentham attempted to reconcile 
the exercise of powers with his imperative theory of law by interpreting 
powers as a consequence of the sovereign im posing duties with an 
"imperfect mandate"40. There are "blanks" in the duty which the power- 
holder must "fill-up" and hence render the duty determinate. But it isn't 
clear what an imperfect mandate would look like and, more importantly, 
powers are not completions of duties but rather the capacity to create new  
duties.
It might be argued that a person's powers are the result of being the 
intended beneficiary of the duty to bring it about that persons can make 
contracts. But the problem with this argument is that whilst there must be a 
general duty to create and sustain a particular kind of moral-legal system, 
Bentham's argument depends upon particular duties creating particular
38See chapter 3.
39HART (3), p.170.
40BENTHAM (2), pp.26, 80-91.
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rights. Powers do not correlate with duties—although they create duties—but 
rather they imply liabilities on others.
It may be the case that Bentham's imperative theory of law got in the 
way of developing an adequate version of the benefit theory. But I think 
that even if we were to take away these theoretical underpinnings, the 
benefit theory would still be inadequate as an explanation of the practice of 
rights. The inability to accomodate powers is serious. Powers do not entail 
the receipt of benefits but rather the ability to create duties in others. Of 
course, we receive benefits as a consequence of having powers but it is not 
the receipt of benefits that defines powers. We must avoid making benefit 
theory trivially true. All rights entail benefits since to have a legal 
advantage is to benefit, but being the recipient of a benefit is not the 
defining core of all rights.
In order to consider further the question of powers I shall now turn 
to an account which places powers at the centre of a scheme of rights:
H.L.A.Harfs will theory41. As I shall argue the strengths of Hart's account 
mirror the weaknesses of Bentham's theory and vica-versa. I believe, 
however, that a reconciliation of the two theories can be brought about and 
I shall attempt to do just that in section 1.4 where I discuss the "autonomy 
account" of rights.
I.3: Will Account
There are, I think, at least two versions of the will account of rights. 
One is based upon the notion of rights as involving a distribution of
41HART (3), pp.171-93.
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freedom, whilst the other is based upon the exercise of powers. Hart, and 
those who have discussed his work42, have tended to run together these 
versions. I believe that whilst this is easily done it is nonetheless a mistake.
In his article "Are There any Natural Rights?", Hart argued that if 
there are any natural rights there must be one: the right to equal freedom43. 
All humans have this right insofar as they are capable of choice, and the 
right is not conferred by individuals' voluntary actions. Hart argued that 
because a right entails having a moral justification for limiting the freedom 
of another person, and for determining how he should act, it presupposes 
that there is a prior, general prohibition upon interference44. Rights are 
then understood to be special exceptions (privileges) that permit the right­
holder to interfere with the actions of another.
Hart's argument is concerned with natural rights but, as Jeremy 
W aldron argues45, the implication of Hart's argument is that rights 
essentially involve the redistribution of freedom, and liberties or privileges 
are central to the scheme of rights. The tension in the argument lies in 
Hart's identification of rights as both (pure) liberties and as interferences 
with liberties. That is, my right to (an equal share of) freedom is 
presupposed by the existence of the rights of others to interfere with my 
freedom. We must then ask what a right is: the ability to interfere with the 
actions of another or a protection from such interference? The difficulty is 
that implicit in the argument is not the idea of pure liberties but of liberties 
protected by a perimeter of claim-rights. This is compatible with benefit 
theory insofar as it places freedom at the centre of human interests and
42WALDRON (3), p.95.
43HART (1), pp.77-8.
44HART (1), pp.81-2.
45WALDRON (3), p.96.
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demands that these interests be protected through the imposition of duties 
not to interfere. Therefore, the first formulation of the will theory—the 
authoritative distribution of freedom—is not distinct from benefit theory.
However, Hart goes on to introduce a distinction in that article 
which is clearly incompatible with benefit theory, and which implies an 
alternative version of the will account; one which is not concerned with 
liberties so much as with powers. The distinction is that between special 
rights and general rights46. When person A enters into a contract with 
person B there are created rights and duties between A and B. These are 
special rights, held, in personam, between determinate persons or groups, 
arising out of specific, contingent acts or events. A, as a right-holder, has 
some control over B, and can alter or extinguish B's duties. His powers are 
limited to the extent that he cannot demand more of B than B promised. 
Furthermore, if B were to insist on performing the duty despite A's waiver 
of it, B's actions would no longer be caused by A's rights—B would have 
chosen to act in beneficial ways. A general right, on the other hand, is not 
created or destroyed by people's actions or agreements, and is held in rem 
against all others. Furthermore, we can say that general rights, unlike 
special rights, are inalienable47.
It might be argued that special rights are reducible to general rights, 
or are just instances of general rights. This may be the case if general rights 
are liberty-rights or privileges. But I think that general rights are better 
understood as powers to create special rights. It is not clear, however, that 
this is what Hart intended by the term, for he talks of the correlative of a 
general right as a duty not to intefere48, and this suggests that general rights
46HART (1), pp.84-8.
47HART (1), pp.87-8.
48HART (1), p.88.
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are liberty-rights. The difficulty with such talk is that liberties cannot 
generate other rights, they are simply exemptions from a general 
prohibition, and, as I have argued, quite compatible with the benefit 
account. If, however, general rights are understood to be powers then we 
can conceive of special rights as the product of the exercise of those general 
rights. Special rights would be, primarily, claim-rights. Given this 
definition we can distinguish the first version of the will theory—rights as 
involving the redistribution of freedom—from the second version which I 
shall now elaborate upon.
After discussing Bentham's benefit account, Hart argues that in order 
to individuate the individual, we need an idea of the person as a "small- 
scale sovereign"49. Involved here are three distinguishable elements. 
Firstly, the right-holder may waive or extinguish the duty which is 
correlative to a claim-right, or demand its performance. Secondly, after 
breach of the duty the right-holder may leave it unenforced or enforce it by 
going to law. Thirdly, he may waive or extinguish the obligation to pay 
compensation or insist on payment50. Now, whilst this may appear simply 
to be a restatement of the "choice version" of rights, I believe that what is at 
the heart of this version is control.
Whilst it is true that powers involve choice and freedom, powers are 
not liberty-rights. To have a power is to be able to change legal relations, 
and to be in the correlative position is to be liable to have one's legal 
position changed. Nothing more is required to "protect" the power beyond 
the general duty to respect the law which creates powers. However, as I 
have argued, liberties do require additional protection, for a liberty to do X
49HART (3), pp.183-4.
50HART (3), p.184.
35
does not entail that another must not stop you doing X. Although Hart 
doesn't acknowledge it, what is central to the will account is the capacity to 
create and destroy daim-rights. Powers are elevated above other Hohfeldian 
forms.
One of the standard critidsms of the will account is that it permits 
persons to alienate their rights, induding their capadty to make choices51. It 
is argued that it is incoherent to advance a theory based upon the value of 
choice which allows that a person can choose to destroy his capacity for 
choice in the future. Relatedly, it is argued that the will theory cannot 
account for the practice of rights in the criminal system—rights that do not 
allow for alienation52. The difficulty with this critidsm is that it assumes 
that will theory is essentially about choice, whereas, in fact, it is about 
control. What is essential is that a person maintains control over his 
relations with others, and over his rights. Whilst powers assume a strong 
conception of agency, choice is not a part of the content of a power. 
Therefore, the critidsm is misdirected in the case of powers, for we can 
have powers as our highest-order rights without self-contradiction. What 
you could not have as your highest-order rights are (pure) liberties, for 
there must be at least one right that is higher than the liberty-right and that 
is the benefit-based right which protects one's capadty to choose. The same 
problem does not arise for powers, because a person for whom a power is 
his highest-order right could never as it were sell himself into slavery, for 
that "contractual" sale would never carry an authority higher than the 
pow er53. A person may, of course, fail to exercise his powers but that is a
51MacCORMICK (2), p.196.
52MacCORMICK (2), pp. 195-6.
53This point may need clarification. If my highest-order right is a liberty then it must be the 
case that I can choose to sell myself into slavery and if that "contract" is disallowed it must 
be because a liberty-right is not, in fact, my highest-order right—some other right exists at 
the apex of my rights or else some non-rights principle (such as the "public interest") 
overrides it. If I can, in fact, legitimately sell myself into slavery then this appears self-
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different problem, and one which I think does reveal the real difficulty with 
the will account.
The problem is that the capacity to exercise one's powers presupposes 
that there are other general rights. It is not so much that a power requires, 
in strict conceptual terms, other rights, but rather that the conception of the 
agent who exercises his powers is one of a free agent, and Hart is correct to 
stress the centrality of liberty in the earlier version that I outlined54. The 
difficulty is how we can connect together the idea of having a discretionary 
power over the performance of a duty with the notion of rights of 
recipience. In other words, the strengths and weaknesses of the will account 
are the opposite of those of the benefit account. The latter cannot account 
for powers whilst the former cannot account for non-discretionary, general 
claims. What I wish to do is to present an account which, I think, combines 
the strengths of both the benefit and will accounts in a coherent way. This I 
have termed the ’’autonomy account” because it stresses the role of the free 
exercise of will as well as the idea that the capacity for free action is 
something that we have an interest in and hence can be a ground of certain 
duties which are imposed by the state.
1.4: Autonomy Account
What will theory presumes is that the exercise of a right directly 
expresses the will of the agent. Benefit theory, on the other hand, takes
defeating, for the same right (ie. the liberty-right) will then provide a ground for valuable 
action (that is, we must assume that it is a good thing to exercise one's liberty) and for the 
denial of that value. Powers, on the other hand, cannot be destroyed because they do not 
allow for a person to sell himself into slavery since the contract itself does not destroy 
powers—I always retain the power-right to leave the state of slavery, hence I cannot, by 
definition, be a slave.
^HART (1), pp.77-8.
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rights to be protective of interests, even where the agent lacks a 
consciousness of those interests. In the benefit theory the interests of the 
agent are identified and acknowledged prior to, and independently of, the 
express will of the agent. To take an example: a child's right to education55. 
A five-year-old child has no choice over whether or not to go to school, or 
over the content of the education received once there. We still insist, 
however, on calling it a right, and this right is held against the child's 
parents and the state, even though both of these parties have a greater 
control over the good than does the child.
We might argue that children’s rights do not make sense. If we were 
to follow the will theory then this must be the conclusion. However, if we 
are to reject children’s rights then we must also reject all other general 
claim-rights, for none allow for the agent to waive the performance of the 
duty. This problem is obscured (by Hart himself) since the content of many 
claim-rights is a freedom to act. This appears to mark a distinction between 
a child's right to education, and, say, an adult's right to a freedom of 
expression. But the structure of the two rights is the same: duties are 
imposed that protect a certain interest.
The question is how such a benefit conception can accomodate 
powers, and the exercise of the will through rights. One way to reconcile the 
’’protective” rights of the benefit account with the ’’expressive’’ rights of the 
will account is to say that the goods secured though non-discretionary 
rights, such as the right to education, contribute to a person's capacity for 
will and action. Education involves the development of skills of thought, 
communication, and social confidence. To deny a person these goods is to
55MacCORMICK (1).
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undermine his interests; interests understood in terms of the long-term 
capacity for choice.
What I term the autonomy account of rights has been advanced, in
slightly different forms, by Carl Wellman, Joseph Raz, and N eil
M acCormick56. My outline draws upon their work but differs in certain
details from their accounts. Firstly, a right is a complex. Hohfeld's scheme
gives the impression that a right is a single relationship rather than
complex of relationships57, and, on one level, this is correct. That is, he is
correct insofar as we can identify particular relationships such as that of a
power-liability or daim-duty. But, in practice, rights are almost always
complex. A person's right to, say, a certain piece of property is a complex of
Hohfeldian forms. As Wellman argues:
Every right has a structure made up of a defining core, together 
with associated normative elements that confer freedom or 
control relating to that core58
In practice, to have a power, such as the power to enter into a contract,
requires certain protective claims, such as rights to non-interference in the
exercise of the power, in order for the power to be exercised effectively.
Immunities from the exerdse of legislative powers entail the protection of
other rights, such as liberties or claims.
I agree with Wellman that the "core" of the right must be unitary if 
we are to be capable of identifying rights but that the periphery of the right 
may be indeterminate59. Or, at the least, it may be difficult to identify all the
56WELLMAN (1), see especially pp.14-19; WELLMAN (2); RAZ (4); RAZ (5), ch.7; 
MacCORMICK (1); MacCORMICK (2), see especially pp.204-5; MacCORMICK (3).
57Hohfeldian rights are not simple, for a right is by Hohfeld’s definition a relation-a two- 
place relation-involving correlativity and opposition. However, his scheme does not allow 
for more complex rights—a right as a cluster of relations.
58WELLMAN (1), p.21.
59That is, it must be a single element or, if complex, the elements of the core must be 
conceptually interdependent. WELLMAN (1), pp.14-15.
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peripheral elements. The difficulty with Wellman's discussion of rights is 
that he fails to show how different complex rights fit together into a single 
scheme. He does provide some hints. He argues that rights confer 
autonomy on the right-holder vis-a-vis some (potential) adversary in a 
confrontation concerning the enjoyment of the core position60. But without 
filling out what he means by "autonomy" this appears to me to be little 
more than a sophisticated restatement of the idea of rights as legal 
advantages, and this is a highly formalistic definition of a right.
My second point is, therefore, that we need to be able to connect 
rights together, and the idea of a right as a complex helps in this respect. My 
idea is that w e should conceive of a right-holder as moving from one 
situation to another in the pursuit of certain goods which, taken together, 
form, or facilitate the pursuit of, his "self-interest". But different situations 
will require different kinds of rights (or core-elements), such that in one 
situation a power may be at the centre whilst in another a liberty is central. 
When I buy a house then powers are exercised, but when I have bought the 
house and wish to "enjoy" the property, then powers m ove to the 
periphery and claims and privileges become central (the power is still 
important, for my enjoyment depends upon being able to alienate the 
property). Furthermore, the same element can be central in one case and 
peripheral in another. Rights should then be seen as chains of inter-locking 
elements, and this connectedness requires that rights be complex and not 
simple61.
60WELLMAN (1), p.18.
61This idea bears some relation to that of the "open-texturedness" or the "essential 
contestability" of moral concepts. The latter entails the ability to identify concepts-the 
essence—and thus stands opposed to conceptual relativism, but it allows that the concept may 
not be fully determinate across different situations. See GALLIE (2), pp.171-2.
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I do not think, however, that this is sufficient to unify the 
Hohfeldian forms. We need to show how apparently diverse rights- 
elements can be reconciled. My third point is, therefore, that we should 
define what interests rights protect or facilitate. The definition is dictated to 
us by the need to reconcile highly protective rights with those rights that 
allow a high degree of discretionary action. I would argue that central to 
rights is the conception of the right-holder as a self-determining, 
autonomous agent. Many rights will protect freedom without entailing 
choice as a part of the structure of the core. This is clear in the case of claim- 
protected liberties. If these are general rights then the right-holder cannot 
alienate them and, therefore, there is no choice over whether or not to 
have the right. Many rights in the criminal law take this form. Other rights, 
such as children's rights, do not specify a liberty as the content of the right, 
but nevertheless these rights facilitate the exercise of autonomy at a later 
stage in the right-holder's life.
Children's rights do raise a special difficulty. Many public policies 
may promote the capacity for autonomy, but we do not maintain that all 
such policies entail the attribution of rights. So, fourthly, we can say that 
protective rights must, in some sense, be intended to benefit an identifiable 
individual in virtue of that person's need for freedom. As MacCormick has 
argued w e may promote the good of children in the same way that we 
promote "the good" of turkeys when we fatten them up for Christmas62. 
And, clearly, there are non-individualized benefits entailed in the 
education of children, such as the need to create law-abiding citizens and 
reproduce a particular culture. This is not incompatible with saying that a 
part of the good of education can be expressed in terms of the rights of 
children.
62MacCORMICK (1), p310.
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Fifthly, w e need to distinguish between rights that determine what 
w e may do (have a permission to do) and rights that determine what it is 
possible to do. An autonomous agent needs to be in a position to create new  
rights if he is not to be cast in the role of a recipient alone. Powers are best 
understood as those rights which allow us to manipulate other rights- 
relations. Raz argues for a distinction between ’’core" and "derivative” 
rights (where he uses the term core in a slightly different way to 
Wellman63), but I take this to be a distinction between power-based rights 
and claim-based rights.
The above distinction differs from the will account distinction of 
powers and other rights in two ways. In the first place, it doesn't accord an 
exclusive authority to powers, for there are general claims and immunities 
and these will support the conception of the agent as capable of exercising 
powers. In the second place, powers are exercised within the context of a 
model of the right-holder as possessing certain inalienable interests. Will 
theory, in its crudest form, appears to assume that the agent is the sole 
arbiter of his interests.
To summarize, we can say that the autonomy account of rights has 
five features. Firstly, a right is complex. It has a core that defines the nature 
of the right in a particular situation and, necessarily, a supporting 
periphery. Secondly, this complexity allows us to talk of connections 
between different rights. The core in one situation is peripheral in another. 
Thirdly, the unity and connectedness of rights is dependent upon a certain 
conception of the right-holder as a free agent. Fourthly, rights which do not 
in themselves entail the exercise of free choice must nonetheless entail the
63RAZ (4), pp.197-9.
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idea that the right-holder is intended to benefit in such a way as to promote 
his long-term capacity for autonomy. Fifthly, we must distinguish between 
what is allowed and what is possible, and the recognition of the distinctive 
role of powers is crucial here.
1.5: Implications
There are, I believe, several implications for the conception of the 
self that has rights contained in the autonomy account. I shall focus upon 
four: the distance that is assumed between a self and its ends; relatedly, an 
essentially instrumental attitude towards one's rights; the assumption of 
agent-relativism; and, finally, the conception that the self must have of 
itself as an enduring being. I conclude with a comment on the relationship 
between the first-order conceptual analysis that I have presented in this 
chapter and the three second-order justificatory theories that I shall discuss 
in chapters 2 and 3.
Presupposed in the autonomy account that I have presented is the 
idea of the self as distinct from its ends. More particularly, it is assumed that 
the self is capable of alienating its ends. The claim that a system of rights 
must contain alienable special rights and inalienable general rights, and the 
distinction made at the end of the last section between rights which define 
what is permissable and rights which determine what is possible support 
the notion of a distancing of a person from the objects of his preferences. If I 
am to be an agent who can manipulate objects and relations, and retain 
autonomy vis-a-vis  those objects and relations, then I require alienable 
special rights and inalienable general rights. For example, if I am to acquire 
a piece of property then I require general rights of acquisition (powers
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supported by protected liberties and claims), and special rights in that 
particular property. If I had no special rights, then to buy that property 
would require that I have general rights in that particular thing, and this is, 
of course, counter-intuitive. What is more it tends to undermine 
autonomy.
To further illustrate my point, we could imagine a society in which 
there existed only general rights to things. In such a society there could be 
scope for free action and a certain distancing of the self from its ends, but 
there would be severe limits. Take, for example, the general right to freely 
associate with others. In a liberal society individuals can join political 
parties and promote certain policies. But the exercise of this right actually 
entails the exercise of powers as well as general liberties. If I were to join the 
Labour Party then this precludes me from joining the Conservatives, or 
campaigning for a Conservative candidate against an official Labour 
candidate. When I join a party I create a special right between myself and 
that organization, and the proof lies in the fact that I could not make a case 
in law against that party if they expel me for campaigning on behalf of an 
opposing party, but there are, nevertheless, other situations in which I 
might be unfairly and illegally expelled. Now, in a society in which no 
special rights existed such a relationship could not come about.
The distance which is assumed to exist between a self and its ends 
im plies that the axiological relationship of that self to its rights is 
instrumental. Rights are goods64 but these goods are assumed to be of 
merely instrumental value. They are means to an end. In Rawls's language
64As goods, rights have a double-structure. There are goods such as freedom, opportunity, 
welfare etc., and these exist independently of rights-relations. In addition, there is the 
authoritative distribution of these goods which adds a moral dimension (and perhaps a 
legal dimension if we are also talking of legal rights). This distinction will be important in 
my defence of constructivism as the basis of rights.
44
rights are primary goods which are assumed to be of use for the realization 
of a multiplicity of different ends65. Autonomy cannot, therefore, be 
conceptualized as an end-in-itself. What is assumed, however, is that 
persons are capable of forming projects which are to be pursued through the 
exercise of rights.
The third implication of the autonomy account of rights is that 
persons have certain agent-relative values which they are permitted to act 
upon. In other words, rights involve the "moralization" of certain 
preferences. Rights allow a person to favour his friends over strangers; to 
pursue one career rather than another; to subscribe to one set of beliefs 
rather than a different set, and so on. Of course, persons can act in the 
interests of others through rights, but we assume that the value of any 
project is generated relative to the right-holding agent. This raises some 
very difficult issues concerning the nature of self-interest which I shall 
discuss in chapter 4. The general point is that rights are associated with self- 
interest but this does not entail that the ends a person pursues are arbitary 
or that agent-relative values are subjective66. It is assumed that there is a 
mode or relation of activity to the world expressed in rights even if rights 
do not assume a conception of the good in the sense of particular ends that 
are objectively valuable for all agents.
The final aspect of rights that I wish to discuss is the idea of the 
endurance of the self over time. If we are going to define rights in terms of 
autonomy then we need to be able to account for rights which allow no 
scope for choice, such as a child's right to education. What we have to say is
65RAWLS (2), p.92.
fact, as I shall argue we must maintain that agent-relative values are objective. My ends 
may be relative-to-me such that they need not be ends-for-others, but those ends can be 
recognized as valid-for-me from a third-person standpoint.
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that the benefits of such rights will not be immediately realized, but will 
only emerge over the course of a person's life. We could describe such 
rights as "investment goods". And furthermore, the benefits will not be 
realized at a single time but spread over the temporal extent of a person's 
life67.
It must be the case that a person can accept that non-discretionary 
claim-rights such as the right to education support his capacity for free 
action68. Clearly, we do not assume that children so perceive the right, but 
w e should assume that the adult can accept (tenselessly) his right to 
education. In other words, I no longer have a right to go to school, but the 
person that I was at the age of five with whom I am identical, had the right. 
If w e eliminate the use of tenses, it can be said that I, as an adult, have the 
rights of a child. I recognize that those rights support my capacity for free 
action. Clearly, this argument presupposes that I am, in some sense, 
identical with the person who had the property of being a five-year old 
child69.
What I claim, in conclusion, is that this is the best interpretation of 
rights as they are practised in a Western, liberal society. By "best 
interpretation" I mean that which explains the underlying unity of what 
appear to be diverse principles. The task now is to see whether we can find
67It may be asked what the status of animal rights are in the autonomy account, since non­
human animals cannot be assumed to have a conception of themselves as enduring through 
time. I do not think that animal rights are coherent. People do have moral attitudes towards 
animals and these are not non-sensical. But the fact that we have duties towards animals 
does not mean that animals have correlative rights, since we have rejected the view that all 
duties correlate to rights. Duties towards animals may derive from a certain moral code that 
forbids cruelty, so that those who engage in, say, fox-hunting are to be condemned for 
engaging in a practice that undermines the fox-hunter's moral sense.
68Clearly, this suggests that both needs and wants enter into the autonomy account of rights. 
For a discussion of the concept of "need" as it impinges upon the present discussion, see 
WIGGINS (2), pp.31-49; THOMSON (1), pp.70-2 & chapter 5.
69I discuss the problem of personal identity in chapter 5.
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grounds for accepting the legitimacy of the practice of rights. That is, are 
there reasons behind the factidty of respect for rights? Furthermore, how  
are we to decide which second-order theory is the best account of our moral 
rationality as it operates in the practice of rights? Clearly, given the nature 
of rights any second-order theory must account for the role of the self and 
self-interest in the exercise of rights, and show how this is compatible with 
the requirements of morality.
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Chapter 2
Constructivism and Intuitionism
In Chapter 1 I was concerned with analysing the nature, or internal 
structure, of rights. This is a prerequisite for a discussion of the moral 
foundations of rights, for we can only describe rights as rationally grounded 
if the term ’’rights" refers to a distinct practice. My attention in the 
remainder of Part I (chapters 2 and 3) is to outline three second-order, or 
justificatory, theories that attempt to explain how rights create reasons to act 
in certain ways, ie. why those under an obligation to a right-holder should 
accept that this provides them with reason(s) to fulfil those obligations. 
Now, just as there are writers who challenge the notion that rights form a 
coherent system, so there are theorists who question the idea of 
foundations. They would argue that rights just exist in some societies and 
that w e cannot stand back from our social practices and question their 
validity1. The assumption underlying this dissertation is that this view  is 
false and that by offering a second-order grounding for rights it will be 
shown to be so.
I w ill d iscuss three second-order theories—constructivism , 
intuitionism, and utilitarianism. The first two are best approached together 
for reasons that should become clear, whilst utilitarianism will be discussed 
separately (in chapter 3). It should be said that my comments concerning 
constructivism are limited to setting out the nature of the theory as a way of 
bringing out the features of the other theories. My aim is to provide a 
critique of those other theories, and to postpone discussion of the problems 
associated with constructivism to Parts II and HI. As I made clear in the 
"introduction" this thesis is a defence of constructivism as the best available
1See, for example, RORTY (3), particularly the "introduction".
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grounding for rights and so the dissertation as a whole should be seen as an 
exploration of constructivism, and the comments in this chapter are an 
introduction thereto.
We can begin our discussion with the following question: if it is 
maintained that rights justifiably permit certain kinds of action, is it 
possible to explain how they are justified in a way which doesn't make 
appeal to further moral claims that must, in turn, be defended as valid? 
Intuitionism can be defined as that theory which asserts that at a basic level 
our moral world is "given": we must simply accept the truth of our claims. 
Intutionism does not appeal to the fact of belief—a widespread belief being 
necessarily true in virtue of it being a widespread belief—but it must, 
nevertheless, hold to the view that we cannot theorize beyond the 
phenomena which confront our moral consciousness. Constructivism, on 
the other hand, rejects the notion that as agents w e are faced with an 
antecedent moral reality. Rather, we can ground rights via a procedure that 
incorporates certain special non-moral facts; facts about the nature of self 
and society.
My reason for discussing these two theories together is that both 
intuitionist and constructivist elements can be found within what purports 
to be the same theory2 (or the same first-order moral theory)—indeed, as I 
shall argue it is very difficult in defending constructivism not to fall into 
the trap of appealing to "moral intuitions". In this chapter I shall focus 
particularly upon the arguments of John Rawls3. Rawls has offered both the 
clearest statement of constructivism in its contemporary form and yet also
2See section 2.2 for a discussion of the different forms of intuitionism. Rawls is intuitionist in 
one particular regard.
3I concentrate on Rawls’s arguments in RAWLS (2) (A Theory of Justice) and in subsequent 
articles (RAWLS (3)-(13)).
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the most sophisticated argument for intuitionism (in at least one of its 
forms), although I think he would deny that his arguments are 
intuitionist4. Both elements are apparent in his writings from A Theory of 
Justice onwards. It will not be my aim to engage in a detailed exegesis of his 
work but rather to focus upon a few closely-related themes5. In particular, I 
am interested in the role of the self in the grounding of a theory of rights.
What I aim to show is, firstly, that there exists a cogent distinction 
between intuitionism and constructivism. Secondly, this distinction, in 
large part, turns upon the role played by a concept of the self in the 
grounding of rights. Thirdly, intuitionism and constructivism are rival, 
and hence incompatible, theories. Finally, intuitionism is incapable of 
providing a rational basis for rights in a way which does justice to our sense 
of what we mean by the term MrationaT.
In section 2.1 I outline what I understand by the term  
Mconstructivism M, g iv ing due consideration to the "Kantian” and 
”Rawlsian” variants, and in section 2.2 I do likewise with "intuitionism". I 
argue that a fundamental distinguishing characteristic of constructivism  
v is-a -v is  intuitionism is the important role that the "self" plays in the 
derivation of moral principles, such as rights, in the former, and its marked 
absence in the latter. I argue that it is the perceived metaphysical problems 
associated with defending constructivism that have led theorists such as 
Rawls to shift to a position that I define as intuitionist. In section 2.3 I 
discuss "Rawlsian intuitionism" as it is expressed in the idea of an 
overlapping consensus. This comes very close to a "modus vivendi" and in
4In RAWLS (2) he contrasts his constructivist arguments with those of an intuitionist, see 
pp34-40. Nevertheless at many points in his argument he does make appeal to intuitions.
5 As a general observation Rawls has tended to emphasize the intuitionist elements in his 
later work, see particularly, RAWLS (8). For a discussion of the changes in Rawls's work see 
HAMPTON; O'NEILL.
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section 2.4 I discuss the reasons why Rawls doesn’t simply defend principles 
such as rights by a straightforward appeal to a "modus vivendi". Finally, in 
section 2.5 I consider the relationship between intuitionism and pluralism. 
I argue that the key to understanding the inadequacy of intuitionism lies in 
its treatment of the idea of a world of plural values.
2.1: Constructivism
Constructivism entails the claim that we do not need to—and ought 
not to—appeal to an antecedently-given moral reality in order to ground 
rights, but rather "we" construct the principles that we accept as binding 
upon "us"6. We can follow the Wittgensteinian idea of reaching "rock- 
bottom" in our beliefs7. Whereas rock-bottom is for an intuitionist formed 
by certain fundamental moral ideas, eg. a prohibition upon slavery, for a 
constructivist rock-bottom is not reached within the moral realm. Rather, 
w e appeal to certain fundamental non-moral ideas, principally a conception 
of the self, and through a certain kind of procedure generate—or construct— 
principles.
Whilst constructivism eschews any appeal to an antecedent moral 
reality, it must be the case that to generate rights, or other ethical forms, 
persons possess a "moral sense". To have a moral sense is not to be moved 
by substantive principles—ie. it is not to have intuitions about moral 
rightness—but to recognize the general form of a moral statement8. To 
expand on this a little it can be said that rights have a form and a content,
6"We" will be defined later in this section. It is of fundamental importance to my defence of 
constructivism that we have a model of the human agent (or class of human agents).
7WITTGENSTEIN (3), propositions 245-248.
8This contrasts with an intuitionist moral sense, such as that advanced by G.E.Moore 
(MOORE, p.218).
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and my discussion in chapter 1 was concerned with both form and content. 
The form of rights consists in certain properties shared by all other moral 
principles. I believe that there are five-universality, impersonality, 
publicity, motivational efficacy and overridingness9.
A person armed with a moral sense will recognize that certain 
statements could not possibly pass as moral. If I claimed that "nobody 
should interfere in person A's doing X" but then asserted that I was exempt 
from that requirement not to intefere I would be breaking the univerality  
requirement10. Any statement that made reference to a particular person 
could be universalized but would be inconsistent with the impersonality 
requirement. Furthermore, I must be prepared to render explicit my claims, 
and this publicity requirement follows from the need for a moral principle 
to be universal and impersonal11. I must also recognize that a moral 
statement is practical; it is an action-guiding directive. I follow Richard Hare 
by arguing that a moral claim is an imperative, by which it is meant that it 
is concerned with affecting the behaviour of another person (or persons) 
rather than stating something about an object in the world12. However, an 
imperative is not in itself moral so we must conjoin the requirement of 
practical efficacy with the other three requirements of universality, 
impersonality and publicity in order to arrive at the fifth characteristic of a 
moral statement—overridingness. That is, morality overrides self-interest.
9Rawls uses the term in the stronger sense of a commitment to particular virtues (or the 
possession of those virtues), such as guilt, shame, remorse, regret and indignation (RAWLS 
(2), p.485). This is different to, but not incompatible with, my definition. What is important 
is that we distinguish between these emotions and their objects. Of course, this abstraction 
must be analytical, for emotions are always tied to objects. See my discussion of the relation 
between desire and object, section 42.
10It should be said that this is a pritna facie requirement, and as such, exemptions would be 
allowed, although adequate reasons would have to be given, ie. in seeking an exemption I 
must already acknowledge the prima facie bindingness of a moral statement (including its 
universality).
11 My discussion follows roughly the definition of morality advanced by K.Baier. See BAIER, 
chapter 8.
12See HARE (1), pp.16-18.
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These requirements appear to be quite strong but it is the case that 
many conflicting principles could "pass the test". This creates problems, for 
the imperative nature of moral statements means that we would be obliged 
to act upon these incompatible principles, which we cannot do without 
contradiction. To illustrate the difficulties associated with the formal moral 
sense w e can consider the Kantian categorical imperative—a procedure for 
deriving moral principles that represents a form of constructivism13. As I 
understand it, we begin with the agent's maxim, which is an action-guiding 
norm valid relative to the agent’s desires and preferences. We assume that 
the agent already understands what a moral statement looks like but we do 
not assume that the agent feels bound by an antecedent moral order14.
The agent begins by recognizing the maxim as an imperative that he 
applies to himself: I should do X under circumstances Y so as to bring about 
Z. This is universalized so that all agents should do X under circumstances 
Y to bring about Z15. Thus far many conflicting principles could be 
rationally and sincerely willed by agents, even by the same agent. However, 
the categorical imperative involves much more than this formal 
universalization, for the agent must recognize that his w illed and 
universalized maxim must became a practical law for application in the 
empirical world,16
13Kant offers several versions of the categorical imperative, see KANT (2), pp.71,88, 89,96. 
For a discussion see RAWLS (13); SILBER; HERMAN; DIETRICHSON.
1 Clarification is in order here. A maxim is assumed to be moral in the sense that it conforms 
to the formal principles of morality outlined above. A agent would not advance a maxim that 
he knows to be inconsistent with those requirements, eg. one-person egoism. However, agents 
also know that their maxims are subject to radical alteration as a consequence of engaging in 
the categorical imperative procedure.
15KANT (2), p.71; RAWLS (13), pp.83-4.
16DIETRICHSON, pp.145-6.
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The problem that we encounter is that the categorical imperative 
appears to be formal whereas the willed maxims are material or concrete— 
they possess an empirical content. As Paul Dietrichson has argued, we need 
a mediating concept17. We must devise a rational construct in the form of a 
fictional idea which in some way typifies the abstract nature of morality. 
We will be unable to make any practical use of the categorical imperative in 
the actual sensory world unless we can think the idea of a purely 
h yp o th e tica l sensory world. The simplest way to conceive of this 
hypothetical world is to ask ourselves: what if everybody did that? But this 
immediately raises the question of who constitutes "everybody" and to 
what situation the conditional "to do" applies. In other words, we have 
moved beyond the purely formal features of morality.
As Rawls has argued the categorical imperative involves not only 
the process of universalization discussed above but also the requirement 
that the agent will the social world associated with his maxim; that is, the 
existing world as it is affected by his maxim18. This can only be achieved if 
the agent already has a conception of the social world, and this introduces 
the second fundamental element of constructivism—a foundational non- 
moral conception of self and society. This (or these) non-moral 
conception(s) are conjoined with the formal moral sense to generate moral 
principles. In its Rawlsian form this is facilitated by appeal to a choice- 
procedure—the "original position"—and this represents the third major 
feature of constructivism.
In Kantian  constructivism appeal is made to a conception of free 
agency where freedom is defined in terms of a "pure will"~a w ill
17We need a "typic", DIETRICHSON, p.146.
18Rawls calls this the "perturbed social world". See RAWLS (13), pp.83-4.
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undetermined by empirical facts such as desires or objective values19. The 
metaphysics of Kantian agency are too complex for the present discussion 
but in brief it can be said that Kant conceived of the agent as having both 
noumenal and phenomenal features, where the former can never be 
ob jectified 20. The will determines principles that are binding upon 
empirical agents but the will can never be incorporated into the 
phenomenal world21. In fact, as many commentators have pointed out in 
some formulations of the categorical imperative Kant does rely upon 
certain empirical desires in order to generate substantive principles, eg. the 
keeping of promises22.
Contemporary constructivists might simply interpret the Kantian 
pure will as an expression of moral agency, rather than of full agency23. 
That is, as rational beings we are empirical entities determined by desires or 
objective values but as moral agents we must be assumed to deliberate and 
act independently of our personal preferences or pre-existing moral 
intuitions. In other words, moral agency is a restatement of the formal 
features of morality, ie. impersonality. Indeed, in Rawls's theory this is 
expressed in the form of a "veil of ignorance" that controls what knowledge 
agents have in the original position24.
I believe, however, that it is necessary but insufficient to have a 
conception of moral agency in the construction procedure. The point is that 
if w e are to move from the formal moral sense to substantive principles we
19KANT (2), p.61: "It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, 
which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will.
20KANT (1), p.382.
21 For a discussion of the relationship between the moral law, free will and the natural order 
in Kant see BECK, pp.37-40.
^HEGEL, paragraph 135; KANT (2), pp.89-91.
^For a discussion of the relationship between Rawlsian and Kantian constructivism, see 
RAWLS (13), HOEFFE, O’NEILL.
24RAWLS (2), pp.12,136-42.
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require conceptions that do not simply restate what is assumed by the 
formal features of morality. N ow , one way of m oving from form to 
substance is to appeal to certain substantive intuitions. These intuitions 
would clearly go beyond what is presupposed in a formal universalization 
procedure, but as I shall argue in subsequent sections there are profound 
problems involved. What I favour is an appeal to certain features of general 
human rationality—a non-moral conception of the self.
Central to my defence of constructivism is an appeal to self-interest. 
What I shall argue is that self-interest involves, in its most developed form, 
the ability to transcend particular desires that one has and form a good for 
oneself that is Mtrans-temporal"25. As fully rational agents (agency 
understood here in non-moral terms) we must treat all the times in our 
lives as having prima facie equal validity. This "prudential requirement" is 
grounded in the metaphysics of the self—the endurance of the self through 
time. This endurance—the fact of personal identity—is empirically 
observable, and the prudential requirement follows from a reflection upon 
the nature of the language of self-interest26.
N ow , of course, the two fundamental features of constructivism—the 
moral sense and the prudential requirement—will at some level come into 
conflict. Prudence presupposes that a person has a bias towards his own 
interests whereas morality requires that a person abstract from his 
particular preferences and treat his life as just "one among many"27. 
Furthermore, morality subordinates prudence such that there appears to be 
something contradictory about appealing to prudence as a means of 
rendering determinate the moral sense. I shall seek to overcome this
25See chapter 4, particularly sections 4.3-4.5.
26See chapter 6.
27NAGEL (1), pp.99-100.
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conflict by arguing that we appeal to the structure of self-interest and not to 
the particular ends that individuals have.
Following Rawls, I conceive of the existence of a hypothetical choice 
situation in which agents are denied knowledge of their own identities28, 
thus ensuring that the choice of principles conforms to the requirements of 
morality. I assume that agents are motivated to enter the choice-situation by 
virtue of their recognition that the construction of moral principles 
requires a denial of self-knowledge. But I further assume that agents require 
a conception of the non-moral good in order to agree to a set of principles. 
Agents know that they are prudential agents and they know that this carries 
with it certain needs—the need for a freedom to act, a certain level of 
income, and "the bases of self-respect"29. The goods of freedom and wealth 
facilitate the formation of a trans-temporal good, and as prudential agents 
persons seek a greater rather than a lesser share of these goods30. Therefore, 
the agreement to principles of justice expresses the nature of prudential 
agency.
There are, of course, certain difficulties involved in this formulation 
of the rational choice situation (besides the credibility of the conceptions of 
the self and prudence). Firstly, we must assume that all agents share the 
same conception of human agency, and if they do not w e must show that 
they are irrational not to do so. Secondly, we have to show how the nature 
of prudential agency fits in with the Kantian model of moral agency. 
Constructivism presupposes that agents determine principles and therefore 
principles are the product of human will, but what if as non-moral agents 
w e are fully determined by the ends that we have? In other words, as a
28RAWLS (2), pp.17-22.
29RAWLS (2), p.62.
B r a w ls  (2), p.i44.
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moral agent I am assumed to determine the moral law but as a prudential 
agent I am faced with values and preferences that are given. Consequently I 
experience a drifting apart of my moral agency from my prudential agency. 
Thirdly, we must show how the notion of prudence can be employed 
without undermining the moral status of the choice-situation—how can we 
avoid egoism?
It is my aim to address these questions in the course of this 
dissertation. Suffice it to say at this stage that it is the credibility of the 
account of the self (personal identity) and of prudential rationality (self- 
interest) that holds the key to the resolution of these problems.
2.2: Intuitionism
Intuitionism as a foundational theory appeals to certain "moral 
intuitions" in order to ground rights. A moral intuition may be defined as a 
moral proposition incapable of being analysed into any non-moral 
propositions. If we are intuitionists then there comes a point where we hit 
"rock-bottom” in our moral reasoning. Whilst w e might be capable of 
deriving certain "secondary" moral propositions from our "primary" 
moral propositions, we cannot eliminate the latter.
It may be objected that the above definition of intuitionism contains 
a serious contradiction, for if we take certain non-moral propositions as 
"basic" then we cannot be advancing a foundationalist theory of rights. To 
talk about foundations implies an appeal to something beyond the existence 
of the moral principles themselves. In terms of my discussion so far it is the 
ability to draw a distinction between a first-order and a second-order theory.
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My justification for applying the term Intuitionist" to a foundationalist 
theory is based upon the belief that those who appeal to intuitions in their 
arguments do so with the view that those intuitions represent truth-claims. 
In other words, our intuitions are correct not simply because they are our 
beliefs. But intuitionists will also argue that any appeal to truth-claims that 
go beyond intuitions are bound to involve controversial claims, therefore, 
intuitionists must assume that their moral claims are well-grounded but 
the grounds must be opaque. Since intuitionism is used in different ways in 
moral and political theory it is worthwhile at this point making some 
distinctions.
There are, I believe, four kinds of intuitionism, of which one 
version is quite distinct, and three are quite similar. Firstly, there is 
metaphysical intuitionism. G.E.Moore argued that reasons for moral action 
depend upon properties of goodness that are simple and unanalysable31. 
The property of goodness is non-natural by which Moore meant that, 
unlike say the colour yellow, it is not susceptible to empirical observation32. 
Rather, we must presuppose a special cognitive faculty~"a moral sense"— 
through which a person may perceive the good33. Moore's intuitionism is 
unfashionable, involving as it does appeal to metaphysical entities whose 
existence is to say the least controversial-just the kind of controversy that 
contemporary intuitionists seek to avoid34. Nevertheless, as I shall 
maintain, certain arguments for the grounding of rights seem to me to 
require some kind of Mooreian metaphysics35.
31MOORE, pp.6-7.
32MOORE, p.7.
^MOORE, p.168.
34Moore inspired many anti-metaphysical views, particularly those of the logical 
positivists, but they clearly misunderstood his argument. Moore's rejection of naturalism did 
not entail a rejection of metaphysics per se.
35Theories which emphasize a commitment to principles independently of their recognition 
within a social practice, eg. a commitment to universal equality, must be intuitionist in a 
Mooreian sense unless they are the product of a construction procedure.
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Secondly, intuitionism may be understood as a decision-procedure 
rather than a metaphysical theory. Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, defined 
intuitionism as the method whereby we begin with a number of prima facie 
equally valid principles which, however, conflict in certain situations, and 
w e must attempt to balance one off against the other36. Since w e have no 
rules for ordering them, this balancing procedure must rely upon intuitive 
judgements. It should be added that some of the principles might be 
generated through a non-intuitionist choice-procedure, but unlike a pure 
constructivist procedure we do not accept the results of the hypothetical 
deliberative process as authoritative, and this, therefore, suggests a third 
form of intuitionism that might be termed "fixed point" intuitionism. 
Rawls himself appeals to certain "settled convictions" as controls against 
which the conclusions of the original position are to be tested and the two 
are to be brought into "reflective equilibrium"37. Brian Barry has suggested 
that w e start out with general principles and then apply them to the "hard 
cases". If you do not like the results then you reformulate the principles38.
Fourthly, intuitionism may operate through an "overlapping 
consensus"39. Since I shall have more to say about this notion in section 2.3 
my remarks at this stage will be brief. We begin from the assumption that a 
pluralism and incommensurability of value pervades our social relations. 
Since we cannot build a non-coercive, stable liberal consensus upon the 
basis of any particular conception of the good we must attempt to reach a
36RAWLS, p.34.
37This is applied to the construction of the original position, but Rawls implies that we are 
making substantive moral judgements through reflective equilibrium. I endorse the idea of 
"reflective equlibrium" if it is applied to the development of die non-moral conceptions that 
we use in building up the choice-situation, eg. we can legitimately apply it to the conception 
of the person.
38BARRY (2), p.263.
39RAWLS (8), pp.9-10.
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shallow, but broadly-based, consensus through the elaboration of principles 
based upon whatever points of agreement we share. If this consensus is to 
be more than a mere "modus vivendi" we must assume that there are 
foundations to it. However, the only available foundations appear to be 
particular conceptions of the good and these are necessarily "sectarian" and 
hence liable to undermine the consensus. As a consequence, the 
appropriate foundations are opaque: we "just have" liberal beliefs. It is 
important to recognize that the "overlapping consensus" is not simply an 
appeal to particular cultural norms or to established power relations, for we 
are assuming the validity of our moral beliefs even if we are prevented 
from rendering explicit their "foundations".
It may be argued that the metaphysical theory of Moore and the non­
metaphysical intuitionist theories advanced today are fundamentally 
different. It could be argued that the perception of non-natural properties 
involves a correspondence theory of (moral) truth whereas the intuitionist 
"weighing" of different principles involves a coherentist model of moral 
reasoning. This latter view simply holds that there must be a small number 
of basic intuitions, such as a prohibition upon cruelty, or a commitment to 
basic equality, whereas the former position holds that for every moral 
sentiment there must correspond some metaphysical object.
This criticism can be granted but I think that the two types of theory 
have sufficient in common for them to be considered together. What is 
crucial to the definition of intuitionism, as opposed to constructivism, is 
that moral principles are regarded as true or false in virtue of a moral order 
that exists prior to its construction through a procedure that incorporates a 
certain conception of the self and of rational will-formation. Since moral 
principles are already given, there is no requirement that w e be able to
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determine them and hence intuitionism requires merely a weak conception 
of the self40. It will be recalled that in section 2.1 I argued that the formal 
features of morality had to be supplemented by a conception of the 
empirical world to which moral principles are to be applied. Moral 
intuitionism conceives of that world as already characterized by moral 
relations and the task is to imagine what the effects would be of the 
introduction of new principles on existing principles—can they be made to 
cohere? This has the apparent virtue that it avoids any controversial 
metaphysical claims.
I shall discuss the problems associated with the conception of the self 
in constructivism in Part II, but here I want to consider why intuitionism 
has an appeal and why Rawls, and his defenders, have shifted towards an 
intuitionist position. Michael Sandel has argued that constructivism cannot 
elaborate an adequate conception of the self. He argues that to be a Rawlsian 
Mdeontological self" a person must be a subject whose identity is given 
independently of the ends that he has. The denial of self-knowledge is the 
affirmation of such independence41. Sandel claims, however, that far from 
confirming, or expressing, the autonomy of the agent, such a lack of self- 
knowledge undermines the capacity for choice and for moral agency42. 
’’Unencumbered selves” must, by their nature, be arbitary, radical choosers 
and radical choice is no choice at all43. Sandel contrasts this deontological
40RAWLS (13), pp.97-8
41SANDEL (1), pp.15-24.
^SANDEL (1), pp.162,178.
43Some anti-communitarians have failed to take seriously Sandel's critique of the 
constructivist self. They argue that Sandel is wrong to suggest that the agent must be capable 
of alienating all his ends. They argue that we should be capable of reforming our ends 
piecemeal. As KYMLICKA argues (pp.52-3) the liberal self need not ask himself "can I 
perceive myself without ends" but rather "can I perceive myself without these ends?". But as 
I argue in chapter 4 the capadty to form a good-for-oneself presupposes the capacity to view 
one's life from a standpoint of "temporal neutrality" and that does mean that we must in 
some way be capable of transcending any particular ends (see section 4.3 and also section 7.2).
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self with the "encumbered self’ that is conscious that its identity is formed
by social and historical forces beyond its control:
as a self-interpreting being, I am able to reflect on my history 
and in this sense to distance myself from it, but the distance is 
always precarious and provisional, the point of reflection 
never finally secured outside the history itself.44
Since Sandel does not specify what he means by "identity”, or by
"reflection" and "distance", there is an indeterminacy in his arguments. But
as I interpret him, he is arguing that constructivism is fundamentally
flawed because it cannot provide a credible account of the self. This is a
serious criticism and I shall in the course of my dissertation attempt to
argue that a credible conception of the self in constructivism can, in fact, be
advanced.
Sandel contrasts the idea of an owner-self who has certain ends with 
a constitutive-self that is its ends45. Sandel rightly observes that Kantian 
constructivism presupposes a distance of self and ends. This means that 
there is not only a distance between a self and its self-interested values, but 
also between a self and its moral values. If we hold that an adequate 
account of the self presupposes that a self is its ends, then we will very 
likely arrive at an intuitionist moral theory. The world of the encumbered 
self is, so to speak, always upon it. The thought-experiment of the original 
position is incoherent for such a self, because it could not survive the 
transition from the self-knowledge of the actual world to the state of no- 
self-knowledge that exists behind the veil46.
44SANDEL (1), p.179.
45SANDEL (1), p.20.
46Sandel makes no distinction between a person's moral ends and his prudential ends. That 
distinction is crucial to constructivism.
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I believe that intuitionism cannot account for certain fundamental 
features of rights. In particular, intuitionism cannot account for the role of 
the will in the determination of principles of justice, and hence it will have 
problems in motivating persons to respect rights (I return to this issue in 
section 2.5). Nevertheless, an appeal to intuition does allow a defender of 
liberal principles to avoid a metaphysics of the self.
2.3: The Overlapping Consensus
Rawls argues that justice as fairness is a moral conception developed 
for the basic structure of society alone47. One of the tasks of political 
philosophy is to locate the "domain of the political" and defend its 
independence from other branches of philosophy, such as epistemology and 
m etaphysics, and  from general moral philosophy48. This clearly has 
implications for the way w e are to understand Rawls’s supposed  
constructivism. The independence of political theory from metaphysics 
means that the concepts we appeal to in "justice as fairness" are internal to 
the moral theory.
Given the "fact of pluralism", Rawls argues that "no general and 
comprehensive view can provide a publicly acceptable basis for a political 
conception of justice"49. That is, since values, both moral and non-moral, 
conflict, and are, according to Rawls "incommensurable", only a 
considerable degree of oppression could ensure a stable, ordered society 
based upon a comprehensive conception of the good. In a liberal society, 
stability will only be achieved if there exists a broadly-based, popular
47RAWLS (2), p.7
48RAWLS (6), p225; RAWLS (11), p.234.
49RAWLS (8), p.4.
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consensus. From this starting point the question that Rawls sets out to 
address is: how can we achieve a consensus given that "reasonable and 
rational" people can and do disagree about conceptions of the good?50
Rawls's response is to argue that whilst there may exist "deep" 
disagreement about moral, theological and philosophical truths, there can 
still be points of agreement. There are certain fundamental intuitive ideas 
implicit in a liberal regime and these include a certain conception of the 
person as capable of formulating and revising a life-plan, and also capable of 
moral reason, ie. possessing a sense of justice51. However, Rawls stresses 
that justice as fairness cannot appeal to this conception of the person as if it 
were a metaphysical theory, even if citizens hold it to be so. The reason is 
that the metaphysical sources of this belief are plural and mutually 
incompatible. For example, there may exist a widely held view that political 
institutions should take into account the idea of the person as an 
autonomous agent, but some people may appeal to the Millian conception 
of autonomy, whilst others may ground their belief in Kantian claims, and 
yet others assume an economic, rational-choice, conception, and still others 
might "just believe" that individuals are autonomous. The overlapping 
consensus can only appeal to personal autonomy if it restricts the reasons 
which can be appealed to in its support. The state can, and must, promote 
beliefs which are supportive of the idea of rights but the values of freedom, 
autonomy and tolerance are not to be regarded as self-supporting, but 
rather, they derive their political value extrinsically, by virtue of their 
ability to stabilize a liberal order.
50RAWLS (9), p .l.
51RAWLS (8), p.6.
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Joseph Raz has raised a serious objection to this idea of an 
overlapping consensus. He argues that such a conception of the basis of 
liberalism entails the promotion by the state of "epistemic abstinence": the 
liberal state must act for good reasons but should not be concerned with the 
truth of the doctrine(s) which guides it52. Clearly, if the overlapping 
consensus is to be more than a mere modus vivendi then it must be 
concerned with the justification of its institutions. But if justification 
entails the explanation of the truth of a value-judgement then how can the 
state avoid appealing to the deep reasons for holding a belief in, say, 
autonomy? The citizens of a liberal state must believe that principles such 
as rights are well-grounded but they cannot appeal to any grounds, for there 
appear to be no appropriate grounds53. It is for this reason that I believe the 
overlapping consensus to be intuitionist.
Rawls insists that insofar as the overlapping consensus is a modus 
vivendi it is a moralized one54. But this can only be achieved if w e assume 
that it is a grounded consensus: that reasons exist for rights which are 
necessarily independent of power relations. Yet how  are w e avoid 
intuitionism? In a recent article Rawls has attempted to clarify his claims. 
He argues that there are two stages in the process of justifying the principles 
of justice. At the first stage justice as fairness is treated as a "free-standing" 
political conception. The "great values" of liberalism are self-subsistent, 
which means that they are not a compromise of competing interests or the 
result of the tailoring of different views in order to fashion a political 
consensus. The overlapping consensus is only introduced at the second
52RAZ (6), pp.4,9.
53RAZ (6), pp.13-14.
54RAWLS (11), p.250.
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stage, at which point we are concerned with the question of the motivation 
to support liberal principles55.
The problem is that Rawls does not explain the relationship between
these two stages. If the first stage entails support for liberalism as valuable-
in-itself then it is not dear what the function is of the second stage. It might
be that Rawls holds the view that the justification of principles does not
entail a motivation on the part of moral agents to respect those principles.
This raises some difficult questions about the relationship between
justification and motivation which I shall address later. Rawls does,
however, give a due to the relationship:
So far as possible, political liberalism tries to present a free­
standing account of these values as those of a special domain— 
the political. It is left to dtizens individually, as part of their 
liberty of consdence, to settle how they think the great values 
of the political domain relate to other values within their 
comprehensive doctrine.56
To make sense of this argument we must assume that the '’political” is both
separate from the moral but is nonetheless an ethical standpoint, ie. a
standpoint from which reasons can be generated that transcend power
relations (the political is a moralized modus vivendi). As moral agents we
must be capable of occupying the spedal political standpoint and a general
moral standpoint. But we must bracket out the general moral standpoint
when we take up the political, even though that general standpoint
generates for us certain ”useful" beliefs (useful from the standpoint of the
political). However, it doesn't really help to say that we "begin" with certain
liberal beliefs and then fit them into our more general conception of the
moral good, for it is the case that the political is fully dependent upon those
more general beliefs. If political liberalism is "free-standing" then it
55RAWLS (11), p.234.
56RAWLS (11), p.245.
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presupposes that the "special domain" of the political has independent 
foundations (with all the "controversy" that would entail), whereas in fact 
it has no foundations at all.
To summarize, we can say that in his more constructivist writings 
Rawls appears to be arguing that whilst we do not appeal to metaphysical 
claims about the nature of the self, we nevertheless construct a conception 
of the self which is incorporated into the choice-procedure of the original 
position. This involves a commitment to theoretical claims that go beyond 
the merely political, eg. a belief in the ability of persons to change their 
preferences. In his overlapping consensus phase Rawls appears to be 
arguing that the conceptual foundations of "the self' are even shallower, 
for we are to make no claims which go beyond what can be agreed to at a 
political level. Since the "theoretical sources" of the conception of the self 
are pluralistic this limits the concept to a political idea: an expression of 
antecedently-given moral and political beliefs, rather than a part of the 
ground of those beliefs. Let us consider the three believers in autonomy 
cited earlier: the Millian, the Kantian, and the rational-choice theorist. If we 
follow Raz's argument, these three hold to an overlapping consensus 
regarding a belief in autonomy, but they must necessarily bracket out, or be 
denied knowledge of, the reasons for holding to a belief in autonomy. 
From the political standpoint it is useful that they share a belief in 
autonomy but its usefulness is dependent upon them not appealing to the 
reasons for those beliefs.
The problem with this dual political/moral conception is finding the 
appropriate source of political value. The most obvious source would be the 
appropriateness of an individual belief to the sustenance of toleration. 
Relatedly, appeal might be made to "free public reason" and the importance
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of tolerance within such a conception. Alternatively, we might ground the 
political in the value of public order, although this seems to entail either a 
non-moral modus vivendi, or else it implies further values which are 
promoted by, or facilitated through, a well-ordered society, eg. scientific 
progress. The problem is that the political must be either "grounded" in 
some "sectarian" belief, such as a belief in public order, or tolerance, or else 
be wholly ungrounded. Therefore, to achieve any kind of belief (be it true or 
false) in the independence of the political standpoint we must either 
promote a belief which we know to be false or else simply accept that the 
foundations of the political are non-moral, ie. accept that our principles are 
the product of a modus vivendi.
What I discuss in the next section is whether it would in fact be 
preferable to replace the overlapping consensus with a modus vivendi. 
What I argue is that either the modus vivendi is a mere compromise of 
interests, and therefore in no sense moral, or else it must appeal to certain 
values as a ground for its existence. What is interesting about appealing to a 
modus vivendi, as opposed to an overlapping consensus, is that it lays bear 
the absence of foundations to liberal rights, or, as I would argue, the need 
for foundations. Indeed, I believe that the notion of a moralized modus 
vivendi is fundamentally incoherent.
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2.4: A Modus Vivendi?
I shall concentrate upon what I believe to be the most well-developed 
argument in favour of a moralized modus vivendi: Charles Larmore's 
Patterns of Moral Complexity.57 Larmore, like Rawls, begins from the 
notion of pluralism, but takes pluralism further, to include conflicts 
between types of moral actions, eg. between making singular moral 
judgements and acting upon principles58. In some situations we have a lack 
of moral guidance (moral under-determination) whilst in other situations 
we have too much guidance and hence a moral conflict (moral over­
determination). Furthermore, there are conflicts between consequentialist 
reasoning, deontological reasoning and particularistic duties59. In short, 
pluralism operates at many levels, creating complex "patterns” of moral 
thought and action. Let us accept these claims for now (I shall raise some 
objections to the idea of moral pluralism in Chapter 7).
The fact of pluralism leads Larmore to claim that, at the political 
level, neutrality must operate. That is, the state should not seek to promote 
any particular conception of the good because of its presumed intrinsic 
superiority, ie. because it is supposedly a truer conception. Political 
neutrality consists in constraints on what factors can be invoked to justify a 
political decision60. A modus vivendi involves the recognition of this 
neutrality.
So far this is very close to Rawls's overlapping consensus, but 
Larmore argues that the attempt to find some common denominator
57LARMORE.
^LARMORE, p.14.
59LARMORE, pp.148-9.
^LARMORE, p.44
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amongst opposing positions is not the best way to secure the neutrality of 
the state and ground liberal principles such as rights. Rather, we should 
abstract from what is in dispute through the idea of a rational dialogue. In 
the face of disagreement those who wish to continue the conversation 
should retreat to neutral ground in the hope of either resolving the dispute 
or else bypassing it61.
Larmore recognizes that the conception of neutrality rooted in a 
rational dialogue raises difficult questions62. Firstly, why should one desire 
to continue the conversation? Secondly, does not the idea of a dialogue 
necessarily entail some rather strong claims regarding, for example, the 
equal right to participate in the dialogue? The answer to the first question 
could be that we have an interest in continuing the dialogue. But this bare 
assertion is compatible with a non-moral modus vivendi in which the 
balance of force in a society dictates that people communicate their 
demands to one another, and that there exist relatively open institutions 
through which this can be done. The nature and distribution of rights will 
reflect the balance of advantage in a society. We cannot, however, justify 
the maintenance of those dialogue-based rights in the face of a change in 
the balance of force within the social system for those rights are themselves 
the product of that force.
Larmore could appeal to equal respect as the reason for continuing
the dialogue. He asks rhetorically:
Why must a political value be made justifiable to those who 
are scarcely interested in rational debate about justification 
anyway? A liberal political system need not feel obliged to
61LARMORE, p53
62LARMORE, pp.54-5.
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reason with fanatics; it must simply take the necessary 
precautions to guard against them.63
The problem is that if w e appeal to the notion of "justification” of political
values then it presupposes that we can give reasons for our political
institutions. From what source are these reasons to be drawn if we cannot
appeal to the intrinsic value of a "particular" conception of the good?
To consider the question in further detail w e need to consider 
Larmore's distinction between a "modus vivendi" and an "expressivist" 
defence of liberalism. Larmore suggests that w e distinguish between  
substantial ways of life and the mode in which w e pursue them, eg. 
autonom ously or non-autonomously64. In a modus vivendi we reject 
appeal to controversial ideals of the person and so w e must reject 
expressivism 65. However, Larmore still wishes to appeal to the notion of 
respect for others as the reason for continuing the conversation. He 
distinguishes between "respect" and "sympathy" and argues that the latter 
implies identifying with another's beliefs and preferences as if they were 
one's own, whereas respect simply means that we recognize that a person's 
beliefs are justified from his standpoint66. Larmore further distinguishes 
between respecting a person's beliefs and respecting the person67. The latter 
grounds in a stronger way than the former the obligation of equal treatment 
implicit in rights. To summarize: the neutrality of the state is grounded in a 
rational dialogue which operates a neutrality between controversial 
conceptions of the good through a suspension or bypassing of certain 
beliefs, and this rational dialogue is sustained through a desire grounded in
^LARMORE, p.60
^LARMORE, pp.73-4.
^LARMORE, pp.76-7.
^LARMORE, p.62.
67LARMORE, pp.63-4.
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the equal respect for persons, where this does not entail an identification
with their beliefs. Liberal rights are based upon tolerance of the other:
Others are due equal respect by virtue of their capacity for 
working out a coherent view of the world and indeed of the 
good life, whether or not they exercise this capacity 
autonomously and experimentally, or through the uncritical 
acceptance of traditions and forms of life.68
But what does it mean to "work out a coherent view of the world" in a way
which is not autonomous? I find it very difficult to grasp how this notion
cannot entail a commitment to a "controversial" conception of the
person69. What I believe is at the root of both intuitionism (the overlapping
consensus) and the modus vivendi view of rights is an appeal to
"pluralism"— more specifically, the idea that pluralism  precludes
foundations—yet there is a profound contradiction behind the idea of both
appealing to pluralism and defying any appeal to metaphysical claims. It is
this contradiction that I want to explore in section 2.5.
^LARMORE, p.65
69Nagel offers one argument: that we distinguish between what justifies individual belief 
and what justifies appealing to that belief in support of the exercise of political power. See 
NAGEL (4). However, as I argue in section 25  this is premised upon a particular 
metaphysical thesis.
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2.5: What's Wrong with Intuitionism
In its non-metaphysical forms intuitionism tends to make appeal to 
the "fact of pluralism". Both Rawls's overlapping consensus and Larmore's 
modus vivendi assume pluralism to be a fact relevant to the question of the 
moral grounding of rights. But since it is possible to be a pluralist and at the 
same time be anti-intuitionist it is important to clarify the connection 
between pluralism and intuitionism.
What Rawls and Larmore maintain is that the liberal ethical forms, 
such as rights, are, in some sense, superior to non-liberal forms, but that we 
cannot appeal to pluralism itself as a reason for accepting their superiority. 
The reason for this is that any appeal to pluralism must provide some 
account of its sources, such as, say, an appeal to the conception of the person 
as a ground of agent-relative value. But as Larmore rightly argues this 
involves an appeal to a certain kind of metaphysics. What underlies the 
overlapping consensus and modus vivendi is the idea that values are not 
only plural but are, in fact, incommensurable70. That is, there is no 
standpoint from which we can compare and order all the values that exist. 
This, I believe, rules out an appeal to a metaphysical explanation of 
pluralism, for such a metaphysics assumes that there is some standpoint 
from which we can view  the world and, at some level, that view is 
comprehensive. The world may contain a multiplicity of particular views 
(personal or particularistic) but it is a single world. For Rawls and Larmore 
the world is not inclusive, hence the rejection of any second-order moral
70It might be argued that Rawls is not committed to any conception of the nature of value, for 
the overlapping consensus is simply a political device for stabilizing a social order. But if 
Rawls wishes his conception to be moral (that is, the political order is also a moral order) 
then his appeal to pluralism must commit him to an axiological thesis.
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theory that makes appeal to a (partially or fully71) com prehensive  
conception of the good.
The overlapping consensus and the modus vivendi are intuitionist 
because they combine incommensurability with a belief in the superiority 
of the liberal forms. If, however, they cannot appeal to anything outside the 
moral conception itself, ie. make appeal to facts about the nature of self and 
society, then we must ju st assume the validity of our beliefs. We can 
demand that people respect rights—and appeal to their intuitions to that 
end—but w e cannot demand that their respect for rights be based upon 
supposedly controversial metaphysical claims.
We can, therefore, draw a distinction between what might be termed 
Mhard pluralism" and "soft pluralism". The former posits a world of 
incommensurable values whilst the latter assumes that there exists a 
plurality of values which will conflict in some situations, but which are 
potentially resolvable from some standpoint. I believe that constructivism  
must appeal to soft pluralism against hard pluralism. To illustrate the 
difference between these two positions it is useful to consider an argument 
advanced by Thomas Nagel in his more recent work72. He argues that 
certain values may be so personal that the reasons for holding to them 
cannot be used to ground rights. He advances this claim in the context of a 
general philosophical thesis that posits two standpoints—the "subjective" 
and the "objective"—from which reality can be viewed. Neither standpoint 
can provide an exhaustive explanation of reality and the two standpoints 
cannot be fully or adequately combined to form a single, coherent view.
71A partially comprehensive conception of the good makes a selective appeal to 
metaphysical and epistemological claims. A fully comprehensive conception of the good 
attempts to ground political principles within a total framework. My arguments in this 
thesis involve a partially comprehensive conception.
72NAGEL (3); NAGEL (4); NAGEL (6).
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From the perspective of moral and political theory we cannot deny the force 
of the personal, subjective standpoint but neither can we possibly ground 
morality in such a standpoint, for morality presupposes that we abstract 
from the identity of the agent73.
The difficulty with Nagel’s conception of the two standpoints is that 
it appears that the personal standpoint is identifiable with individual 
persons, ie. human beings (or embodied minds). It must be the case that 
such beings are—metaphysically~a part of the natural order and hence we  
can recognize their existence from the centreless standpoint. N ow , of 
course, Nagel may be arguing that we cannot grasp the subjective aspects of 
experience from that centreless standpoint but this does not support hard 
pluralism unless one assumes that the contents of mind are logically 
private such that I cannot communicate my values to another. Nagel may, 
of course, be a soft pluralist by which he maintains that there are two 
standpoints but one can gain a grasp of the other standpoint. So, whilst I 
have a special access to my own subjective states I do not believe that I am 
the only person who has subjective states and whilst I have a special 
attachment to my particular ends I recognize that others also have special 
attachments.
Nagel appears not to acknowledge this tension in his argument but it 
is illuminating for the discussion of Rawls and Larmore. Rawls and 
Larmore avoid appealing to pluralism as a ground for rights because such 
an appeal would require a justification in terms of an explanation of the 
sources or bases of such pluralism, and the idea of explaining pluralism has 
an air of paradox about it. The claim that some values may be so personal 
that they could not form the basis of public policy depends upon taking up a
73NAGEL (3), pp.171-5; NAGEL (6), chapter 2.
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(objective) standpoint that can identify those values as personal—we, as it 
were trace those values to persons. But if we were to be hard pluralists then 
we would have no way of persuading individuals to treat some of their 
values as so personal that they should not affect the grounding of moral 
principles. Hard pluralism assumes a form of solipsism whereby persons do 
not recognize other personal standpoints. Only soft pluralism can conceive 
of a pluralistic world.
Hard pluralism may be regarded as the affirmation of the 
independence of the agent, and hence an ethico-political theory "grounded" 
in hard pluralism will be more adequate to the task of motivating 
individuals to respect the rights of others. But, in fact, intuitionism is 
wholly incapable of showing how a person can be suitably motivated. As an 
agent I occupy a standpoint radically detached from the objective standpoint 
of morality associated with Kantian constructivism. I face a world of plural 
and incommensurable values and whilst in such a world my allegiance to 
liberal ethical principles is called for, it is left unexplained how I am to 
relate to those principles as moral principles. My allegiance is either a 
contingent fact; a product of a happy convergence of my "private 
convictions" and those public principles, or, alternatively, I face an 
antecedent moral reality, the foundations of which are obscured from me. 
In both cases the moral force of rights is independent of my will.
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Chapter 3 
Utilitarianism
So far I have discussed two possible second-order theories of rights. 
However, no discussion of the foundations of rights would be complete 
without discussing utilitarianism. As a second-order moral theory 
utilitarianism maintains that the only fundamental moral facts are facts 
about human well-being1, but because of the way the concept of well-being 
is treated--that is, as an aggregate concept—utilitarianism is at a basic level, 
maximizing and consequentialist2. This appears, at first sight, to be inimical 
to the project of rights in that rights presuppose a plurality of personal 
standpoints3. However, there exist sophisticated versions of utilitarianism 
which claim to be able to ground rights, and it is these theories which 
interest me in this chapter.
My treatment of utilitarian rights is necessarily restricted to particular 
theorists and specific issues. I am particularly concerned with how  
utilitarians have treated the conception of the self and self-interest. Since I 
have defined rights as principles which permit the legitimate pursuit of 
self-interest and the right-holder I have characterized as an enduring being, 
these issues are central to the credibility of utilitarian rights4. And I should 
stress that it is rights that interest me—utilitarianism could plausibly claim 
to survive without rights5.
H anlon (l), p.ios.
2SCANLON (1), p.110.
3See section 1.5.
4See section 1.5.
5In fact, I believe that rights are an indispensable principle for a rational society, but this 
requires arguments that go beyond those of this chapter. I discuss these issues in chapter 7.
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In section 3.1 I shall discuss utilitarianism as a value-theory. That is, 
I will be concerned with the conception of moral value that is presupposed 
by utilitarianism and which makes the theory distinctive. In subsequent 
sections I will consider various arguments that have been advanced for 
grounding rights in that basic value-theory6. As I shall argue the idea of 
utilitarian rights involves appealing to utilitarianism as a value-theory and 
not as a decision-procedure; that is, utilitarianism must be treated as a 
second-order theory that defines the values which rights promote and not 
as a decision-procedure that directs a person to act. Utilitarianism as a first- 
order theory is, I argue, clearly incompatible with rights7. In section 3.2 I 
consider the argument for utilitarian rights based on the "limited 
rationality" of agents, and in section 3.3 I analyse the claim, made by 
Richard Hare, that there is a substantive agreement between Bentham's 
(utilitarian) "each to count for one" principle and Kant's (constructivist) 
"categorical imperative", such that we can resolve some difficulties 
associated with utilitarian-based rights, such as the problem of intolerant 
preferences8.1  find his argument particularly interesting and indeed I am in 
agreement with much of it, but I will question whether his interpretation of 
Kant's categorical imperative really does lead to utilitarianism. In section 
3.4 I discuss Hare's two-level theory in which rights operate at an intuitive 
level but are grounded in utilitarianism at a "deep level". In section 3.5 I 
briefly consider various theories that attempt to combine utilitarianism 
with apparently non-utilitarian principles at a foundational level, by 
treating rights as goals to be pursued. I will argue that this is incoherent and 
actually undermines the positive claim of utilitarianism to be rationally
6In particular I shall discuss the work of Richard Hare, Russell Hardin and Ronald Dworkin.
7As I argued in chapter 1 rights presuppose the ability to act upon agent-relative reasons, 
whilst utilitarianism assumes a commitment to agent-neutral value. If we were to stop at the 
first-order and refuse to consider any foundational theories of rights then utilitarianism and 
rights would be incompatible.
8HARE (2), pp.4-5.
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superior to intuitionism or constructivism. The general aim of this chapter 
is to see whether there is a version of utilitarianism that can ground rights 
without denying its own value-theory.
3.1: Utilitarianism as a Value-Theory
As I have already suggested, we can distinguish between  
utilitarianism as a first-order theory concerned to define the content of 
moral principles, and utilitarianism as a second-order theory concerned 
with how w e justify those principles. As a second-order theory, 
utilitarianism has (and must have) a strong, monistic, value theory, and 
this is com bined w ith a requirement to m axim ize that value  
(consequentialism)9. But the general (or abstract) requirement to maximize 
at the second-order need not necessarily translate into a maximizing 
decision-procedure at the first-order: the level of action-guiding principles. 
If, however, we are to make this distinction between ground and content 
then clearly it must be shown how rights serve to advance utilitarian goals. 
In other words, the stress lies in combining an apparently non-utilitarian 
first-order with a utilitarian second-order.
As a theory of value utilitarianism must presuppose that values are 
commensurable, and that we have some measure for comparing and 
ordering them. Whereas classical utilitarianism took pleasure to be the 
measure of value10, contemporary theorists tend to concentrate on human 
welfare expressed through preferences. Preferences are not however
^This appears to suggest that utilitarianism must also be a decision-procedure, but the point 
is that there exists an abstract commitment to maximize utility rather than substantive rules 
for maximizing i t
10See QUINTON for a discussion of "classical utilitarianism", especially chapters 2 and 3.
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themselves valuable, for they are simply the epistemic device for gaining 
knowledge of what is valuable and they provide a means to order and 
compare those values across persons.
A more serious difficulty is how we explain the relationship of the 
self, or subject, to the utilitarian value-theory: does subjective desire 
presuppose a desiring subject? Does this subject generate values which are 
relativized to itself? Since this goes to the heart of my discussion of 
utilitarian rights I shall offer a rather "crude" characterization of the 
utilitarian agent and attempt to add some complexity at a later stage. Despite 
its crudity I do think, however, that at a basic level (the level of the value- 
theory) this initial characterization is accurate.
Insofar as the generation of value depends upon conscious, desiring 
subjects, utilitarianism presupposes the existence of selves as sources of 
value. Furthermore, the structure of a person's system of desires is complex, 
by which I mean that an individual desires many different things and will 
have to make complicated qualitative judgements which entail going 
beyond a mere summation of desires. In other words, a utilitarian agent is 
not a sophisticated pig11. Many of these desires, or preferences, will be self- 
regarding, whilst others will be other-regarding, and some desires will be 
indexed in time, ie. a person will have desires for a future good. The latter 
presupposes that a person believes himself to be an enduring being. But 
whilst utilitarianism presupposes that people will have egoist desires, and 
that they will have a sense of self, it denies that there are any truly agent- 
relative values. It may of course be argued that utilitarianism accepts the 
existence of agent-relative values yet simply ignores them from the moral 
standpoint. However, as with constructivism (and unlike intuitionism),
11See CHARVET (1), p.92.
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utilitarianism does not presuppose the existence of intrinsically moral 
preferences. The preferences that are combined to form a social welfare 
function can only become moral preferences by virtue of a certain kind of 
procedure; a procedure governed by the principle of maximization. 
Therefore, w e are entitled to ask on what grounds a preference is included 
in the welfare function, and a reason cannot be that a certain preference is 
conducive to a utilitarian outcome by virtue of its agent-neutrality. It 
follows that the preferences that enter the maximand will be heterogeneous 
in character and utilitarianism must somehow ignore the particularistic, 
agent-relative aspects of them.
Given this problem I think that the concept of an agent-relative 
value requires elaboration. It can be said that I have projects which are of 
special importance to me such that I choose to devote a disproportionate 
amount of time and energy to them. A utilitarian can accept that I just have 
these projects; they do not require any explanation as to how I acquired 
them or why I pursue them. What a utilitarian cannot accept is that a 
reason for pursuing these projects is that they are my projects. The objection 
will, of course, be raised that neither can a Kantian constructivist accept the 
validity of an agent-relative reason for action, and indeed only an egoist 
would attempt to ground principles upon such reasons. But this objection 
would miss the point, for a constructivist would deny that agent-relative 
reasons can be m ora l reasons, and in this both utilitarians and 
constructivists must be right. However, up to this point I have not 
conceived of utilitarianism as a moral theory in the discussion of its 
axiological foundations. The desires which are to be added together and 
filtered through the maximand are not, in themselves, moral desires, but 
only become moral directives by virtue of the procedure of maximization. 
This has several consequences.
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Utilitarianism shares certain characteristics with constructivism  
which are not likewise shared by intuitionism. Both theories begin from 
certain non-moral facts—eg. the self in the case of constructivism and 
preferences in the case of utilitarianism—and then posit a procedure 
whereby substantive moral principles are generated. The procedure is quite 
complicated for a constructivist, but relatively simple for a utilitarian. In 
the latter case it is a simple maximizing procedure (the maximand). This 
superficial similarity has given rise to the view  that utilitarianism and 
constructivism can be combined, but this is, I believe, mistaken12. Because 
of the role of the self in a constructivist procedure, we can assume that 
there exist agent-relative values. The fact that the utilitarian procedure is a 
simple maximizing operation means that non-moral values must be 
treated as if they are all agent-neutral. Indeed the procedure resembles that 
of prudence extended to society as a whole rather than a contract between a 
plurality of agents13. This has the curious effect of "overcoming" the 
traditional gap between morality and self-interest whilst, at the same time, 
undermining the notion of the self which I take to be central to self-interest.
So much for utilitarianism as a value-theory, what about 
utilitarianism as a decision-procedure? In its purest—or crudest—form 
utilitarianism requires that value, as expressed through preferences, be 
maximized. Since maximization is a problem, this is re-phrased to read that 
a person should act so as to bring about the "highest-ranked state of affairs 
conceivable". In its act-utilitarian version this maximization-demand 
applies to individual acts: in each situation a person should calculate which 
course of action would maximize utility. In its rule-utilitarian version the
12I discuss this later, see section 3.3.
13RAWLS (2), pp.23-4. Alternatively, it represents the idea of a sympathetic observer who 
attempts to act in the interests of society understood as a unified being.
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requirement is to act upon a rule that if generally observed would bring 
about the best-ranked state of affairs14.1  will discuss the latter version at a 
later stage, but the general verdict on act-utilitarianism is that it would 
have consequences which are regarded as intuitively immoral: it 
undermines the institutions of rights and promising; it involves great 
personal sacrifice; it is insensitive to patterns of distribution; and, it justifies 
the punishment of innocent people15. However, the idea that we move 
directly from a value-theory to a decision-procedure—ie. be act-utilitarian—is 
not a view  w idely defended today16. Indeed, my presentation of 
utilitarianism is liable to be criticized as simplistic. In a sense, this criticism 
is valid, for I have deliberately abstracted the value-theoretic elements from 
the full theory. A full theory would have two or more levels and would 
allow for weaknesses in human reasoning. But it is important to stress the 
axiological presuppositions of utilitarianism, for it is these which define 
utilitarianism as a distinct theory and, it should be added, ground the 
benefidal aspects of the theory such as its determinacy—its ability to give 
answers in situations of apparently serious moral conflict.
A great deal of energy has been directed at overcoming the negative 
consequences of the value-theory. This, standardly, entails keeping the 
value-theory and the decision-procedure apart. As I shall argue certain 
theorists go so far in this attempt as to undermine the foundations of 
utilitarianism. Other theorists, however, recognize the importance of 
grounding the decision-procedure in a clearly utilitarian value-theory, 
whilst acknowledging the traditional objections to such a grounding. As a
14The earliest explicit statement of rule-utilitarianism was in HARROD.
15See, for example, the objections to utilitarianism which have been advanced by Bernard 
Williams, see WILLIAMS (1).
16It may be that few utilitarians have advocated an unqualified act-utilitarianism. 
Bentham defended rights as a way of stabilizing long-term expectations and he thus assumed 
psychological egoism on the part of moral agents. J.S.Mill attempted to distinguish between 
the higher and lower pleasures, see MILL, pp.7-9.
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consequence they have attempted to add sophistication to the value-theory 
as well as combining it with a level of decision-making that takes into 
account the nature of rationality.
What we need are arguments as to why we should not move directly 
from a value-theory to a decision-procedure. Before discussing these it is 
worth considering whether some of the criticisms of act- utilitarianism are 
valid. The argument is that act-utilitarianism cannot respect the 
separateness of persons and the relativity of certain personal values and, 
consequently, cannot accomodate rights. There are at least two arguments 
that can be considered straightaway.
Firstly, all theories of rights must explain how it is justifiable to 
override individual self-interest in order to sustain a system of rights as a 
whole. It might be argued that utilitarianism can offer such an explanation 
in virtue of the strong claims that it makes regarding the nature of value. If 
values are commensurable then we are in a stronger position to make 
trade-offs between different persons than if values are plural and 
incommensurable. Indeed, some theorists, such as Harsanyi17, seem to 
think that utilitarianism is the only rational theory.
Secondly, it could be argued that utilitarianism does, contrary to 
criticisms, take into account individual interests and that, furthermore, self- 
interested desires are counted into the maximand insofar as they are utility- 
generating. The principle of Bentham~"each to count for one and none for 
more than one"—is taken to be a recognition of the individual standpoint, 
and the grounding of utility in individual preferences appears to avoid the 
Kantian abstraction from personal characteristics which seems to be implicit
17HARSANYI, pp.40-41.
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in constructivism. Rights can then be justified because they ensure a 
stability of expectations for persons who are assumed to be egoist in 
motivation. Like Bentham, w e could combine ethical impersonality with 
psychological egoism.
The first point can be accepted as a general requirement of a moral 
theory. But the ’’rationality” of a moral theory depends upon its ability to 
ground principles in ways consistent with other spheres of rationality, such 
as self-interest. This is not to argue that morality should be reduced to self- 
interest but rather we must find a means of reconciling the standpoint of 
morality with the standpoint of self-interest and simple act-utilitarianism 
fails to do this18. The second point is problematical for two related reasons. 
Firstly, the conflation of self-interest(s) into a single scale of "human 
welfare” is, for reasons I shall explain, a false m ove19. Secondly, the 
Benthamite equality principle can be interpreted as the rejection of agent- 
relativism rather than the endorsement of the personal standpoint from 
which agent-relative values are derived. Nobody can claim that any special 
weight attaches to his values in virtue of them being his values. What 
utilitarianism does is to collapse agent-relative values into agent-neutral 
values, or self-interest into morality. This has the effect of undermining 
both morality and self-interest, as I shall attempt to argue later (section 3.3).
There are, however, other arguments for utilitarian rights and these 
attempt to "insulate" the personal standpoint from the full force of the 
impersonality of the basic value theory. Considerations concerning the 
nature of human rationality lead utilitarian theorists to advance rights as 
the best available means to secure the utilitarian good. In section 3.2 I
18See section 7.1.
19What is at issue is the possibility or impossibility of washing out all traces of egoism from 
the concept of "human interests".
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consider two such arguments from rationality which have been employed 
to generate rights. What I concentrate on are the implications for the 
conception of the person at a basic level in utilitarianism.
3.2: Identity and Limited Rationality
It is commonplace to argue that utilitarianism fails to respect the 
separateness of persons20. The argument, in its most developed form, runs 
as follows. The duties imposed by utilitarianism involve a sacrifice of one's 
personal interests, including one's non-utilitarian moral beliefs. As 
Williams has argued, utilitarianism imputes "negative responsibility"21: if 
a person is responsible for anything then he is just as much responsible for 
the things that he allows to happen (or fails to prevent happening) as he is 
for the things he himself does in the more direct sense of doing: "the 
doctrine represents an extreme of impartiality and abstracts from the 
identity of the agent"22.
Williams employs various examples in order to illustrate how the 
actions of others so "structure the causal scene" as to lead to a requirement 
that a person sacrifice his projects in order to satisfy the utilitarian duty23. 
These examples have been attacked as far-fetched and useless since we 
cannot be sure how w e would act in such situations, whilst Williams relies 
upon our intuitions in order for us to come to a judgement regarding the 
rightness or wrongness of the utilitarian duty24. As Samuel Scheffler puts it, 
Williams’ objection is that:
20This is central to Rawls's critique of utilitarianism. See RAWLS (2), p.27.
21WILLIAMS (1), pp.95-6.
^WILLIAMS (1), p.96.
23WILUAMS (1), pp.108-18.
24HARE (2), p.49.
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Utilitarianism alienates an agent from his actions by making 
the permissability of an agent's devoting energy to his projects 
and commitments dependent on the state of the world viewed  
from an impersonal standpoint.25
But Scheffler argues that only egoism would prevent this and, therefore, a
better definition is that utilitarianism requires that a person pursue his
projects in strict proportion to their impersonal value26.
It may be argued that Bentham's principle of "each to count for 
one...” would ensure that there exist constraints on what can be done to 
people and limits to what can be expected of them. But as I have argued this 
principle is best understood as a rejection of agent-relative value: a person 
can attach no weight to his projects in virtue of them being his projects. As 
I have also argued the rejection of identity goes beyond a moral 
requirement and is grounded in a non-moral value theory, and it is this 
which distinguishes a utilitarian rejection of identity from a constructivist 
rejection of identity.
A different argument is required if we are to insulate the personal 
standpoint from the excessive demands of a utilitarian value-theory. One 
such argument is the claim that given the limits to human powers of 
reason w e could never translate a utilitarian value-theory into a direct, 
maximizing decision-procedure. Russell Hardin27 has argued that we could 
not possibly make the calculations that are required by act-utilitarianism. 
We cannot predict the consequences of our actions or make complicated 
calculations of utility-loss and -gain. Our minds lack such a capacity for the 
prediction, calculation and processing of such information28.
25SCHEFFLER (1), p.8.
26SCHEFFLER (1), pp.8-9.
27HARDIN.
28HARDIN, pp.8-9.
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Hardin argues that there is a further problem which touches upon 
our rational abilities: the problem of collective action. What I should do in 
a particular situation will depend upon what others do and what I expect 
them to do, and what they expect me to expect them to do, and so on29. 
Hardin is making here several important claims: moral thinking is situated 
in already-existing relationships; it is a "long-run" game in which past 
performances and future expectations matter; and, it involves very 
complex, reciprocal calculations. This means that the detached, monistic 
reasoning presupposed in act-utilitarianism is inappropriate—decision  
making cannot be modelled on the prudential calculations of a single 
agent30.
Where does this leave rights? Hardin argues that rights enter the 
picture as a means of decentralizing decision-making to the level at which 
calculations can be made, and as a way of stabilizing expectations in a long- 
run "n-person" gam e31. The need to stabilize expectations does not 
automatically follow  from the fact that people have self-referential 
preferences, but rather because of the demands of collective action. The 
possibility of collective action depends upon assuring individuals that 
others will comply with moral principles in order for all to benefit from the 
cooperative gain. Given the danger of free-riders the state will almost 
certainly have to guarantee rights through the use of coercion32.
Hardin’s defence of rights depends upon the ability to push the 
axiological dimension of utilitarianism to the background. The question
29HARDIN, pp.9-11.
30HARDIN, p.31.
31HARDIN/ pp.77-8.
32HARDIN/ pp.147-8.
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that this raises is whether it disappears altogether and with it Hardin's 
claim to have advanced a utilitarian theory of rights. After all, so far as I 
have presented it, his argument is compatible with egoism or a non-moral 
modus vivendi.
That Hardin’s argument is, in fact, utilitarian is indicated by his 
claim that a utilitarian duty to help another (or others) exists if the donee's 
gain is greater than the doner's loss, and if we are capable of making the 
necessary calculations33. An egoist might ask why such a duty exists: what is 
the ground of the duty? The answer must be that there still exists a 
utilitarian duty to maximize utility but the ability to do so is limited by 
human cognitive faculties. The question that w e should then ask is 
whether this is the only factor that prevents us from being straightforward 
maximizers. I think it must be.
Hardin admits that a pure conflict situation involves a far stronger 
value-theory to justify sacrifice than does a mixed-motive game or a mere 
co-ordination gam e34. This is an implicit acknowledgment that it is a 
utilitarian value-theory that does the work in grounding rights and right- 
based duties. It is only because it is difficult to make calculations of utility- 
loss and -gain that the field in which we can claim that someone has a 
utilitarian obligation is severely restricted. The problem with Hardin's 
defence of utilitarianism as a second-order theory for rights can be stated 
thus: utilitarianism must presuppose a value-theory if w e are to make 
trade-offs between individual interests, but in order to defend rights we  
must rely upon the inefficacy of its value-theory. In other words, 
utilitarianism must be successful but not too successful.
33HARDIN, p.39.
34HARDIN, p.53.
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I think that the limited rationality argument is inadequate as a basis 
for rights and I shall attempt to illustrate why. We can distinguish between 
agent-relative and agent-neutral values, and agent-relative and agent- 
neutral reasons,35 Direct (act-)utilitarianism assumes the existence of (only) 
agent-neutral values and the ability to be motivated to pursue those values 
in a direct way, ie. through agent-neutral reasons. The indirect 
utilitarianism of Hardin assumes only agent-neutral values but many 
agent-relative reasons for action. Because parties can act upon agent-relative 
reasons one might be misled into believing that the values which a person 
pursues are, or can be, agent-relative. But to use the terms advanced by 
Scheffler, the indirect utilitarian strategy can allow for only dispensations 
and not prerogatives,36 The latter denies that it is important that one’ s 
actions always have good overall consequences, whilst the former allows 
one to act in ways which do not direc tly  promote utility, but the 
justification of such permission is itself utilitarian: it presupposes that the 
ground of the dispensation is agent-neutral value.
This distinction makes a difference at a crucial point in Hardin's 
argument for utilitarian rights. He argues that the insulation of rights 
depends not upon rule-utilitarianism, but upon w hat he terms 
institutionalized utilitarianism37. He appeals to the argument advanced by 
Rawls in his T w o  Concepts of Rules"38, that we should not be concerned 
with individual rules but rather with the whole institution of rule-making. 
We would never empower any individual, or group of individuals, to 
engage in making calculations as to whether a departure from the rules
^This is Nagel’s terminology, see NAGEL (3), pp.152-3.
36SCHEFFLER (1), p.15.
37HARDIN, pp.100-5.
38RAWLS (1).
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would be beneficial from a utilitarian standpoint39. The problem with this 
argument—from Hardin's perspective—is that it presupposes that we choose 
the principles which we would be prepared to live under, but for a 
utilitarian there is no choice-procedure which precedes the operation of 
utilitarian principles.
Hardin might be able to defend utilitarian rights if he so restricts the 
supposed rational capacities of agents that, despite the underlying agent* 
neutral value theory, they could never deviate from the practice of rights in 
such a way as to undermine those rights. But the problem is that if we can 
never act as direct-utilitarian agents, due to our rational deficiencies, then it 
is reasonable to ask whether the value-theory is false. Perhaps our inability 
to make utilitarian calculations derives not from som e perceived  
inadequacies in our cognitive machinery but rather stems from the fact of 
the pluralism of value which, by its nature, will not permit utilitarian 
calculations. In other words, Hardin has provided us with no reason to 
believe in utilitarianism, and hence no reason to believe in utilitarian 
rights.
3.3: The Self in Utilitarian Theory
I have argued that utilitarianism requires a value-theory and that the 
attempt to push such a theory into the background in order to ground rights 
is self-defeating, for what are utilitarian rights without utilitarianism? 
What might be possible, however, is a selective appeal to a utilitarian 
value theory. The personal standpoint, and rights, can be insulated from
39RAWLS (1), pp.ll-13.
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the full force of impersonal reason by the operation of a second level of 
moral thinking: intuitionism40.
Hare, in his book Moral Thinking, advocates such a strategy. In this 
section I want to concentrate upon what Hare terms the ’’critical" ( which 
means, in fact, act-utilitarian) level and, therefore, deliberately bracket out 
the intuitive level41. Of course, the theory only works if it is treated as a 
two-level theory, but there are good reasons for approaching the theory in 
this way. Firstly, critical thinking is epistemologically prior to intuitive 
thinking and, unlike the latter, it is self-subsistent: it requires no further 
principles of justification42. Secondly, some of us, argues Hare, must be 
capable of critical thinking some of the time if we are to be capable of 
resolving the conflicts that exist at the intuitive level43. The strength of 
Hare’s account is that he recognizes that a utilitarian theory of rights must, 
at some point, appeal to a value-theory, and it is that value-theory which I 
discuss in this section.
Critical thinking is act-utilitarian thinking. But what is interesting is 
how Hare comes to this conclusion. Hare argues that if we begin from what 
is involved in a moral judgement we will end up with a utilitarian theory. 
To say that something ought to be done entails an imperative or 
prescription44. That is, to say "you should do x" implies (in its central cases) 
the command "do x!". As it stands, such an imperative is not moral
^This intuitionism is a first-order, non-foundational form of intuitionism. Clearly, to be 
effective moral agents we must act upon intuitions, but that does not mean that we cannot give 
reasons for our actions (or that reasons cannot be given) which go beyond an appeal to 
intuition. I am in agreement with Hare over his locating intuitions at the non-foundational 
level but I disagree with his interpretation of the non-intuitionist, critical, second-order 
level of moral reasoning.
41HARE (2), pp.25-8.
42HARE (2), p.40.
43HARE (2), pp.45-6.
44HARE (2), p.23.
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because a person can command anything, however immoral the prescribed
action may be. Therefore, w e have to add the requirement that the
prescription entail no reference to particular persons—this being a defining
characteristic of a moral judgement. As a consequence, for my imperative to
be a moral requirement I must "go the rounds" of all the affected parties
and ask what I would want in their situation. What I would want in their
situation depends upon the desires that they have, and therefore what we
desire to be done universally is a simple additive function of what we
desire to be done in the case of each person45. And as Hare argues:
the logical apparatus of universal prescriptivism, if we  
understand what we are saying when w e make moral 
judgements, will lead us in critical thinking (without relying 
on any substantial moral intuitions) to make judgements 
which a careful act-utilitarian could make.46
The ability to engage in this kind of thinking is not always possible for the
reasons which I outlined in section 3.2. Nevertheless, Hare believes that it
is valid to conceive of a being capable of so thinking: the Archangel47. The
Archangel has superhuman knowledge and no weaknesses of reasoning; he
can scan a novel situation in all its essentials and come up with a
determinate judgement on every occasion48. What I think is of particular
interest is Hare's treatment of the conception of the self as it operates at the
critical level. What I argue is that there is a tension between a weak
(utilitarian) conception of the self and a strong (non-utilitarian) conception,
and this will have consequences for the two-level theory as a whole. My
view is that universal prescriptivism is best associated with constructivism
and as such there is much in Hare’s arguments that I believe is correct.
What I disagree with are Hare's utilitarian conclusions.
45HARE (2), pp.42, 221-6.
46HARE (2), pp.42-3; HARE (1), p.16.
47HARE (2), pp.44-5.
^HARE (2), p.44.
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We can approach this problem by considering two threats to rights, 
which exist whether or not rights are grounded in utilitarianism. The first 
threat comes from intolerant external preferences which threaten the 
autonomy of right-holders, and examples would include the imposition of 
religious or racial ideals. The second threat comes from egoism whereby 
persons lack a sufficient motivation to respect the constraints on their self- 
interest which derive from the rights of others. It should be noted that these 
threats appear to come from different, and opposed, sources.
Let us consider intolerant external preferences. Imagine that a person 
(A) has a preference that members of an ethnic minority should be given 
less-than-equal rights, such as the denial of the right to vote or to express 
opinions in public. A member of that ethnic minority (B) will, we can 
assume, have opposing preferences, ie. will desire to be treated equally. 
Imagine, however, that A's preferences are shared by a majority of the 
population such that A-type preferences outweigh B-type preferences. On a 
straightforward utilitarian calculation we would have to conclude that B 
should be treated unequally. The question is how universal prescriptivism 
might get us out of this problem whilst retaining its daim to be utilitarian.
Hare argues that in making comparisons we do not give extra weight 
to the preferences of others unless the acceptance of this is defensible from 
an impartial standpoint. He further argues that the implications of 
Bentham's "each to count for one” principle and Kant’s categorical 
imperative mean that external preferences must be ruled out. The 
argument is that by the requirement of universalization we must occupy 
the standpoints of others (Kant) and by identifying with their preferences
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w e are act-utilitarians (Bentham)49. But the problem, it seems to me, is that 
Hare runs together the notion of identifying with another and possessing 
identity :
The suggestion is that T  is not wholly a descriptive word but 
in part prescriptive. In identifying myself with some person 
either actually or hypothetically, I identify w ith his 
prescriptions.50
Hare illustrates this with the example of punishment: thinking of the 
person who would be punished as myself entails having now an aversion 
to his being punished which is equal to his then aversion. I identify with 
his prescription as if it were that of a future self51. The point is that in 
"going the rounds" of the potentially affected parties, I must consider 
whether each individual would will my prescription given his preferences 
and therefore my relationship to the other is not dissimilar to my 
relationship to my future self. So in the case of the racist preference, A must 
take up the standpoint of B which entails identifying with B’s preferences 
and then adding on the racist preference. By the same token, B must be 
prepared to universalize his preference for equal treatment and add that 
anti-racist preference onto A*s racist preferences. As a consequence we we 
shall either have a stand-off, ie. a failure to agree on a moral directive, or 
else one of the preferences will have to give way. Intuitively, we feel that 
A's preferences must give way to B's preferences, but the question is how  
we are to explain this in utilitarian-critical thinking terms. What I believe is 
at work in Hare's argument is a conception of the personal standpoint 
which involves not merely a quantitative addition of preferences but a 
qualitative  distinction between preferences. What is presupposed is a 
conception of the self not merely as a bundle of preferences but as a
49HARE (2), pp.4-5. See also my discussion of the Kantian categorical imperative, section 
2.1.
^HARE (2), pp.96-7.
51HARE (2), p.97.
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conscious self-reflective being. A can know that B has preferences to be 
treated equally but if he is to step into B's shoes then that experience adds 
something to A’s knowledge. In other words, there is a distinction between 
’’knowing that” a person has certain preferences and "knowing what it is 
like" to have those preferences.
The difficulty comes, however, when w e move our focus from 
intolerant external preferences to self-interested (self-referential) 
preferences. If I have a strong attachment to certain projects which may 
im pose costs on others, and are thus sub-optimal from a utilitarian 
standpoint, then act-utilitarianism requires that these projects give way to 
impersonal concern. But what if I say that there is a standpoint—a personal 
standpoint—which, if taken up by another person, will show that the 
sacrificing of my projects will impose great costs upon me? It may be argued 
that if a prescription involves a reference to a particular person then it 
cannot be a moral directive. But I can universalize my projects by saying 
that everybody in similar circumstances should promote their projects (the 
only difference in circumstances would be the identity of the agent 
involved). So, for example, I can prescribe that everybody should show  
disproportionate concern for their family, if they so wish. This will not 
generate a maximizing directive and it will generate conflict, for doing the 
best for your family entails that others may lose out, or you may lose by 
their actions. But not giving up these preferences is what it means to take 
up a personal standpoint, just as is resisting the implementation of A's 
racist preference.
In order to make identification result in act-utilitarianism—and 
hence counter egoism—Hare assumes a weak conception of the self but to
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overcome the problem of obnoxious preferences he must appeal to a strong 
conception of the self. I believe that this is incoherent.
3.4: Intuitions
I have concentrated upon the critical level of moral thinking because 
it is epistemologically prior to the intuitive level. However, the intuitive 
level is not a rival procedure but rather a part of the same structure, and, 
therefore, Hare’s version of utilitarian rights cannot be evaluated  
independently of a consideration of the full structure of the two-level 
theory. As I have suggested, intuitionism can be considered as a first-order 
theory of the content of moral principles, or as a second-order theory about 
the justification of those principles. Hare clearly intends intuitionism to be 
a first-order theory complementing act-utilitarianism at the second-order of 
justification. This is in contrast to intuitionism as I discussed it in chapter 2, 
for second-order intuitionists appeal to intuitions in an ultimate way as the 
rock-bottom of moral justification. Just as I am in agreement with Hare 
insofar as he takes universal prescriptivism to be the correct ’’ethical 
method” so I believe that the appeal to intuitionism at a non-foundational 
level is valid. Once again, the difficulties come when you try to combine 
this non-foundational intuitionism with a foundational utilitarianism.
What, then, is the case for intuitive thinking in Hare’s theory? 
Firstly, although it is possible to develop principles at the critical level they 
would be extremely complicated. An imperative "do X!" would require a 
multiplicity of qualifications in order for it to fully capture the slight, but 
real, differences between situations52.
52HARE (2), pp.40-1.
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Hardin argues that given the fact that moral thinking depends upon 
the intentions, or perceived intentions, of others, we could not develop 
principles such as Hare supposes that the Archangel is capable of 
developing and acting upon53. I think that this is wrong; the real point to 
be gained from treating morality as having, in part, an interactive character 
is to show that principles and judgements will be extremely complicated. 
Given this complexity we need relatively simple principles in order to 
arrive at any determinate moral conclusions. It follows that whilst critical 
thinking will be applicable only to a particular situation it will still be 
recognizable, from an impersonal standpoint, as a universal principle. 
Principles which are operative at the intuitive level lack the quality of 
specificity. They must necessarily possess the quality of generality because 
we need relatively simple principles in order to cope with situations which 
are not identical but which share many common features54.
In terms of the acquisition by individuals of principles, intuitive 
thinking is derived from the educational and socialization processes. 
Critical thinking is self-subsistent. But it is the task of critical thinking to 
select the prima facie principles to be used at the intuitive level and, 
therefore, intu itive principles are ultim ately grounded in act- 
utilitarianism55.
Hare employs many of the same considerations as Hardin in order to 
defend rights (which must be for Hare principles operative at the intuitive 
level) such as limited rationality56. In addition, Hare argues that w e need to
53HARDIN, pp.9-11.
54HARE (2), p.41.
55HARE (2), p.43.
56HARE (2), pp.35-6,89.
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be capable of acting spontaneously in situations which demand moral 
thinking57. This is an important point, for morality is essentially a practical 
problem and therefore we need to develop a moral theory which takes into 
account the necessity of action. Just as children need to become habitual 
language-users so they must also become habitual moral actors. If children 
had to continually think about the rules of grammar, their ability to read 
and write and speak would be impaired. So, likewise, children must be 
taught not always to think critically if they are to be effective moral agents.
Hare's first-order intuitionism should be contrasted with second- 
order intuitionism as I discussed it in the last chapter. Second-order 
intuitionism must appeal to the moral-sense in a basic way, by which I 
mean it must take moral sentiments as given. This creates serious limits to 
the possibility of critically re-forming our intuitions and, indeed, raises the 
question of how any critical re-formulation is possible. First-order 
intuitionism can appeal to a critical level because ultimately it is critical 
utilitarian thinking which selects intuitive principles.
This, however, raises some difficult questions. If w e have an 
intuitive belief in, say, the right to private property, do w e have that belief 
because it accords with critical thinking, or do w e have the belief 
independently of critical thinking? In other words, can our intuitive beliefs 
be false or go wrong in some way? Clearly, this must be the case if we are to 
retain the priority of the critical level over the intuitive level. As a 
consequence, if we are to have confidence in the validity of our intuitive 
judgements—and we necessarily suppose that we do when we think our 
actions moral—then we must actually appeal to the critical level a great deal 
of the time. This means that rights are not, in fact, insulated from the effects
57HARE (2), p.35.
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of a second-order act-utilitarian value-theory. There are, I think, three 
possible responses to this.
Firstly, w e might argue, as Hardin does, that w e can never think 
critically58, and therefore we cannot have recourse to the critical level in 
order to validate our intuitive judgements. But as I have argued this 
denudes utilitarian rights of their utilitarian basis. Secondly, we might 
suggest that the intuitive level is really a form of rule-utilitarianism. Rule- 
utilitarians hold that utility is maximized if w e take into account the 
consequences of following a rule rather than simply attempting to calculate 
how to maximize utility in every case. Given human motivations the 
observance of rules stabilizes expectations, overcomes collective action 
problems and reduces the costs of calculation. Overall, it should increase 
utility.
However, there are several difficulties with rule-utilitarianism. If we 
had perfect information and super-human powers of calculation, then rule- 
utilitarianism would be extensionally equivalent to act-utilitarianism59. 
This is because rule-utilitarianism cannot be justified if it leads to sub- 
optimal outcomes, and perfect information means that w e can make quite 
precise calculations such that any rules will become loaded down with 
exceptions to the point at which the rules are undermined. But even if we 
lacked perfect information we would still find rule-utilitarianism unstable. 
I w ould argue that a consequence would be what might be termed 
"sectional rule-utilitarianism". Rights would be respected within sections of 
society insofar as individuals were incapable of making distinctions within 
that group. This would lead to rights being respected within that group but
58HARDIN, pp.17-18.
59LYONS (1), pp.115-18
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not outside of that group and, consequently, the generality of rights would 
be threatened. For example, men will assert their rights relative to women 
in the work-place insofar as people are capable of making discriminations 
between men and women. Men will have no fear that their preferences will 
generate disutility for themselves through the application of rules because 
they discern a difference between themselves and other groups. This 
argument should not be misunderstood. Although the rejection of equal 
rights for men and women is the product of self-interested preferences, 
what generates differential treatment on utilitarian grounds is that the 
rejection of equal rights generates the most utility because it avoids the 
charge that it would be disutilitarian for anybody to ignore the rule. Rule- 
utilitarianism would generate some rights but not a structure of general 
rights, and those rights it did create would be inherently unstable60. Of 
course, Hare’s universalization principle, involving as it does a strong 
conception of the self, would dispose of this problem. But I have argued 
that such an argument presupposes an appeal to non-utilitarian thinking.
Thirdly, it might be argued that the critical level must not simply 
select principles which are to operate at the intuitive level but must also 
inculcate a belief that those principles are worthy of respect independently 
of utilitarian considerations. This is premised upon a belief that trying to 
copy the Archangel will have disastrous consequences. In order to get 
results as close to what the Archangel would get w e must deliberately 
restrict our intuitive thinking. We have to believe that our intuitive 
principles are self-subsistent, which means that they are independent of 
utilitarianism. Moral education would then involve the application to
60As Lyons argues the only way that utilitarianism can accomodate rights is either by 
arguing that rights-observance matches utility, or else that breaking rules has great 
disutility. Neither can be assumed and neither addresses the issue that once rules are 
stablished, it is illicit to break them. Rule-utilitarianism cannot account for the moral 
bindingness of rules. See LYONS (4), pp.120-1.
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utilitarianism of what Raz, in a different context, called epistemic 
abstinence. It would involve splitting the motivation for an action from the 
justification for an action61.
The problems with this are two-fold. Firstly, Hare has argued that 
some of us must be capable of critical thinking some of the time. Secondly, 
and, I think, more seriously, it involves the inculcation of theoretical 
irrationality; the reasons for which people act, or believe they are acting, are 
false. Hare would be betraying the rationalist claims that he has sought to 
uphold62.
61RAZ (5), p.14.
62And undermining the formal requirements of morality that he has elsewhere advanced. 
See section 2.1.
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3.5: Rights as Goals
Various strategies have been advanced to build rights—and hence the 
personal standpoint—into the utilitarian value-theory. Rather than treating 
rights as (just) first-order principles, we take them to be, or represent, 
objectively-valuable states of affairs, which are to be promoted. Rights are 
conceived as goals to be maximized in consequentialist terms. This strategy 
bears some similarity to the ideal-utilitarianism advanced by G.E.Moore63. 
Rather than simply aggregating preferences (regardless of their content) we 
begin with a number of conceptions of ideal states, eg. a society governed by 
rights, and we build these into the maximand.
The starting point for the "rights as goals" strategy is the exclusion of 
"external preferences". An external preference is one in which a person A  
has a preference that another person B be treated in a certain way. A's 
preference could be positive by which I mean A might desire that B should 
receive beneficial treatment, or negative as in the "racist preference" 
example discussed in section 3.3. In standard utilitarianism no distinction 
can be drawn between self-regarding and other-regarding preferences. John 
Harsanyi argues that the Benthamite principle of equal interests requires 
that we exclude all external preferences from the utilitarian maximand64. 
He argues that we should assign some value to free personal choice65. What 
we must do is to give extra weight to individual preferences in the 
utilitarian calculation, even if this leads us to select strategies which would, 
in classical terms, be sub-optimal. I have already questioned whether 
Bentham's principle really entails a protection for the personal standpoint. I
^MOORE, pp.105-7.
64HARSANYI, p.56.
65HARSANYI, pp.60-1.
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question whether it can be said even to imply the exclusion of external 
preferences. The strategy of weighting individual, self-regarding preferences 
does not amount to a recognition of a strong, ie. evaluative, conception of 
the self. Values can still be placed on a single scale, and agents are still 
required to view  their own values impersonally. It is strange to say that 
Harsanyi is giving a weight to free personal choice, for the conception of the 
self as a free agent cannot be accomodated simply by excluding external 
preferences, and if free personal choice means more than the exclusion of 
such preferences then Harsanyi must defend his theory against the charge 
that it is not utilitarian66. In other words, once w e give a weight to free 
personal choice then we have admitted some form of prudential reasoning 
into the utilitarian maximand, and with it the possibility that values are 
not automatically commensurable.
Ronald Dworkin has offered what I believe to be a similar theory. He 
argues:
rights are best understood as trumps over some background 
justification for political decisions that states a goal for the 
community as a whole.67
The background is a kind of utilitarianism: fulfilling as many goals of
individuals as is possible. Since utilitarianism owes its appeal to its
egalitarian cast, the grounds for accepting it as a background justification
shows that utility must, in Dworkin's opinion, yield to some right of moral
independence68. This excludes obnoxious external preferences69.
^Harsanyi admits that rationality isn't enough: we need to share some basic moral 
commitments. This seems to me like intuitionism. HARSANYI, p.62.
67DWORKIN (3), p.153.
68DWORKIN (3), p.158.
69For a critique of Dworkin's argument see HART (2), pp.91-8.
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I think that Dworkin conceives utilitarianism as a theory which we  
use as a justificatory device in a situation in which we choose constitutional 
principles: a kind of utilitarian original position70. But the right of moral 
independence immediately assumes a foundational conception of the self, 
for w e need a reason to accept the notion of independence (independence of 
what?) which is not merely the kind of psychological egoism assumed by 
Bentham. What I think is at work in Dworkin's argument is an appeal to 
equality as intrinsically valuable, independently of a conception of the self. 
In other words, there operates in Dworkin's argument a foundational 
in tu ition ism .
Thomas Scanlon has argued that freedom and equality (and rights) 
should be understood as goals to be pursued. Rights are desirable features of 
states of affairs and they should be incorporated into the maximand71. This 
represents a departure from the standard m axim izin g  procedure of 
utilitarianism. It represents an attempt to incorporate factors about what 
may happen to people and the ability to affect what will happen into a 
utilitarian moral theory. Treating rights as goals to be promoted is 
consequentialist in that it holds rights to be justified by appeal to the states 
of affairs that they promote. But it is not a maximalist strategy for the aim is 
to avoid very bad consequences. The theory is concerned to achieve and 
maintain an acceptable distribution of control over important factors in our 
lives.
The problem is that rights as goals appears to fall between two stools. 
As Scanlon himself suggests, rights can work in either of two ways. They 
can constrain individual decisions in order to promote some desired
70DWORKIN (3), p.157.
71SCANLON (2), p.143.
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further effect or they can parcel out valued forms of discretion over which 
individuals are in conflict72. I believe that these are incompatible 
conceptions and that the latter presupposes a conception of the self which 
resists incorporation into a utilitarian value theory. Once you grant rights— 
and here it is important to assume that rights entail powers and not just 
claims—you grant a certain degree of self-determination to the agent such 
that, from an impersonal standpoint, you lose, as it were, control over the 
collective outcome of rights. Of course, a moral theory must be concerned to 
ensure that moral principles are not distorted by individual preferences and 
maybe this is what Scanlon has in mind, but this concern does not make a 
rights-theory consequentialist.
To conclude this chapter, we can say that there are, in general, three 
strategies that have been adopted to ground rights in utilitarianism. Firstly, 
there is Hardin's appeal to the problematic nature of human reasoning. 
Secondly, we can, like Hare, distinguish between a value-theory and a 
decision-procedure, and allow our intuitions to guide us in our respect for 
rights. Thirdly, we might attempt to incorporate rights into the value- 
theory itself by treating rights as goals. I have argued that none of these 
strategies work. Weaknesses in human reasoning call into question the 
efficacy of the one thing that makes utilitarianism a distinctive theory: its 
value-theory. Hare's two-level theory is incapable of insulating rights from 
the full force of the act-utilitarianism that is operative at the highest level 
of his theory. Furthermore, his attempt to overcome obnoxious preferences 
involves making an appeal to a conception of the self that is incompatible 
with act-utilitarianism. Likewise, to treat rights as goals is either too 
utilitarian or not utilitarian enough.
72SCANLON (2), pp.147-8.
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PART II: THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF.
Chapter 4
Prudential Rationality
In Part One I outlined three foundational theories of rights and 
argued that of the three neither intuitionism nor utilitarianism could 
account for certain fundamental features of the practice of rights. However, 
up to this point I have merely outlined what I believe to be entailed in a 
constructivist account of the grounds of rights rather than providing a 
defence of constructivism. I have suggested that central to this theory is the 
idea that persons deliberate from the standpoint of a hypothetical choice- 
situation in which they are characterized as having a desire to reach 
agreement upon, and live by, principles that are moral, but are also 
motivated by a certain non-moral good, ie. the primary goods1. That is, 
persons are assumed to have both a moral and a prudential motivation.
This combination of prudence and morality may appear to generate a 
serious tension. I, qua moral agent, can will that I live by certain moral 
principles, yet those principles will appear in certain circumstances to be 
irrational; that is, they appear to be irrational from the standpoint of self- 
interest. The tension between moral and prudential agency appears 
irresolvable. I, as a fully rational agent, feel the force of two kinds of 
rationality pulling me in different directions and neither one of these 
rationalities can be reduced to the other or elim inated through
1See section 2.1.
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redefinition2. If I attach a special weight to my interests I cannot maintain 
that it is prudentially rational to subscribe to the hypothetical choice- 
situation.
Of course, we can argue that morality must override self-interest, and 
this is indeed a feature of moral rationality. The difficulty is that to move 
from the formality of a moral universalization procedure to substantive 
principles requires making appeal to certain non-moral facts, and if we are 
to avoid intuitionism or naturalism3 these will be facts about human 
interests. Therefore, we must ask whether it is possible to wash out all 
traces of self-interest from the notion of interests in general. Clearly, the 
moral construction procedure must transcend self-interest and this can be 
done if we can show that each person gets the best deal possible consistent 
with the requirements of morality. To puli this off, constructivism must 
demonstrate that the primary goods are of equal value to each person4.
As I have suggested the primary goods presuppose a conception of 
the agent as capable of transcending the immediacy of his preferences5; he 
need not change his preferences but he must have the capacity to do so: his
2See NAGEL (6), p .ll.
3Naturalism assumes that moral facts are accessible in the same way as facts about the 
empirical, physical world.
4As I shall argue (chapter 6) the primary goods entail a strong conception of social cooperation,
albeit of a non-moral kind. However, in order to achieve the benefits of social cooperation we 
must have some notion of moral cooperation-indeed, the point of the moral choice situation is to 
bring about social cooperation on moral terms. Yet since we must not assume any substantive moral 
principles, eg. rights, we have to distinguish between non-moral social cooperation that is part 
of one's prudential good and the idea of the formal requirements of morality that underlie the 
choice-procedure. I argue that the combination of these commits one to the equal validity of the 
primary goods.
5See section 2.1.
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relationship to his ends must be reflective rather than brute6. My aim in 
this chapter will be to argue that an agent who does not, or cannot, adopt 
such a standpoint vis-a-vis his ends is not optimally rational, and hence not 
acting in his own best interests. Central to this discussion is the notion of 
"prudence" or "prudential rationality". I regard prudence as the highest, or 
most developed, form of self-interest. To act prudentially is to treat one’s 
life as a temporal whole, rather than privileging immediate (present) 
desires over past or future desires. I further argue that prudence 
presupposes that we are enduring beings—that is, w e possess trans-temporal 
personal identity. Hence, the twin conceptions of rational prudence and 
personal identity are central to constructivism.
Derek Parfit, in his book Reasons and Persons, and Michael Sandel, 
in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, also take the concept of the self to be 
central to ethical theory, although it must be admitted that they approach 
the question in rather different ways7. I follow them in taking the 
relationship between a "self" and its "ends" to be of fundamental 
importance. As a self-interested actor I, as it were, attach myself to objects in 
the world, and endow those objects with value: value-for-me. The problem 
is how w e connect together various elements in this process: what (or who) 
is the actor? Why does it (or he) favour some objects rather than others? 
Are these objects intrinsically valuable? Since the primary goods exist to 
facilitate the formation of agent-relative value these questions are crucial to 
the coherence of constructivism.
6By "brute" I mean that the agent just has ends which he cannot reflect upon and which he cannot 
imagine himself without.
7PARFIT (2); SANDEL (1).
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One strategy for dealing with the problem of the self and its ends is 
simply to appeal to basic desires as the foundation of rational self-interest. 
But it is here that the concept of prudence is so important. Rational 
prudence entails the claim that a person can be moved to act in his future 
interests in d ep en d en tly  of his present psychological states (which 
necessarily include his desires). A defence of prudence will, therefore, 
involve a rejection of the desire-based theory of practical reason and one of 
the aims of this chapter is to show the falsity of that desire-based theory.
However, I shall also argue that the rejection of this view of practical 
reason leaves a gap in the defence of prudence. If desire does not explain 
value, and reasons for action, then must we assume that it is the desired 
objects that generate the motivation to act? Are my pursuits, or ends, 
objectively valuable independently of my desires? If this is so then how do 
we explain the relativism of values; that is, why should I have a bias 
towards my interests where that bias is caused by those projects being mine? 
Somehow, we need to re-introduce the subject if w e are to ground 
prudence. As will be clear I shall not attempt to show how this is possible in 
this chapter, rather I shall engage in a problematics. I argue that any theory 
must confront Humeian scepticism concerning the existence of a self 
separable from its perceptions where "perceptions" may be basic desires for, 
or images of, objects existing independently of mind and generating value8.
I begin with a discussion of various competing theories of practical 
rationality (section 4.1) and then move on to a discussion of the nature of 
desire as it operates in rational action (section 4.2). I argue that the appeal to
8HUME, p300.
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basic desire is incoherent, but also that self-interest cannot be explained in 
terms of objective agent-neutral value and so we need a conception of the 
subject. In section 4.3 I turn my attention towards the special problem of 
prudence and argue that the ability to form a "trans-temporal good" 
involves the capacity to "transcend" both desire and object, and this 
suggests that what is at work is a capacity—"reason". The task is to explain 
how this faculty works, and here we come up against the Kantian problem 
of relating abstract reason to empirical circumstances (section 4.4), and this 
is particularly acute in the case of prudence (as opposed to morality). In 
section 4.5 I set out what I believe is required if w e are to develop an 
adequate account of prudence.
4.1: Practical Reason
In order to grasp the nature of practical reason it would be useful to 
begin the discussion with a practical syllogism. This is a way of presenting 
the rational deliberative situation that an agent is faced with. Let us 
imagine a person (A) faced with the following syllogism: (l)major premise: 
you (A) would like, or aim, or desire, to own a painting by Rembrandt; 
(2)minor premise: such a painting is being auctioned tomorrow at 
Sotheby's; (3)conclusion: you ought, all things being equal, to go to 
Sotheby's and make a bid for that Rembrandt.
There are several questions that can be raised concerning the 
relationships between the elements in this syllogism. Firstly, we can ask 
what is the source or nature of the major premise: is it a desire or an 
objective value or some other principle that provides A with the aim of
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owning a Rembrandt? Does A aim to own it simply because he desires it or 
because such a painting has objectively desirable properties, where 
objectivity may be agent-neutral or agent-relative?
Secondly, even if one were to maintain that the answer to the first 
question is that desire determines a person's ends, we might still argue that 
the means to that end are objectively determined. So, for example, a person 
may desire to go to the local department store in the belief that he will be 
able to buy an original Rembrandt there, but this desire is based upon a false 
belief such that the minor premise is in conflict with the major premise: 
attempting to buy a Rembrandt at the local store will not secure the end in 
question. Is it coherent to maintain that desire sets the end but that the 
means are determined independently of desire?
Thirdly, there is the question of the nature of the conclusion to be 
drawn from the conjunction of the major and minor premises. Is it to be 
inferred that person A has a reason to go to Sotheby's and make his bid but 
it also be admitted that A lacks a sufficient motivation to so act, or does the 
conclusion provide both a reason to act and a motivation for acting? That 
is, can a person be "practically indifferent" with regard to a reason for 
action? Can the agent acknowledge that he has a reason to go to Sotheby's 
but decide not do so and maintain that he is not irrational in so deciding?
There are three perspectives on these questions, and I shall term 
them conativism, cognitivism and rationalism. In order to illustrate the 
distinctions between them I shall use an example presented by Nagel in his 
book The Possibility of Altruism. He imagines that there is a person (I shall
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call him Tom) who is feeling thirsty and sees a drinks-machine in the 
room. Tom puts some change in the machine, waits for a drink to be 
dispensed, opens the resulting bottle, and drinks9. Nagel asks why Tom 
does this action and not some other action, such as putting a coin in his 
pendl-sharpener in the belief that a drink will result and thereby he will 
quench his thirst10. We could say that the drinks-machine has certain 
objective characteristics that a pencil sharpener lacks. A conativist will 
accept that these objective features will in part determine Tom's action (and 
his reason for action), but a conativist would also argue that if it were not 
for the fact that Tom was feeling thirsty he would have no reason to put a 
coin into the drinks-machine. In other words, contained in the major 
premise is a basic desire to achieve the pleasurable state of not feeling 
thirsty, or more simply, Tom has an aversion (a negative desire) to thirst. 
Reason simply informs Tom about what features of the world are useful to 
him given his desires11.
For a cognitivist desire is always derived from a reflection upon the 
desired object or state of affairs. The things that a person pursues, such as 
say, a religious life, or the enjoyment of fine wines, or the pursuit of the 
intellect, do not determine reasons for action independently of a reflective 
process, but that reflective process must always involve having before one's 
mind the idea that certain objects have desirability-characteristics; object 
precedes desire.
^AGEL (1), p33.
10NAGEL (1), p34.
n HUME, pp.461-2.
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Conativism presupposes that desire endows objects with value, 
whereas a cognitivist assumes that it is the "desirability-characteristics" of 
objects that generate desire. The problem is that we are faced with a stand­
off12. In the drinks-machine example, Tom must be thirsty (have a basic 
desire to quench his thirst) in order to have a reason to put some money in 
the machine13; but Tom must already have a conception of what it is like 
not to feel thirst if he is to desire to eliminate his thirst, and he must 
assume that the state of "being free from thirst" is valuable14.
Let us at this point introduce the third view  of practical reason: 
rationalism15. The reason for action is not to be identified with either the 
desire to act or the desirability of the object, but rather the reason is the 
product of a deliberative process that involves both desire and object. For a 
rationalist, desire is evidence of the presence of a subject who acts upon the 
world, whilst objects stand opposed to the subject. Reason is that faculty of 
the intellect that "guides" the subject to favour some objects over others; 
rationality is to be found in the structure of deliberative thought rather 
than in desire or object. Now, admittedly this is an obscure notion, and 
since it is my preferred position I shall attempt in the rest of the dissertation 
to put some flesh on it16. However, it should be said that I have already
12See MARKS (2), p.139.
13See FOOT; MARKS (2).
14What is more, the nature of the object can be seen to determine desire and this is evidenced by 
the experience of disappointment De Sousa argues that we can have technical satisfaction (our 
desires are achieved) without phenomenological satisfaction (our actually enjoying the 
outcome). DE SOUSA, ch.8.
15Rationalism I associate with the practical philosophy of Kant. See KANT (2).
16The attraction of rationalism lies in its emphasis upon the nature of reason as both justifying an 
action and motivating a person to act. A rational agent does not act in accordance with a reason 
but from a reason.
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discussed a form of rationalism in Part I: the Kantian categorical 
imperative17.
The categorical imperative is, of course, applied to moral reasoning 
whereas my concern in this chapter is with prudential reason. However, it 
is useful to point out a special problem with self-interest which is brought 
out when we consider moral reason. Morality is concerned with the 
universalization of maxims, and to an extent this involves an abstraction 
from the characteristics of particular individuals. That abstraction cannot be 
complete for the reasons that have led me to the present discussion—the 
need for a conception of the social world and the beings that exist in that 
world. However, self-interest involves appeal to the concept of agent- 
relative value—a self-interested reason is limited to a particular individual. 
Whilst rationalism involves abstraction from desires and objects it must 
nevertheless anchor reasons for action in the human subject18. It is the 
worry that rationalism (and cognitivism) cannot achieve this that lends 
support to the conativist position, which places the emphasis upon basic 
desire as the "motor" for rational action. Let us therefore consider the 
conativist position in more detail.
17See section 2.1.
18The function of reason is to produce a will that is good-in-itself and not one that is good merely 
as a means. This suggests that reason stands opposed to both conativism (desire) and cognitivism 
(object), for both tie the will to heteronomy-indudng features of the world (KANT (2), p.64). 
Clearly, this generates difficulties for morality; difficulties which are severe when applied to 
prudential reasoning.
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4.2: Desire and Object
We should make a distinction between motivated and unmotivated 
desires. If I aim to do something, such as own a Rembrandt, or overcome 
my thirst, I desire to do something. Yet this does not prove that desire must 
be among the conditions  of action since to have a reason to act will 
inevitably result in a desire to act. This desire is derived from something 
that is not itself desire and far from affirming the conativist view of reason 
this fact suggests that desire is an effect and not a cause. It is a "motivated 
desire”. An unmotivated desire exists if one claims that a person has a 
desire for an object and that desire cannot be explained by the desirability- 
characteristics of the object19.
The conativist account of reason must depend upon a certain 
conception of desire: desire as an immediate drive. If I desire X then I want 
to have or do X and this means that I shall have formed an intention, of 
whatever complexity, in order to get X. But the intention cannot be 
identical with the desire, for the intention is complex; it is directed onto an 
object20. An intention is a reflective act. A desire must be, from a conativist 
standpoint, a brute datum; an unmediated psychological state the character 
of which is a sensation of wanting some object or state of affairs. 
Furthermore, a conativist must follow Hobbes in believing that there are 
only two kinds of attitude: desire and aversion21. Whilst there can be 
quantitative differences between desires and aversions, ie. differences in
19NAGEL (2), p29; DAVIS, pp.63-7.
20ANSCOMBE (2), pp.84-5.
21HOBBES, p.119.
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their relative levels of intensity, there can be no further q u a lita tive  
distinctions.
This definition of desire implies not only that desire is a subjective 
state but that the conditions for the satisfaction of a desire are different from 
the conditions for the adequacy of a mind-independent statement about the 
world. The conditions of satisfaction for desires are subjectively determined 
and are thus not dependent upon what happens in the world. Yet this 
seems to be implausible, for surely my desire to have or do X will only be 
satisfied if, in fact, I have or do X. The quenching of my thirst will depend 
upon the availability of the means to that end and this will be objectively 
determined. But as I suggested in section 4.1 a conativist will appeal to the 
fact of having a desire to quench one's thirst, yet as I have also argued this 
always already involves a conception of the object that could satisfy the 
thirst.
Thus, a conativist must show how a non-circular definition of desire 
can be arrived at. Desire always seems to involve a notion of desirability22. 
Conativistism is unable to show how desire, qua desire, can motivate a 
person to do some act in particular such as putting a coin in a drinks- 
machine. That is, every act of desiring involves a conception of the object 
that is before one, such that desire always involves a belief about that object. 
What then are the strengths of the conativist position?
^STAMPE (1), p.161.
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Firstly, a distinction is often drawn between justificatory and 
explanatory reasons23. Moral theory ("normative theory") is associated with 
what we ought to do, and prudence can be understood as analogous in this 
respect to morality, whilst empirical social science ("positive theory") is 
concerned with explaining why we do what we do and it assumes that we 
do not always do what we ought to do; we do not act upon the reasons that 
w e give ourselves24. This easy distinction between justification and 
explanation, if true, would undermine practical reason. If true it would 
mean that reasons for action do not move persons to act and "practical" 
reasons are, in fact, nothing more than theoretical statements, and very 
strange theoretical statements at that. So, for example, I could say "I should 
buy a Rembrandt at Sotheby’s today", but fail to make any effort to act on 
that. Now, clearly there are cases where people appear to recognize that they 
have a reason to act but fail to act. My objection to the normative/positive 
distinction is that it leaves human action unintelligible from the 
standpoint of the agent. If we argue that persons are incapable of being 
moved to act on reasons they ascribe to themselves then we cannot credit 
them with the ability to reason at all. We must then find "objective" factors, 
such as psychological disorders, in order to explain their actions25. If I fail to 
buy a Rembrandt and yet claim that "I should buy a Rembrandt" then I 
have not understood the statement correctly. It is a condition of the 
intelligibility of human action that persons are moved by the reasons that 
they give themselves, or else that other reasons are to be found to explain 
their behaviour.
23RAZ (3), pp.2-4.
24G.R.Grice argues that it is false to say that there are no reasons without corresponding desires 
but true to say that there are no motives without desire. If desire is understood as unmotivated 
desire I think this argument is incoherent. See GRICE (1), p.168.
^STRAWSON (2), pp.16-17.
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The second line of support for the conativist position is that it 
provides a link between subjectivity and human action and hence provides 
a way of accounting for agent-relative values. The claim, however, is largely 
negative, for it involves considering a purely cognitivist account of reason 
whereby it is the objective features of, say, a painting by Rembrandt, or a 
drinks-machine, that move a person to act. Such a cognitivist account must 
assum e that value inheres in objects independently of mind and, 
consequently, it is not at all clear what role the subject plays in the 
formation of ends, or how we are to explain why different agents can 
rationally  adopt different ends26. What we are left with is a Platonist 
account in which the subject is reduced to an unproblematically cognitive 
role, and a form of reasoning that involves no significant choices27 (the 
choices that are "made” are pre-determined as valid or invalid). It is 
perhaps this worry that lends credibility to the idea that there are basic 
desires which move a person to act. In other words, conativism seems to 
involve a greater sensitivity towards the idea of subjectivity28.
The third reason why conativism appears plausible is its association 
with rational choice theory, and, in particular, with the idea of ’’revealed 
preference”29. Here desire is no longer associated with states of mind but
26Stampe argues that the appeal of desire is that it expresses the perception of value. If I desire 
an object X then it seems to me that object X is worth desiring. STAMPE (2), p.359.
27As Gauthier argues—I think correctly—the desirability-characterization of an object does not 
explain the ground of the want, rather it explains the particular nature of the want, by 
describing the object wanted in such a way that it is clear why it is wanted. Desirability- 
characterization straddles the distinction between subject and object—an object is only valuable 
for beings capable of appreciating the object. See GAUTHIER (1), chapter 3.
28The difficulty is that conativism cannot account for the subject that has desires. This raises 
some difficulties concerning personal identity, which I discuss in chapter 5 (especially section 
5.4).
29See SEN (2), pp.66-8, for a discussion of the assumptions of rational choice theory.
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rather with behaviour as expressed through preferences (the model of the 
consumer is very much in evidence). Various principles are advanced for 
ordering one's preferences: internal consistency, transitivity of preference, 
full knowledge of one's ends. Some sophistication is added by the idea of 
making decisions under conditions of uncertainty (this introduces the 
element of risk). I shall have nothing to say about rational choice theory in 
its details, but I would say that the theory presupposes that a person need 
not be concerned with the rationality of the ends themselves, except insofar 
as ends generate utility (utility can be defined in different ways). This 
assumes that conflict is quantitative rather than qualitative; ends are not 
only commensurable but can be ordered on a single scale. But as I argue 
persons face conflicts of ends such that they cannot avoid making 
judgements about the intrinsic value of their preferences. People face 
conflicts of religious belief, of lifestyles, of career choices, of relationships 
with others, and these often involve qualitative choices and as such there 
exists no scale or maximand to provide guidance30. The difficulties with 
conativism become even starker when we turn to the question of decision­
making over time, and it is to this issue that I now turn.
4.3: Prudence
Prudence is the rational concern that a person should have for 
himself as an enduring being. The prudential standpoint treats times in a 
person's life as having value at all times, and as such, generating reasons 
for action. Since prudence is something of a term of art in moral and
^STOCKER, pp.172-3, 180-1.
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political theory—unlike, say, self-interest—it might help to locate the concept 
by making some comparisons and contrasts.
Prudence is sometimes taken to be that part of practical reasoning 
concerned with the interests of the agent in general, and in contrast to 
morality31. Prudence is, however, a narrower term that signifies a particular 
form (the highest form) of self-interest, ie. the view that it is rational to give 
prima facie equal concern to all parts of one's life32. As I shall argue 
prudence represents a high-order form of self-interest, the fact of which I 
believe has important implications for the relationship between self- 
interest and morality in rights.
Rational prudence must be distinguished from the psychological 
disposition, ie. the tendency to be circumspect. This disposition would, for 
example, imply that a person should not engage in "life-threatening" 
activities, such as boxing or rock-climbing. But the question of the 
rationality of such preferences will depend upon one’s aims and values, 
and prudence may well "endorse" them. It is not even to be inferred from a 
defence of rational prudence that one should always place a priority on 
one’s physical preservation over "ground projects" that might tend to 
threaten that preservation.
One reason for not taking account of the future is simply that we do 
not know what it holds. Rather, we just accept that we have a future (and a 
past) and this ought to have a force upon our actions. As I shall argue,
31RICHARDS (1), p.69.
32NAGEL (1), pp36,69.
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insofar as prudence is problematic it is so for reasons deeper than that of the 
cognitive or epistemic inaccessibility of future states of affairs.
Prudence entails the possibility of imprudence—the failure to act on 
prudential reasons for action. But the riva l theory to prudence is 
aprudence33. Aprudence discounts an action not because of uncertainty 
about the future, but on principle, because the object of an action lies in the 
fu tu re34. There is, however, a third position between prudence and 
aprudence and this is the view that prudence is neither irrational, as the 
aprudentialist claims, nor a rational requirement, as the prudentialist 
maintains. It is this middle position that I am concerned with in this 
section, for this is the conativist position on prudence. Just as I require a 
basic (unmotivated) desire in order to attempt to obtain a drink from a 
drinks-machine, or bid for a Rembrandt, so I require a basic prudential 
desire in order to be motivated to act in ways that will be beneficial to me in 
the future. Acting prudentially is rational insofar as one has a desire to so 
act, but the nature of the self as an enduring being cannot be the source of 
that prudential desire.
I shall consider a second example by Nagel to illustrate the conativist 
position on prudence. I should say that I find Nagel's arguments against 
conativism quite compelling, but I also find his own formulation of the 
nature and grounds of prudence to be unsatisfactory, and I shall consider 
those in more detail in section 4.4. Nagel imagines that he will be in Rome 
six weeks from now (time t+6) and at t+6 he will have reason to speak
33See TREBILCOT.
^TREBILCOT, p.205.
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Italian. As a means to speaking Italian at t+6, prudential reason would 
direct him to enrol in an Italian language class now, ie. at time t35. The 
problem is how we are to conceptualize the nature of the reason such that it 
can be shown that it requires a person to so act. The major premise is 
"Nagel will be in Rome at t+6 and will need to speak some Italian". The 
minor premise is the availability of the means to speak some Italian at t+6: 
a language class. The difference between this example and Nagel’s drinks- 
machine example is that the person who is considering using the drinks- 
machine desires to quench his thirst now—there are assumed to be no 
intervening events. However, a person planning a trip to Rome in six 
weeks time must assume that there will be intervening events and that the 
object of his prudential desire is at a distance from the fact of desire.
Given the conativist definition of desire as a brute datum—an 
immediate sensation directed onto an object—it follows that for a conativist 
desire is always rooted in the present. A person may well desire now  to 
speak Italian at t+6 but he cannot be sure that he will, in fact, desire to speak 
Italian at t+6. Alternatively, he may not now desire to speak Italian but 
knows that he will desire to speak Italian at t+636. For a conativist the fact 
that a person may have a future desire to speak Italian cannot provide a 
reason to act now. Only present desires can motivate a person to act such 
that in the case of prudence there must exist an unmotivated desire to 
speak Italian at t+6. The point can be underlined by saying that given the 
nature of desire as an immediate phenomenon, present desires must have 
complete priority over future desires.
^NAGEL (1), pp.58-9.
^NAGEL (1), pp.39-40.
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It might be argued that we do not need a specific present desire for a 
particular action at t+6 but rather merely a prudential desire. Richard Foley 
argues that a desire-based prudential requirement can be arrived at through 
a two-step procedure whereby a person has a desire for self-respect and 
believes himself to be an enduring entity. The combination of these two 
steps generates a respect for one’s temporally-extended self which, of 
course, entails a concern for what one knows one will desire at some future 
date37.
The problem with the prudential desire argument is that either it is a 
derived, or motivated, desire, or else it is just another basic desire that must 
compete with other non-prudential desires. Foley's argument presupposes 
a belief in personal identity such that it must be the case that it is features of 
the self that are desirable rather than desire generating value for oneself. If 
this is not the case then what is the focus of self-respect or self-concern? Of 
course, it might be a false belief that grounds the desire but then the 
conativist argument still presupposes that there is something that is held to 
be desirable even if that "something” does not exist What I mean by this is 
that a conativist might sustain the prudential desire by promoting a belief 
in personal identity. This would be the prudential equivalent of the 
application of epistemic abstinence to morality that I discussed in chapters 2 
and 338. The argument would be that life goes better if we care about our 
personal futures and to care about those futures requires believing that we 
are enduring beings and hence believing that it isn't unmotivated desire
37FOLEY, pp.7-2.
38See sections 2.3 and 3.4.
125
that explains value but the objective value of ourselves. Therefore, it is 
better if we do not act like conativists. I think, however, that such an 
argument undermines the principles of rationality, eg. self-transparency.
What the case of prudence brings out is the problem of "intra- 
personal pluralism". We know that we will have a variety of desires over 
the period of our lives and the task of prudence is to arbitrate between these 
conflicting claims. What we need is a standpoint that "transcends" those 
desires. Now, it may be argued that we are creating a problem of intra­
personal pluralism by insisting upon prudence as a requirement upon 
action. If we were simply to posit the priority of present desires (or ends) 
over future desires then rational self-interest could be defined as the 
interests of the self at any particular time. However, this objection to the 
rational requirement of prudence fails for two related reasons. Firstly, if I 
claim that I am acting in my "se//-interest" then this presupposes that there 
is an entity separable from my particular preferences which forms the 
ground of those preferences. If this self does not endure through time then 
it is incumbent upon an opponent of rational prudence to explain how a 
"momentary self" is identifiable.
Secondly, the way we act in the present is structured by a conception 
of ourselves as enduring beings. The content of present desires and 
preferences presupposes that we endure through time, and hence as 
rational agents we must have some idea of what we think w e will want in 
the future. What is more, in the absence of a conception of ourselves as 
enduring beings we would be faced with some troubling conflicts. I might 
be faced with choosing between push-pin and poetry as alternative activities
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and I cannot resolve this conflict by engaging in both activities 
simultaneously, so I move to a higher synthetic level39--the level of the 
enduring self. I ask myself what elements make up a "trans-temporal good" 
(for me) and I will, perhaps, conclude that a good which allows for both 
push-pin and poetry is such a good. Difficulties arise, however, when I 
know that my conception of the good will change over time and that on 
pain of contradiction I cannot simply privilege my present conception of 
the good over past or future conceptions.
One of the difficulties with prudential rationality is how we 
accomodate agent-relative value. If I am to form a trans-temporal good, 
then it must be a good-for-me. The point is that prudence represents the 
ultimate standpoint of self-interest, such that an agent may be rationally 
required to forgo his present desires in the interests of a future good, but 
this does not entail the abandonment of his desires completely. The 
question is whether a standpoint can be found that is capable of 
transcending the present whilst maintaining a strong link with the 
"personal" or "subjective". Whilst I believe Nagel's critique of conativism, 
and the idea of prudential desire, is compelling, I do not think that his own 
formulation of the prudential standpoint is coherent. Nevertheless, its 
shortcomings are informative, and I shall in the next section use his 
arguments as a way of exploring further the problems associated with 
prudence.
39STOCKER, pp.172-3,180-1.
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4.4: The Problem of Agent-Relative Value
Nagel's argument for prudence is based upon a claim about the 
nature of time—its essential unreality40. He argues that every reason can be 
formulated as a predicate. If the predicate applies to some act, event, or 
circumstance (possible or actual) then there is a reason for that act, event, or 
circumstance to occur41. The impersonal language is significant: there is a 
reason for an event to occur and whilst that event may be located in time 
our attitude to that event is not determined by the time at which 
deliberation took place. In other words, we should be able to say "the same 
thing" about a particular event before, during, and after that time. 
Although in speech, and hence in deliberation, w e use tenses to describe 
what has, is, or will happen, this is not essential to rationality. It should be 
possible, argues Nagel, to convert out tensed statements into tenseless ones.
Nagel suggests that we have a reason to promote any event, actual or 
possible, if it is tenselessly true that at the time of the event a reason- 
predicate applies to it42. Whilst we are unable to change the past, the 
application of this principle to the future means that a person has a reason 
to promote an act simply because it will obtain and not because of any 
additional present desire. Nagel cannot, however, simply assert that reasons 
should be treated tenselessly. What is required is some structural, or 
metaphysical, basis for such a claim, and it is with this that I am concerned
40NAGEL (1), p.60. Alternatively, we can say, as Nagel does, that persons are equally real at all 
stages of their lives.
41NAGEL (1), p.47.
^NAGEL (1), p.48.
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in this section. Nagel, at several points, implies or even states, that what is 
at the base of tenselessness, and hence prudence, is the fact of personal 
identity. Yet he further argues that tenselessness is an "abstract question of 
time" rather than one of personal identity43. What sense are we to make of 
these apparently conflicting claims?
What I believe is at work here is the unacknowledged application of 
certain Kantian claims about time and reason. One claim originates from 
pure reason whilst the other derives from Kant's practical reason. In the 
opening sections of A Critique of Pure Reason Kant makes a series of claims 
about the nature of time. Firstly, time is a necessary presupposition 
underlying the perception of objects44. Time "structures" the world such 
that it is possible to conceive of the permanency of objects despite changes 
in their constitutive properties. Whilst an object cannot have different and 
incompatible properties at a particular time it may have such properties at 
different times45. Time is, therefore, logically prior to perceived objects and 
cannot, consequently, itself be an object or phenomenon. Secondly, time is 
one-dimensional and unitary so that there cannot be simultaneously 
different tim es46. Relatedly, "particular" tim es are only partial 
representations of time and time itself is infinite47. Thirdly, since time is 
unreal in the sense that it is not a property of objects external to the mind 
but is an "imposition" upon those objects, it follows that there must be 
some faculty capable of imposing time on the phenomenal world48. In
^NAGEL (1), p.60.
44KANT (1), p.77.
^KANT (1), p.74.
46KANT (1), p.75.
47KANT (1), p.75.
^KANT (1), p.78.
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Kant's terms time is a "pure form of sensible intuition"49. This requires the 
existence of beings possessing the faculty of sensibility: mind or minds. 
However, in order to avoid the false inference, made by psychological 
rationalists, such as Descartes, Kant does not identify the mind that imposes 
time on the world with the empirically-referable human being. Such a 
m ind can possess merely noumenal properties; properties that are 
insusceptible to empirical observation50.
The second source of timeless reason is to be found in Kant’s 
practical reason. I briefly discussed his conception of the pure will in chapter 
2, where I argued that moral principles were derived from the exercise of 
the rational capacities of beings undetermined by empirical desires51. If it 
can be shown that Nagel's argument is derived from the idea of a pure will 
then this is interesting in that for Kant the autonomous will was the 
ground for the derivation of moral principles and not prudential reasons. 
Indeed, Kant explicitly excluded prudential reasoning from the noumenal 
realm and opposed it to moral reasoning. Prudential reasons are based 
upon hypothetical im peratives52 such that a person only has a self- 
interested reason to act if he has the relevant end, so that there is, for 
example, no general directive of owning a Rembrandt, or even of 
quenching one's thirst. I believe, however, that it is central to Nagel's 
structural identification of prudence and morality that he should refuse to 
accept the distinction between hypothetical imperatives and categorical 
imperatives. What Nagel seeks to do is to treat the equality of persons
49KANT (1), p.79.
50KANT (1), p.168.
51See section 2.1.
52KANT (2), pp.82-3.
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implicit in morality as equivalent to, or structurally identical with, the 
equality between times (and hence desires or preferences) in an individual's 
life that is required by the application of tenseless reasoning53.
This rather brisk survey of the Kantian basis of timeless reason is
intended as a way of making sense of Nagel's claim that prudence depends
upon a conception of time rather than personal identity and yet also:
the failure to be susceptible to prudence entails a radical 
dissociation from one's future, one's past, and from oneself as 
a whole, conceived as a temporally extended individual54.
As I interpret the argument, to be conscious of oneself as a temporally-
extended being one must assume the objective unreality of time. What
Kant's conception of time makes possible is the conjunction of
contradictory properties in the same entity. So, for example, because I have
a conception of time I can imagine that I will, or can reasonably expect to be,
aged 65 at some point "in time" despite the fact that I am now 26. These
contradictory properties can inhere in the same entity because time is
subjective; time is the organization of objects by mind rather than itself
being an object or states of affairs. Therefore, to privilege an action because
it takes place at a particular time is to value something that cannot be an
object of value, ie. time itself. The aprudentialist or desire-based
prudentialist is engaged in a kind of "time-fetishism". On the other hand,
the recognition of the unreality of time allows us to act prudentially and
requires that we act act prudentially where prudence means recognizing
that we are continuants.
53NAGEL (1), pp.13-17, 79-142.
^NAGEL (1), p58.
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The difficulty with Nagel's account is that it involves the application 
of a highly abstract principle to the operation of self-interest, where self- 
interest is particularistic, by which I mean that it involves the operation of 
agent-relative reasons for action. Time is an abstraction from all desires and 
not only from my desires. To generate a plausible argument for prudence 
Nagel must limit his claims for the application of timeless reason to 
particular lives. What prudence presupposes is that I act to secure my future 
good and not just anyone's future good. But the standpoint of temporal 
neutrality, or timeless reason, cannot explain why Nagel, for example, 
should be particularly concerned about the person travelling to Rome at t+6 
even though it is Nagel himself who will be travelling. The prudential 
standpoint, which is grounded in timeless reason, is not the standpoint of 
an empirically identifiable person but of a noumenal mind existing 
"outside o f ’ the phenomenal world.
To confuse the universalist-transcendental standpoint of timeless 
reason with the standpoint of a particular individual in time is to commit a 
"Cartesian error"; it is to mistake the transcendental claim that time is only 
to be explained from a standpoint of consciousness with the quite different 
claim that this standpoint is identifiable with particular individuals. If it 
were true that the standpoint of timeless reason could be understood from a 
particular standpoint then I, as a prudential agent, could both recognize 
myself as a particular being and as the source of an abstract idea (time) 
which I then apply to my particular being. But if this is, as I think, a 
mistaken view  of the standpoint of timelessness then it is impossible to 
both adopt this standpoint and retain the perspective of a particular 
individual in time. Whilst timeless reason suggests that to give priority to
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the present over the past or future is irrational it doesn't suggest that giving 
priority to "my" present against "my" future or past is especially irrational, 
ie. irrational in a different way to that of simply privileging the present in 
general (impersonally).
It is unsurprising that N agel m oves w ith ease from the 
establishment of the claims of prudence to the claims of morality. He does, 
however, attempt to distance prudence from morality by arguing that 
reasons may be agent-relative, that is, restricted to a particular person55. The 
question is how such agent-relativity is to be established on the basis of 
timeless reason. It seems to me that it must be merely a desire, or an end, 
which is one among many and, therefore, to be considered impartially. This 
is, of course, inadequate from the standpoint of a rational prudence that 
posits a principled agent-relativity. It is my aim in the next section to argue 
for a different basis to prudence; one that explains rational concern for self.
4.5: The Problem of the Self
Prudence inevitably entails abstraction. It requires abstracting from 
the immediacy of present desires in order to resolve the conflict between 
those desires, and given that desire is parasitic upon the objects of desire 
then this also entails that we abstract from objects and states of affairs. 
Through the exercise of prudence a person can order and validate his 
desires by the application of a concept that is not itself identical with any 
particular desire, or reducible to any set of desires, namely, the idea of a
55NAGEL (1), p.48.
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"trans-temporal good”. This is a higher synthesizing category. My objection 
to Nagel's argument is not that it entails abstraction, but that the abstraction 
is taken too far; to the point of impersonality.
The absurdity of basing prudence on timelessness can be illustrated 
by the problem of past preferences. Whilst the preferences that we had, and 
the actions that we have undertaken, may give rise to emotions of regret, 
pride or remorse, w e do not believe that w e can change them and, 
consequently, we cannot promote those past preferences and actions56. 
Nagel acknowledges this but fails to explain why it is that we adopt an 
asymmetrical attitude to the past and future; that is, he cannot explain the 
intuitive rationality of treating past and future differently57. In chapter 6 I 
shall argue that prudence should be conceived of as the highest level of a 
communicative rationality, and that rationality must be grounded in 
human beings as empirical entities, and this fact explains asymmetrical 
attitudes to time.
I believe that it is possible to base a theory of prudence on features of 
the self that are both empirically referable and unavoidable. Nagel's 
Kantian account presupposes principles that are unavoidable but also a 
priori. Since agent-relativity necessarily makes reference to particular selves 
this leaves the grounds for self-interested action indeterminate. An 
empirical approach assumes that in order for a person to form a conception 
of his good over time he must have a conception of himself as an enduring 
being and recognize that this is relevant to his reasons for action. But here
^PARFIT (2), pp.156-8.
57NAGEL (1), p59.
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we face a difficulty, for what we are requiring is that the self, as it were, turn 
in on itself and become reflexive object of (temporally-extended) self- 
concern, yet as David Hume observed, when one introspects one finds no 
self behind the transitory perceptions that one has58.
There is one response to the Humeian objection which I do not 
believe works. It may be argued that any talk of "my" perceptions must 
commit me to a belief in my own subectivity and this is sufficient for self­
concern and prudential rationality. There must, it is argued, be a subject 
that "ties" the bundle of perceptions together. But the difficulty is that any 
such self cannot be an object of reference without infinite regress. When I 
take up the prudential standpoint and turn in on myself and ask what plan 
of life is appropriate for a being like me, I find no answer; a being "such as I 
am” is simply an abstraction from all the empirical characteristics that I 
"have”, such that there is no being "like meM since I am myself unsure of 
what sort of being I am. Therefore, even if we counter Humeian scepticism 
with the charge that language commits us to talking about irreducible 
selves we cannot make the stronger claim that in talking about selves we 
are repesenting something.
I shall argue that we should attempt to construct a model of the self 
from tw o ep istem ologica l sources: the "em pirical’1 and the
"presuppositional". The latter involves asking what w e already assume 
about the self in our rational lives, and I will argue that language is the key 
to grasping this concept of the self. Central to the argument is the idea that 
prudence is a form of autonomy. To be capable of forming a trans-temporal
SSHUME, p.300.
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good I must be able to reflect upon my desires and critically re-form them59. 
In order to achieve this I must occupy a standpoint which transcends those 
desires but which is accessible to me; that is, the autonomous standpoint 
must be anchored in the empirical world. I claim that this standpoint is to 
be associated with the a self that endures through time and, is relatedly, 
separable, in a significant way, from its perceptions. This raises some rather 
difficult questions concerning the nature of personal identity and it is, 
therefore, appropriate to turn to the question of personal endurance 
through time.
59I follow the now familiar two-level conception of autonomy advanced by Harry Frankfurt in 
his "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person". See FRANKFURT, pp.16-19.
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Chapter 5 
Personal Identity
As I argued in Chapter 4 the problem of prudential rationality can 
be understood to be that of finding a standpoint from which to arbitrate 
between the competing claims of past, present and future conceptions of 
one's trans-temporal good. Such a standpoint will not be found by 
positing the priority of desire over object (conativism) or of object over 
desire (cognitivism ), but rather by transcending these categories 
(rationalism). I suggested, however, that the rationalist appeal to the 
unreality of time could not account for the special concern for oneself 
which is central to the concept of prudence, ie. it cannot account for agent- 
relative value. Rather, we should look for a basis for prudential 
rationality in the fact of the endurance of the empirical self through time. 
The task then becomes that of giving a content to the claim that selves do, 
in fact, endure through time. That is, a person must have discernible 
properties that are susceptible to re-identification from one time to 
another. And it is here that the "personal identity approach" appears to 
come unstuck; as Hume observed, there is, on introspection, no "self" to 
be discovered behind the mass of perceptions which a person 
experiences1.
In this chapter I want to discuss the possibility that a Humeian 
"solution" to the problem of personal identity might be adequate to the 
task of grounding a theory of prudential rationality2. I shall focus
^ or a discussion of Hume’s argument regarding personal identity see ASHLEY & STACK; 
BIRO; PENELHUM (1); VAN CLEVE.
2Hume talked of an empirical self as the object of pride or regret, but this self did not 
correspond to a spatio-temporally continuous entity. See HUME, pp.329-31; see also 
PENELHUM (2).
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particularly on the arguments advanced by Derek Parfit3, who, in many, 
though not all, ways, follows in the tradition of Hume. My interest in 
Parfit is, in part, a consequence of the fact that he, like Nagel, has 
advanced some quite sophisticated arguments regarding the nature of 
self-interest and, particularly, its temporal dimension. Another reason is 
that Parfit is a leading representative of those theorists who have been 
inspired by Hume (and Locke4) to develop a reductionist (and empiricist) 
theory of personal continuity. The discussion of this chapter is, therefore, 
applicable to many other theories of personal identity5.
My aim in this chapter is to show how  a purely empiricist 
approach, such as that advanced by Parfit, fails to account for certain 
features of the self, and of crucial importance, certain facts pertinent to the 
grounding of prudence. Admittedly, Parfit makes a point of rejecting the 
notion of temporal neutrality that is central to Nagel's defence of 
prudence and, furthermore, does not attempt to defend rights as basic 
principles of a rational society6. Indeed, he elaborates his own moral 
theory in opposition to what he calls the "self-interest view", and believes 
that his argument lends support to utilitarianism7. Nevertheless, there 
are theorists who attempt to argue that the conception of the person in 
the original position can be constructed independently of any 
commitment to metaphysical claims concerning the nature of personal 
identity, or in other words, we can be neutral between reductionism and
3PARFTT (2), particularly part 3.
4Locke wasn’t a sceptic concerning personal identity, but his approach to the question, which 
involved appeal to thought-experiments and stressed the importance of psychological 
survival over physical survival, has inspired many reductionists. See LOCKE (2), Book n, 
chapter 27 "Of Identity and Diversity".
5Other reductionists include H.P.Grice, J.Mackie, J.Perry, D.Lewis. See GRICE (2); "The 
Trascendental I" in MACKIE; PERRY <2); LEWIS (2).
6PARFIT (2), p.321.
7PARFIT (2), parts 2 and 3.
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non-reductionism 8. Furthermore, since reductionism does not appear to 
involve any controversial metaphysical claims w e can, it is argued, make 
appeal to the Humeian conception of the self9. What I shall argue is that 
reductionism is incompatible with constructivism, and the ethical 
conclusions to be drawn from Parfit’s arguments lead us towards either 
utilitarianism or else intuitionism.
Before entering into the details of the reductionism versus non- 
reductionism debate it is worthwhile outlining what actually is at issue in 
the "problem of personal identity". I believe that there is a general 
problem of identity; of the identity of any object. Since everything changes 
it appears to be incoherent to talk of the sameness of an object over time: 
nothing appears to satisfy the conditions of trans-temporal identity. What 
I think is, therefore, required is a redefinition of the concept of 
"sameness" or "identity" in terms of "grades" of continuity10. A house, for 
example, possesses a higher grade of identity than, say, a pile of sand. 
Indeed, the sense of permanence of the house vis-a-vis the pile of sand is 
derived from its relation to that pile of sand. Identity is an extrinsic 
relationship. The world of objects can, therefore, be conceived of as 
consisting of various sortal kinds arranged in a hierarchy with objects 
being assigned a particular place according to their (relative) degree of 
continuity.
Thus far this account of identity appears compatible w ith a 
Humeian "feigning" of identity11. However, any scheme which is
8RAWLS (3), pp.15-20; RAWLS (6), pp.225,232-3; DANIELS, pp.273-4; WOLF, p.718.
9I shall argue that reductionism does, in fact, involve controversial metaphysical claims, see 
section 5.4.
10SPRIGGE, p.<Ff.
11In the appendix to A Treatise of Human Nature Hume admitted to finding himself in a 
"labyrinth" with regard to the problem of personal identity, for "when we talk of self or 
substance, we must have an idea annex'd to these terms, otherwise they are altogether
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relational w ill require certain fixed points if it is not to fall into 
incoherence. Relatedly, there must be a standpoint from which objects 
are, so to speak, "put together”. The Humeian view fails to account for the 
mind (or minds) that engages in such construction12.
Personal Identity is, in my view, a special problem distinct from the 
general problem of identity. Personal identity differs from identity in 
general because persons are understood (at least intuitively) to be 
embodied minds. N ow , of course, persons can be treated as if they are 
objects, for they have bodies, and manifest behavioural characteristics. But 
I believe that a purely empiricist approach to personal identity will be 
incapable of accounting for certain phenomenological characteristics 
which are at the base of self-concern and, particularly, of the concern for 
survival. I believe that a solution to the problem of personal identity is 
parasitic upon a solution to the problem of the relationship of mind to 
body and that issue may be insoluble. Yet as I shall argue, this should not 
be a reason for pessimism with regard to the possibility of elaborating a 
conception of the self in constructivism. We can be confident that the 
mind, and its enduring embodiment, are central to self-concern without 
having direct, empirical evidence of any relationship between mind and 
body13.
In section 5.1 I shall outline what I take to be at issue between 
"reductionists" and "non-reductionists". Section 5.2 is devoted to a 
consideration of the idea of psychological connectedness as opposed to
unintelligible" (HUME, p.675). Hume suggested it was the composition of perceptions that 
gave rise to our conception of the supposedly enduring self. We feign our identity, but Hume is 
by his own admission at a loss to explain the connection between perceptions (HUME, pp.677- 
8).
12This is the Kantian argument against Hume. See Kant's discussion in KANT (1), pp.333-83. 
For a discussion of Kant's argument see KITCHER, pp.l 14-17; POWELL, pp.22-33.
13See section 6.5
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iden tity . In section 5.3 I discuss the reasons why reductionists tend to 
reject spatio-temporal continuity of the body as a criterion of personal 
identity. In section 5.4 I critically consider the im plications of 
reductionism for arguments about the rationality of prudence, and hence 
constructivism. Finally, in section 5.5 I argue that w e need to move 
beyond empiricism if we are to form a belief in personal identity.
5.1: Reductionism and Non-Reductionism
The problem of personal identity is often expressed in the 
following way: how is it that person A at time t is identical with person A 
at time tl? Everything possesses self-identity necessarily, but if this means 
"A=A" then it states nothing more than the tautological truth that A is A. 
But the claim that "A at t=A at tl" does state something. Since time 
necessarily entails change, the claim of trans-temporal identity implies 
that person A remains the same entity despite a change in at least one of 
his properties, namely that of existing at a particular time. However, we 
immediately come up against the problem that whilst time is the factor 
that makes identity statements interesting it also seems to make them 
impossible. This logic can be stated in three principles: the reflexivity of 
identity, the indiscernibility of identicals, and the identity of 
indiscernibles14.
The reflexivity of identity simply states the analytical truth that 
everything is identical with itself: A=A. The indiscernibility of identicals 
maintains that if A-at-t is identical with A-at-tl then everything that is 
true of A-at-t must also be true of A-at-tl. Finally, if everything true of A-
14LEIBNIZ, pp.238-41; BRENNAN (2), pp.9-10; WIGGINS (1), pp.18-23.
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at-t is also true of A-at-tl then A-at-t must be identical with A-at-tl: the 
indiscernible is identical. Clearly, if we take these principles seriously then 
person A cannot survive a change in his properties, whilst the concept of 
identity necessarily entails the notion of at least one change and 
contingently of many changes.
What 1 think is common to both reductionists and non­
reductionists is an acceptance of this logic of identity15. What 
differentiates them is the response which is developed in order to 
overcome the difficulties presented by this logic. To retain a belief in 
identity requires making certain adjustments to what can count as a 
change16.
Firstly, w e have to distinguish between relational and non­
relational properties. The one property-change necessarily entailed in 
trans-temporal identity—that of existing at a certain time~is a relational 
property, and as such can be ruled out as a real change17. Secondly, if we 
are to have a coherent conception of time we must assume that many 
entities undergo real changes in their constitutive properties. These 
entities cannot, therefore, possess identity over time. Persons, however, 
must be among that class of beings that undergo no change in their 
properties if we are to maintain that identity holds in their case. Yet this is 
counter-intuitive, for people clearly undergo physical changes and 
changes in their states of consciousness. Therefore, we must make a third 
assumption. A person must be conceived of as having both essential and
15Neither reductionists nor non-reductionists endorse identity-relativism. For a discussion of 
identity-relativism, see WIGGINS (1), chapter 1.
16As a general point, identity should not be equated with "no-change", but with a criterion 
which determines which changes are survivable and which are not. See CHAPPELL, p.352.
17There is a difference between "real changes" and "Cambridge changes". For a discussion see 
GEACH, p321.
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contingent properties. An essential property must exist for as long as the 
entity exists and, indeed, since it is the case that the entity endures only in 
virtue of these essential properties it might be misleading to talk of the 
Messe" in terms of properties. A property is a quality or a modification of a 
more basic substance. Essential "properties” cannot be the properties of 
anything more fundamental than themselves18.
The consequence of these qualifications is the view  that personal 
identity  inheres in substances which are necessarily identical 
(indiscernible) over time. The problem is that w e must identify these 
substances and once we have identified them we must be capable of 
showing how contingent, non-essential properties relate to this substance. 
So, for example, we have to show how the properties of being a boy, or a 
man, or a student, or of feeling ill, or happy, are related to the substance 
that "bears" them, or is modified by them. Both of these things are 
difficult. All the available evidence suggests that nothing in the empirical 
world is both unchanging and yet congruent w ith our intuitive 
conception of the person. And that even if such basic substances were 
identifiable they do not appear to be a basis for self-concern. Prudence 
entails the choice of a particular good from among a set of alternative 
goods. The person, qua prudential agent, is always faced with the 
possibility of change, but on the non-reductionist view no change can 
bring into question what a person really is19.
Parfit, in his book Reasons and Persons, takes identity to be strict 
Leibnizian identity20. It is an "all-or-nothing" affair and, he argues, if it 
can be shown that all empirically-referable facts about persons are subject
18LOWE, p.107.
19SANDEL, p.179.
20PARFIT (2), pp.206,226.
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to change then we can have no reason to believe that identity holds. The 
only way that we can maintain a belief in personal identity is by assuming 
that there is a subject who has properties and is necessarily separable, in 
some meaningful sense, from those properties21. In other words, what is 
at issue between reductionists and non-reductionists is that the latter 
believe that there is a subject who ”hasN certain physical and /or  
psychological states whilst the former believe that a person just "is" his 
physical and/or psychological states. The difficulty with Parfit's view is 
that he implies that non-reductionists hold to a subject-conception 
whereby there is an independent entity discernible behind a person's 
perceptions, w hilst reductionism holds that a person just is his 
perceptions. But if we take the statement "Tom feels pain", it is difficult to 
find a formulation that doesn’t imply that there is a subject separable 
from that state or property. We could say that "Tom pains” or T om  has a 
feeling of pain”, but these linguistically presuppose a subject, and 
something is lost if we simply say that "pain is going on". In other words, 
w e seem to have a quite mundane grasp of the subject and no need to 
presuppose a substrate that is indiscernible to empirical observation.
I think, however, that Parfit's formulation of the distinction  
between reductionism and non-reductionism is valid. The problem that 
w e have in the above case is not an epistemological one but rather a 
semantic one. We do not know what it means to say that Tom has pain, 
or feels pain, or is paining; that is, we cannot adequately conceptualize the 
relationship between the subject and the psychological state. We seem to 
have only two options, both of which lead to obscurities. We can say that 
the pain is logically separable from the subject who has the sensation, or 
that the pain is constitutive of the subject. The relation of the pain to Tom
21PARFTT (2), pp.210,223.
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could be analogous to, say, the relation of an Oxford college to the 
University of Oxford: the University is the name that we give to the 
complex of colleges that are related to each other in certain ways, but the 
university adds something to the totality of colleges22. This latter 
formulation would, I think, be acceptable to a reductionist. Parfit himself 
does not, and cannot, avoid the implication that subjects are, in some 
unspecifiable sense, separate from their properties. In discussions of 
reductionism Parfit often uses the terms "my present self" and "my future 
self' as if a person were a relation of discrete selves23. But, what is crucial 
to Parfit's argument is that there are no discrete entities, but rather only 
"fuzzy" entities (an argument which must not be confused with identity- 
relativism 24). Persons do not "die" periodically to be "reborn" at a later 
date, but rather they survive by degrees over time. This is what is crucial 
to the distinction between identity and connectedness. The point is that 
they do not exist independently of their properties: persons are not 
substances. The question is really one of whether language must always 
carry ontological commitments, and for Parfit it doesn’t.
As I have said, I think that Parfit's distinction between reductionism 
and non-reductionism in terms of "being" and "having" is justified, but I 
wish to add a qualification. I believe that the validity of the distinction 
depends upon certain empiricist assumptions. This might appear to be a 
strange thing to say insofar as non-reductionism implies a non-empirical 
substrate or substance. Indeed, Parfit, like Hume before him, appears to 
have Descartes in his sights as the leading proponent of non- 
reductionism25. However, Descartes made a crucial empiricist assumption
^RYLE (1), pp.17-18.
23PARFIT (2), p.226.
24See NOONAN, pp.134-7.
^PARFIT (2), p.224.
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when he argued for the existence of the subject of thought from the fact of 
thinking. The claim was that one could identify the subject of thought as a 
being in the natural order and not merely a noumenal entity26. This 
leaves the Cartesian approach open to the charge that no such subject can, 
in fact, be discemed—thinking implies nothing more than that "thought is 
going on"27.
We can say that there are two assumptions which guide Parfit's 
approach. Firstly, the issue of personal identity is not, in itself, a special 
problem. It can be resolved through an empirical investigation, albeit 
guided by our intuitions, which are to be tested with the help of various 
thought-experiments. Secondly, what, if anything, can be said to survive 
over time must be related to what is of value. So, for example, that soggy 
grey matter which w e call a brain cannot be what we care about in 
survival, rather we must be concerned above all else with psychological 
states.
26DESCARTES, pp.68-74.
27PARFIT, p.225.
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5.2: Connectedness of Consciousness
Whilst Parfit is a materialist his conception of the person is focused
upon psychological states as the basis for continuity. Like Locke he
believes that the conception of the person is fashioned to account for
certain beliefs about morality and rationality28. This explains why it is
psychological connectedness that is central to survival:
What we value, in ourselves and others, is not the continued 
existence of the same particular brains and bodies. What we 
value are the various relations between ourselves and others, 
whom  and what we love, our ambitions, achievements, 
commitments, emotions and memories and several other 
psychological features.29
This approach implies that personal identity—if it were to hold—would be
derivative of the concern expressed in the above quotation, and not the
reason why we have such concern.
The assumptions that I have attributed to Parfit—empiricism and 
the derivativeness of identity—come together in his criticism of the 
Cartesian Mcogito". As an empiricist he echoes Hume's observation that 
no self can be conceived of as existing behind the psychological states that 
w e experience, and that even if we could get a grasp of such a concept it 
wouldn't be what matters in survival, for how can a bare substrate be a 
ground for prudential concern?30 Parfit's alternative entails accepting that 
people are nothing more than complexes of more particular psychological 
states. Unlike Hume, he argues that whilst we may feign strict identity 
there is a real connection between psychological states such that w e can 
talk of connectedness31. Whilst this move relieves the pressure on
^LOCKE (2), pp.335-8.
29PARHT (2), p.284.
^PARFIT (2), pp.227-8.
31PARFIT (2), p.215.
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reductionism to posit a strong conception of mind that does the 
"feigning"32, it nevertheless requires an explanation of the relationship 
between psychological states in non-sceptical terms.
Parfit's insistence upon the reality of connectedness pushes his 
approach closer to Locke as opposed to Hume, and it is to Locke's 
understanding of personal identity that we should turn in explicating the 
idea of the connectedness of consciousness33. Locke argued that persons 
are not substances but rather m odes or relations terminated in 
substances34. Persons are composite. In this respect persons are like non­
human animals except that whereas animals are organized into particular 
forms through their physical constitution, persons are defined as persons 
by virtue of the existence and operation of conscious connections over 
time. Consciousness unifies various sub-personal substances into 
enduring selves35. The memory criterion of personal identity is often 
attributed to Locke but, in fact, consciousness is a much wider concept and 
entails intentionality to act in the future36. My understanding of Locke 
and Parfit assumes that psychological connectedness is broader than 
memory.
Locke argued that consciousness is transferred from one thinking 
substance to another via the mechanism of memory37. This argument 
has, however, come in for criticism. Reid argued that a person A-at-t3
32That is, Parfitian reductionism appears better able to deal with the Kantian critique (see 
reference 12).
^For a discussion of Locke’s arguments with regard to personal identity see particularly 
ALSTON & BENNET; BROAD; FLEW; HUGHES; MIJUSKOVIC; NOONAN, ch.2; 
WEDEKING.
^LOCKE (2), p.336.
^LOCKE (2), p.335.
36Locke argues that consciousness constitutes the basis of identity but memory bridges the 
"gaps" in other forms of consciousness (ie. we can remember what we did yesterday despite 
having "broken" our consciousness through sleep). LOCKE (2), p.335.
37LOCKE (2), p.336.
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may remember what A-at-t2 did and A-at-t2 may remember what A-at-tl 
did but A-at-t3 may fail to remember what A-at-tl did. Hence A-at-t3 
cannot be the same person as A-at-tl38. This challenge has led to a 
reformulation of the memory relation so that there must be a transitive  
connectedness between psychological states. In other words, consciousness 
must form an unbroken chain of psychological states and w e are to 
describe the identity relationship in terms of this chain-connectedness.
A more serious objection (advanced by Butler) is that of circularity. If 
A-at-t3 remembers A-at-tl doing an action X, doesn't that imply that there 
exists a person who is identical across those times independently of any 
connectedness or continuity of consciousness?39 Butler's point isn't 
entirely clear, but I think that the argument is that remembering doing 
som ething doesn't entail that one did do it40, but if the Lockeian 
argument is that consciousness proves (is a veridical guide) that one did 
do it then it is circular, for either consciousness itself must be the bearer of 
continuity, and hence a substance, or else it is some other substance that 
acted and hence the memory criterion presupposes that that entity exists.
W.P.Alston and J.Bennett have suggested that a way out of this 
problem would be to posit a distinction between "person” and "thinking 
substance"41. Locke could have said that what A-at-t3 remembers is not 
himself acting at tl but a thinker, or thinking substance acting, and that 
the relationship is between thinking substances. But this solution would 
place Locke in a bind. He must hold thinking substances and persons 
apart if he is to avoid the charge of circularity, but this leads to absurdity.
38REID, pp.114-15.
39BUTLER, p.110.
40WILLIAMS (2), p.4.
41 ALSTON & BENNETT, pp.25-6.
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As Roderick Chisholm asks: if I want my dinner, does it follow that two of 
us want my dinner? Or does the thinking substance want its dinner and 
not mine?42 Harold Noonan suggests that I want my dinner but I can only 
express this through a thinking substance43. The difficulty is that the "I" 
then appears to be superfluous. Surely the "I” must be a thinking 
substance and so we have two thinking substances and as substances they 
must be independent of one another. Therefore, if Locke succeeds in 
keeping persons and thinking substances apart he must then show how  
they are related. When I remember at t3 what T  did at tl, presumably I 
am remembering through my thinking substance but how can I be sure 
that it was I who was thinking at tl? Either I am identical with my 
thinking substance(s) and hence the circularity objection stands, or else I, 
qua enduring self, am distinct from my thinking substances, and, 
consequently my memory is not a reliable indicator of identity.
Whereas Locke attempted to maintain that persons were identical in 
a strict sense, Parfit is not likewise constrained, and consequently he 
makes a move which is not open to Locke. Parfit argues that a relation of 
quasi-m em ory may hold44. I quasi-remember event X if I seem to 
remember "from the inside" event X, and someone did experience X, and 
my apparent memory is causally dependent on that past experience45. 
Quasi-memory may be criticized for requiring bizarre memories which 
cannot be integrated into a person's life. Husband Peter cannot remember 
having his wife Jane's baby, nor can father Peter remember the fact that 
yesterday he started attending the local kindergarten. But this criticism 
may be misplaced, for Parfit accepts that persons must be mentioned in
42CHISHOLM (1), pp.107-8.
43NOONAN, p.76.
^PARFIT (2), pp.220, 226; LOCKE (2), pp.337-41.
45PARFIT (2), p.220.
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the content of psychological states and that normally this fact imposes 
limits on what we can remember. His point is, however, that w e could 
quasi-remember such that Butler's objection is answered. We can appeal 
to mental connectedness without self-contradiction because memory, and 
other psychological states such as intention, belief or desire, do not entail 
personal identity.
It might be objected that quasi-memory may entail false memories 
and/or that more than one person might remember the same event from 
the first-person standpoint46. The reductionist would counter that the first 
objection requires an explanation of truth and falsity with regard to 
memory, since it cannot be the case that a true memory is defined in 
terms of personal identity, ie. a criterion that assumes that certain 
psychological states are unique to a person, without circularity. The 
second objection can be granted by a reductionist—indeed, it is no 
objection to connectedness. For Parfit, consciousness may branch off and 
this means that identity cannot hold but connectedness can, because 
connectedness admits of degrees47.
What I think is wrong with quasi-memory is the idea that any cause 
is acceptable, such that memory-traces could, for example, be transferred 
from one brain to another and this logical possibility should make a 
difference to how w e think about personal identity and survival. Parfit 
suggests that for the connectedness of consciousness to hold there must be 
a causal connection between psychological states (this must be the case if 
we are to avoid Humeian scepticism). This causal mechanism may be 
narrow, wide or the widest possible. A narrow cause would be one which
^WILLIAMS (2), pp.8-9.
47PARFIT (2), pp.221-2.
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is dependent upon the continuity of a particular body (and especially a 
brain) whilst the widest cause could involve the transfer of memory 
traces from one brain to another or the duplication of bodies48.
In the next section I will explain why I believe that anything but 
narrow causality should be ruled out. I argue that restricting 
connectedness to narrow causality will have significant implications for 
how we should think about prudential rationality.
48PARFIT (2), pp.207-9,215.
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5.3: Physical Continuity
Central to my critique of reductionism is the claim that reductionists 
do not take bodily identity as seriously as it should be taken. There are two 
main reasons why physical continuity is rejected or ignored. Firstly, as I 
have suggested it is viewed as unimportant in survival, by which I mean 
that w hilst w e need to survive physically in order to achieve a 
psychological survivor, to survive physically without psychological 
continuity is not something to value. Secondly, it is argued that even if 
physical continuity mattered it would still involve changes in physical 
states which would render survival a matter of degrees and not an all-or- 
nothing affair.
I shall deal with the last objection first of all since it seems to me to 
be the less important one. Parfit concedes that in the world of physical 
necessity, ie. given the way the world is, in order to get a qualitatively 
similar psychological successor one will require physical continuity49. It 
may be the case, however, that if bodies could be duplicated or memory 
traces transferred from one brain to another, then psychological survival 
could be split from physical survival. Why then not accept the spatio- 
temporal continuity of a conscious body as the criterion of personal 
identity?
Parfit argues that physical continuity could suffer the same breaks 
and disruptions as psychological continuity50. But his arguments depend 
upon accepting thought-experiments which defy what we believe about 
the physical world and human physiology, and I question whether this is
49At least, continuity of the brain. PARFIT (2), p.208.
50PARFIT (2), pp.234-6.
153
justifiable. Our concept of the person is determined by certain background 
beliefs that we have about the world. In such a world neither brains nor 
memory traces are successfully transplanted. That it is a possibility that 
this could occur will not alter our beliefs about the nature of the person. 
One might translate Parfit's puzzles into the language of possible worlds51. 
There exists a possible world in which bodies are duplicated and brain* 
traces transferred. Because that world exists as a possible way of being we 
know that from the standpoint of this (actual) world it is a real possibility, 
it is what David Lewis calls a "modal reality"52. Should this modal reality 
affect our conception of the person? It might be argued that it should, 
because persons exist across possible worlds so that it is a possibility that I 
might have my brain split and one half transplanted to another body— 
there exists a possible world where "I" (or my "counterpart"53) have 
undergone such an operation. Should I care? To put it another way, 
should I in this world take this possibility into account in my actions in 
this world? I think not, because a distinction has to be drawn between 
logical and physical possibility. In the possible world there exist physical 
laws different to the laws of this actual world, but that fact cannot affect 
the physical laws in this world because there are no causal relations across 
possible worlds54.1 am confident that I will not undergo a brain transplant 
in this world although I accept that if it became a medical practice then I 
would be forced to revise my attitudes to myself and others. But this 
wouldn't be because a possible world had causally affected the actual 
world but rather because that possible world had ceased to exist—it was 
now the actual world.
51For a discussion of the use of possible worlds in the personal identity debate see 
PLANTINGA (l)/(2); KRIPKE (1); CHISHOLM (2).
52LEWIS (3), pp.1-5.
53LEWIS (1), pp.205-6.
54LEWIS (3), p.2.
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Some theorists have attempted to derive substantive conclusions
about the nature of persons and personal identity from the use of possible
worlds (modal) logic. But a possible world is only a logically possible
world and not an empirical, physical world. Persons are, for reductionists,
empirical entities but they would lose all those empirical properties that
define them as the sortal kind "person" if we no longer restricted
ourselves to natural reasoning. Lewis asks rhetorically whether a human
could have been bom to different parents, or a person could be a robot or a
poached egg or an angel?
Given some contextual guidance these questions should 
have sensible answers. There are ways of representing (a 
person) whereby some worlds represent him as an angel, 
there are ways of representing whereby none do. Your 
problem is that the right way of representing is determined, 
or perhaps under-determined, by context—and I supplied no 
context.55
The context is surely supplied by the beliefs that we have about the nature 
of the physical world and of psychology56.
Parfit does, however, have certain arguments regarding the nature of 
the body which are consistent with facts about the actual world. As was 
clear even in the Seventeenth Century (and taken up by Locke57) the body 
undergoes changes by degrees, such that we cannot say that a certain mass 
of cells suddenly comes into being at time t and then disappears at t l, thus 
clearly demarcating the duration of a person's life. That the body changes 
by degrees suggests that we are faced with a difficulty akin to Sorites' 
problem. One can imagine a pile of sand at time t and some grains of sand 
at tl. At some point between t and t l the pile ceases to exist, but if the 
process of grain-loss is a gradual one then we cannot say when the pile
55LEWIS (3), p.251.
56See WITTGENSTEIN (3), propositions 245-248; WILKES, pp.43-8.
57LOCKE (2), p.336.
155
ceased to exist, for how can the loss of one grain of sand make the 
difference between existence and non-existence?
I think, however, that the complex nature of the human body, in 
contra-distinction to the simple nature of a pile of sand, renders the 
application of Sorites' problem to physical continuity inappropriate. A 
body undergoes certain qualitative, step-wise changes in its internal 
functioning and its relation to its enviroment. This sense of qualitative  
change is substantially augmented by the development of consciousness 
at a certain stage after the physical conception of the human being.
The difficulty is that there are cases where psychological unity and 
physical unity appear to come apart. There have been well-documented 
cases of brain bisection and MsplitH personalities, or several personalities 
inhabiting a single body58. However, in these documented cases there has 
been a tendency for the afflicted party to (consciously or unconsciously) 
bring into unity their physical and mental attributes. A person who has 
lost the functions of one half of his brain will ’’retrain" the other half to 
carry out the "lost" functions. A "person" who has multiple personalities 
will attempt, so to speak, to "kill" the other personalities. It appears that 
there is an in-built drive to correct these abnormalities59. As Timothy 
Sprigge argues, all we need to do in order to retain a justified belief in 
personal continuity is not to fission or fuse even where this is a physical 
possibility60.1  would qualify Sprigge's remark by saying that fission and 
fusion should be restricted to marginal, borderline cases. If it were a 
frequent occurrence, and "persons" managed to live with it, then we
58WILLIAMS (2), pp.77-80; WILKES, pp.154-7; "Brain Bisection and the Unity of 
Consciousness" in NAGEL (2).
59WILLIAMS (2), pp.17-18.
S prig g e , p.46.
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would have reason to revise our beliefs.
Whilst Parfit offers many arguments againt physical continuity from 
the standpoint of the logic of identity what is crucial to his rejection of the 
physicalist account is that it isn't "what matters" in survival61. This 
assumes that what constitutes the possibility of continuity and identity 
should itself be what w e value. For reductionists continuity is a by­
product of the fact that a person cares about his psychological states and is 
only a direct "object" of concern insofar as "to care" involves the desire to 
reproduce one's psychological states. But this is only a concern for short­
term connectedness between myself today and my hoped-for survivor, 
and it is not a concern for trans-temporal identity62.
I shall argue that what w e care about involves a relationship of 
mind-to-world and world-to-mind that entails the ability to represent 
oneself to oneself as an enduring being. A person, although a subject, 
must become object to himself. This means that states of consciousness 
are dependent upon certain physical states (brain states) even if we cannot 
explain the relationship of mind to body. Whilst it is psychological states 
which fundamentally matter, the capacity to have a conception of oneself 
as an enduring being, which is crucial to rational action, depends upon 
our being embodied subjects and recognizing ourselves as such.
I believe that Parfit's approavch leaves unexplained the concern 
which he attributes to persons. This becomes particularly evident if we 
turn to his arguments for practical rationality.
61PARFIT (2), p.284.
62PARFIT (2), p.262.
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5.4: Reductionism and Prudential Rationality
Both reductionism and non-reductionism seem to have problematic 
implications for prudential rationality. Reductionism posits a conception 
of the person tied into the properties he has or is, whilst non- 
reductionism assumes an indiscernible subject behind the states he has, 
and this subject lacks any qualitatively definable features. Neither 
position seems capable of providing that vantage point from which the 
person can form a trans-temporal good. The self is either too close to his 
constitutive properties (reductionism) or too far from them (non- 
reductionism).
I have two aims in this section. The first is to consider Parfit's 
arguments for self-concern in the light of his rejection of strict identity in 
favour of a looser connectedness relation. This shift has two 
consequences. Firstly, concern must be directed toward one's present 
states—one's qualitative make-up~rather than to a substrate that endures 
through time. Secondly, if the question of personal survival is 
indeterminate then a kind of "otherness" enters into one's relationship 
with oneself. We can no longer draw a sharp line between moral concern 
and prudential concern and, hence, I believe that reductionism tends to 
lead to intuitionism at a foundational level, and perhaps, as Parfit argues, 
utilitarianism at a non-foundational level. The second aim is to show  
how reductionism is incompatible with constructivism
Parfit argues that it is wrong to burden one's future self through 
action in the present. This, he argues, is a moral condemnation rather 
than a rational-prudential condemnation63. I think that the argument is
63PARFIT (2), p318-21.
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something like this. If in twenty years time I have sixty per cent of the 
psychological states that I presently have (making allowance for the 
relative value of each state) then I shall be connected by a factor of 0.6 to 
that future self. Correspondingly, there will be a 0.4 that is "other" than 
the person that I now am. If, for example, I were to start smoking now, 
then the bad consequences can be condemned as immoral to a factor of 0.4 
and irrational to a factor of 0.6. There are, however, two difficulties with 
this argument. Firstly, it is difficult to make sense of this "other”. It 
appears to be just a number of psychological states that I do not have but 
which I shall have at a future stage. If I lose, by degrees, forty per cent of 
my present psychological states over the next twenty years then this forty 
per cent cannot be said to constitute even a loose bundle for they are lost 
(or accrue to the "other") by small increments.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Parfit talks as if the degree 
of connectedness, and hence concern, is an independent variable; 
independent, that is, of my present and future actions. So Parfit talks of 
applying a "discount rate" of concern whereby my concern is less for 
events further in the future64. This is based upon the rational expectation 
that the further in the future an event is the less is the connection 
betw een that event and m y present psychological states. But 
connectedness is itself the product of prudential concern. What a person 
is being asked to do is to be rationally concerned for his future by the 
degree to which he is connected to a future self which does not exist 
independently of that rational concern. This calls into question what it is 
that is the object of any future concern and from which continuity is a 
derived relation. In other words, what is the causal mechanism that links 
one psychological state to another? Are w e not in the situation in which
64PARFIT (2), p.313-15.
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w e have no reason to be concerned about what happens in the next 
moment, as Butler argued?65
It would be useful at this stage to turn to Parfit7 s Present-Aim Theory 
(PAT) of rationality for answers to these questions. Whilst rational 
prudence can be taken to require that one treat each part of one's life with 
prima facie equal concern, PAT stands opposed to it by positing a bias to 
one's present aims66. If we put morality aside for the purposes of this 
discussion then prudence is part of what Parfit calls self-interest theory 
(S)67. S argues that what it is most rational to do is to make one's life go as 
well as possible. For an egoist S overrides morality but bracketing out 
morality, S coincides with rational prudence.
PAT holds that what each of us has most reason to do is whatever 
w ould fulfil our present desires. PAT comes in three varieties: 
instrumental, deliberative and critical. Instrumental PAT concerns itself 
only with means and not with ends. Parfit follow s Hume in his 
construction of instrumental PAT: a desire cannot be "false”, it can only 
be "unreasonable" if it involves theoretical irrationality68. So, in the 
example from Nagel considered in the last chapter, the desire to put a coin 
in a pencil sharpener is irrational if what a person really wants to do is get 
a drink from a drinks-machine69. In deliberative PAT a person has full 
knowledge (ie. theoretical rationality) and a change in knowledge will 
move a person to change his desires. The ends a person pursues are not 
completely beyond critical analysis, but the basis of this critical analysis is a
^BUTLER, p.99.
^Actually, Parfit believes that his preferred version of PAT (critical PAT) may require 
prudential concern, but not as a dominant concern. But since even critical present-aims are 
present aims this stands opposed to rational prudence. PARFIT (2), p.135.
67PARFIT (2), pp.l29-30.
^PARFIT (2), pp.117-18; HUME, p.463.
69PARFIT (2), p.118; NAGEL (1), pp.33-5.
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recognition of the costs (or gains) involved in pursuing a particular 
means to an end.
The third version is critical PAT. In this case some desires are held to
be intrinsically irrational. As Parfit argues:
it is irrational to desire something that is no respect worth 
desiring. It is even more irrational to desire something that is 
worth not desiring—worth avoiding.70
So, for example, it is irrational to prefer the worse of two pains without
any reason (although presumably the theory isn't strong enough to rule
out, say, masochistic desires)71. Another set of examples relate to making
decisions turn upon trivial facts, eg. caring about everybody in a fifty mile
radius but nobody beyond it72. Parfit's examples tend to be negative-
ruling out desires rather than rationally requiring certain other desires.
The reason is, I think, that Parfit wants to avoid appearing to be
cognitivist in his approach73. Nevertheless, he favours the critical version
of PAT and this version clearly entails a recognition that some values are
generated independently of desire itself. The question is whether Parfit
can transcend the distinction between desire and object. If it is the case
that value is objective then what I care about, or should care about, is
determined independently of the desires that I may have. The problem
then becomes one of explaining why my actions are rational given that
they differ from the next person's. In other words, we need to explain
value-pluralism and agent-relativism.
In view of the problem of pluralism Parfit attempts to retain some 
link with unmotivated desire (conativism). He argues that desire can be
70pa r fit  (2), p.122.
71PARFIT (2), p.123.
72PARFIT (2), p.125.
73See section 4.1 for a definition of conativism.
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among the conditions of rationality, and it should be said that the notion 
of present aims looks suspiciously like immediate desire74. However, 
"desire" is defined very widely to include all kinds of aims, projects and 
beliefs and, hence, includes motivated desires. Furthermore, the notion of 
an intrinsically irrational desire presupposes that there are at least some 
reasons for action that are not dependent upon desire.
This leaves Parfit in difficulties. The concern that I have for my 
projects must rest either on the value of my life as a ground for those 
projects (objective agent-relative value) or else upon the objective value 
of those projects for everybody (objective agent-newtral value). The 
former presupposes a commitment to an enduring self whilst the latter 
leaves unexplained why I should have the particular projects that I do 
have.
John Perry attempts to argue that a concern for the future can be 
derived from moral considerations (I think that he must mean 
particularistic moral considerations)75. A person wants certain non­
personal states of affairs to happen in the future such as have his children 
educated and cared for, and this person believes that if he continues to 
exist with his present psychological states, then these moral aims will best 
be realized76. Perhaps this argument offers a way out of the dilemma for 
Parfit. After all, present aims (unlike S) can include moral aims. The 
difficulty is that such particularistic moral commitments presuppose that
74PARFIT (2), p.117.
75PERRY (3), p.80.
76The argument suggests that concern for one's future can be constitutive of personal identity; 
that is, if we begin from the impersonal standpoint from which we simply want certain 
impersonal things to happen in the future, eg. have a certain group of children cared for. To 
bring about these impersonal things the agent desires to become a person. But it seems to me 
that the agent must be completely indifferent as to which particular spatio-temporal person 
he, in fact, becomes.
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you are the same person such that all this quasi-altruistic argument does 
is to redirect the conception of the self through another person: in their 
eyes you are~and must be~the same person. Alternatively, it might 
involve a commitment to intuitionism, but I have already outlined my 
objections to that theory77.
Many psychological states are self-referential. I care about my 
achievements and about the people who stand in particular relations to 
me. I cannot detach a particular psychological state and it be easily 
incorporated into someone else's biography. I was born in a particular 
place, to particular parents and have a "personal'1 history. I believe that 
other people can say the same kinds of things about their relationships, 
projects, ambitions etc.. Self-reference and other-reference both depend 
upon individual biographies.
Parfit, of course, argues that self-reference in psychological states does 
not prove that selves exist or that selves exist irreducibly78. Whilst this is 
true it does not follow that self-reference will not affect the rational 
attitude  that w e adopt to ourselves. If our self-concerned actions 
presuppose our own existence as enduring beings and that belief is 
advanced as a rational (ie. true) belief then a reductionist must explain 
why, if it is a false belief, we should persist in being concerned about 
anything beyond the present. Why not be hedonists?
Reductionists seem to be attempting to retain self-concern without
the enduring self. But as Wiggins argues:
there is a real difficulty in the idea that we could purify our 
actual concerns of every taint of the personal identity concept,
^See sections 23-2.5.
78PARFIT (2), pp.221-2.
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and then, with everything else intact, persevere in—or identify 
ourselves with—the purified desires that emerged.79
Yet this is what a reductionist must seek to do. In the case of Parfit it is
incompatible with the revisionist thrust of his arguments, that is, not
holding on to false beliefs about the continuity of the self80.
What then is left of rational self-concern if w e embrace 
reductionism? It could be argued that the psychological states that 
constitute a person stand in some kind of moral relation to one another. 
The explanation as to why a certain bundle of states constitute a particular 
person would be explained by the "kinship relation” of one psychological 
state to another. Psychological states w ould be self-replicating  
independently of a subject who has such states.
This kind of micro-morality or micro-rationality may seem bizarre 
but it is implicit within certain social and economic theories ("pico- 
economics”) and bio-ethics (the "altruistic gene”). I believe, however, that 
these theories make false anologies with inter-personal moral situations 
in which persons face each other as self-conscious agents and as such have 
characteristics which could never be attributed to a gene or psychological 
state. Indeed, Parfit does not endorse such a conception of self-concern 
and, from his standpoint, with good reason. He believes that persons are 
fuzzy entities and that the question of their survival is not an all-or- 
nothing affair. His rejection of determinate identity rests upon his view of 
the notion of the self-as-substance as obscure and hence indefensible. If he 
were to accept micro-rationality then he would be substituting the 
obscurity of "psychological states" for the obscurity of the substance-self. 
To replace a non-rigid ontology (the person) with a rigid ontology
79WIGGINS (2), p311.
^PARFIT (2), p.x.
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(psychological states) would require an explication of these states and the 
causal mechanism that operates between one state and another.
I think that Parfit's discussion of the implications for rationality cast 
light on the question of the moral grounding of rights. Parfit argues that 
the im plications of his argument are that w e should embrace 
utilitarianism and, on one level, I believe that he is correct81. The 
problem with utilitarianism as I discussed it in Chapter 3 was that it could 
not account for agent-relative values and every attempt to avoid the 
implication that rights could not be grounded in utilitarianism failed. The 
virtue of Parfit's arguments is that he begins from the assumption that 
there is something wrong with the idea of agent-relativism, or at least the 
assumption that there is a standpoint from which w e can establish agent- 
relativism, ie. the standpoint of the enduring self. Of course, as I have 
suggested Parfit does not eliminate the idea of self-concern altogether. If 
he were to push his argument to its conclusion what I believe would  
result would be a metaphysical form of intuitionism at the foundational 
level (at the first-order) and perhaps utilitarianism (or consequentialism) 
at the level of principles. This follows from the fact that the basic unit of 
moral assessment would be psychological states from which the notion of 
personal identity had been eliminated. Therefore, we would have the 
notion of certain objectively moral states which we can only assume must 
be maximized.
It might be argued that whatever conclusions Parfit might draw from 
his arguments the reductionist conception of the self is compatible with 
constructivism. A person can act prudentially even if he cannot develop a 
conception of himself as an enduring being. But this is simply false, for it
81PARHT (2), pp.330-2.
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is the fact of being an enduring entity that imposes upon a person the 
need to be prudential. Parfit is quite right to argue that if we were not 
enduring beings then we would have no reason to act prudentially.
To conclude this section I would argue that Parfit has failed to 
explain why we should care about anything beyond the present and hence 
why w e should not be rational aprudentialists.
5.5: Beyond Empiricism
I have argued that Parfitian reductionism cannot account for the 
concern that a person has for the particular properties which constitute 
himself. A related, if rather standard criticism, is that the bundle 
conception of the self cannot account, in a semantic-cum-metaphysical 
way, for the particular concatenation of properties that make up a person. 
A reductionist w ould hold that the rational question and the 
metaphysical question are not independent of one another, for the latter 
question is derivative from the former question. If "identity" or 
connectedness is a derivative relationship then persons create the 
"bundle" through an attitude of self-concern. I have argued against this 
view  on the grounds that it is the wrong priority, what we need is an 
explanation for why a person should care about what he self-evidently, 
and without choice, takes to be his properties. Being precedes reason.
For a non-reductionist the metaphysical question and the rational 
question are separate. I might well be capable of grasping that I am an 
enduring being but that may have no force on my actions. This, of course, 
is central to the reductionist critique of non-reductionism. My view is that
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the correct criterion of personal identity is the spatio-temporal continuity 
of the body, and given that we have principles for re-identifying the body 
over time I hold this view to be non-reductionist. I further maintain that 
the ground of prudential concern derives from a basic, primitive (that is, 
unanalyzable) drive to survive82. In the next chapter I shall attempt to 
argue for a dialectical process of rational development (a cognitive- 
development process) whereby a person comes to value things in the 
world intrinsically, but that the starting point is this primitive drive to 
survive. Before embarking on that exercise I wish to explain what I think 
is fundamentally wrong with the reductionist approach, by which I mean 
is wrong at a metaphysical level.
What seems to me to be crucial to both the rational question of self­
concern and the metaphysical question of personal unity is the 
recognition of the embodiedness of persons. Consciousness of objects 
external to mind is consciousness from a standpoint in space and time 
and our only empirical reference for that standpoint is a body. Whilst we 
must be capable of distinguishing a mental state from a physical state it is 
difficult to imagine the unity, or co-existence, of our mental states 
independently of their location in a body. This is a common sense view  
and as such may be countered by appeal to Parfit's thought-experiments, 
but for reasons which I have set out I do not accept that recourse to what 
might happen in a possible world can have an impact on such a deeply 
embedded view  of human consciousness. What common sense does not 
help us find is an adequate conceptualization of the relationship between 
mind and body. Whilst the body has an objective status consciousness has 
a subjective status. In order to grasp consciousness qua consciousness we 
must somehow render it object to itself and this cannot be achieved by
82See chapter 6, especially section 6.2
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identifying it with a body83.
The inability to conceive of oneself as a subject goes to the heart of 
the problem of prudence. If a person can form no conception of himself as 
an enduring conscious being (as opposed to just having a body or being 
embodied) then he cannot know what needs he has or values he should 
hold. If I cannot conceive of myself as a being in the world with various 
discernible properties then how can I conceptualize my relationship to the 
world such that I can form a trans-temporal good? I know, as a matter of 
fact, that there are certain things that I need, such as food or shelter or 
physical protection. These needs are derived from the constitution of 
myself as an embodied being, but it isn't as a body that I need them (my 
corpse will not need them) but as a self-conscious being. Therefore, whilst 
I can confidently predict that I will require food, shelter and physical 
protection in the future I cannot adequately characterize the subject who 
needs those things. That this is so follows from the fact that both mental 
and physical states are involved and we do not know how these 
properties are related.
I believe that the inability to explain the mental-physical
relationship means that w e cannot explain the m ental-m ental
relationship, by which I mean the relationship between one mental state
and another, whether at a time or over time. This is because I would
maintain that there must be some relationship between the mind and the
body such that physical-neurological states are somehow involved in the
continuity of a mental life. Parfit would, I think, agree with this, at least
insofar as it is applied to "narrow causation". But he thinks that it doesn't
matter. I disagree. The dependence of mental states upon physical states
83See section 6.5
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means that there are certain limits on what consciousness can represent. I 
shall develop this further in the next chapter but suffice it to say this is 
critically important for how we understand the relationship between 
ourselves and the objects of value in the world: it is central to memory 
and intentionality84.
David Wiggins argues along similar lines. He claims that there is a 
certain fixity with regard to the conception of the person and this is 
imposed on it by the fact that a "person" is a non-biological qualification 
of an animal and as such a person is an embodied being. The correct 
criterion of personal identity, he argues, is that of the spatio-temporal 
continuity of the body85. His response to Butler's charge of circularity 
directed at Locke is to say that the memory that a person A-at-t3 has of 
acting like and being A-at-tl is dependent upon the fact of sharing the 
same body86.
Whilst I endorse Wiggins' approach I believe that something has to 
be added: the confidence of continuity depends upon a (true) belief that 
the "body" which acted at tl is related to a person who acted at tl such that 
the presence of the same body at tl and t3 denotes the continuity of the 
same person. In other words, we must assume a mind-body dependence. 
The problem now is how are we to say with confidence that such 
dependence holds? We have moved from the problem of personal 
identity to the problem of the mind-body relationship and this latter 
question may be insoluble.
My point is that Wiggins is surely right to appeal to the spatio-
84See section 6.5
85WIGGINS (1), p.171.
^WIGGINS (1), p. 162.
temporal continuity of the body as the criterion of personal identity but 
w e need to be sure that between time tl and t3 the re-identified body 
"carried" the same conscious subject. We have to be sure that Parfitian 
wide causation is ruled out and that physical continuity is an infallible 
guarantor of psychological continuity. This appears to be difficult in the 
absence of a resolution of the mind-body problem. Indeed, it may be 
impossible.
In the next chapter I argue that this does not mean that we cannot 
have confidence in the mind-body unity. What is required is what might 
be termed a "positive strategy of avoidance". Unlike intuitionism we do 
not appeal to a moral conception of the person but rather to the 
conception of the person implicit in our rational-epistemic relationship 
with the world and articulated through the pragmatic dimension of 
language87. A positive strategy is based upon the importance of certain 
metaphysical facts but seeks to find inductive and inferential evidence to 
reconstruct the conception of the person. Inevitably this entails going 
beyond empiricism.
87See section 6.5
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PART III: CONSTRUCTIVISM AND COMMUNICATIVE 
RATIONALITY.
Chapter 6
Communicative Rationality
Constructivism  presupposes the existence of tw o distinct 
standpoints—morality and self-interest. Persons possess a moral sense in 
that they recognize the nature of a moral statement as an action-directive 
that overrides self-interest. But people are also assumed to have a bias 
towards their own projects and ends and this underpins the primary goods1. 
Far from generating a deep conflict in the motivations of individuals, this 
dual-structure is essential to rendering morality determinate in a way that 
avoids appeal to moral intuition(s). The formality of the moral sense 
means that many incompatible principles could be willed by agents, and 
hence we need some substantive notion of the (non-moral) human good, 
and this I believe can be recovered from an analysis of the conditions for 
the formation of a good (prudential rationality).
I accept, however, that there appears to be a deep conflict between 
morality and self-interest, and, therefore, the task of Part III of this 
dissertation is to outline a strategy for reconciling the two standpoints and 
vindicating constructivism as a foundational theory of rights. Central to 
this project is the recognition that what is important, from the standpoint 
of constructivism, is that both morality and self-interest involve structures 
rather than substantive ends and the relevant structure w e can term 
"autonomy”. Moral autonomy involves the ability to determine the
1The primary goods form the objects of moral choice—that which is to be distributed. The 
process of moral construction involves the allocation of rights to those goods.
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principles that one is prepared to live under whilst non-moral autonomy 
(prudential rationality) is based upon the capacity to transcend immediate 
desires and preferences, and form a trans-temporal good for oneself.
Sandel is, therefore, right to argue that constructivism presupposes 
the separability of a self and its ends2. This follows not merely from the 
formal requirement that moral principles contain no reference to particular 
individuals, but it also reflects something about constructivism as a 
particular moral theory. That an agent is able to adopt—and indeed must 
adopt—a reflective attitude to his life as a whole, ie. his moral and non- 
moral ends, is essential to the coherence of the construction procedure. The 
primary goods—freedom, a level of income, self-respect etc.—must be equally 
valid for all agents if the original position is to generate moral principles 
(principles that are fair). If agents were to be moved by a strong conception 
of a good that has been arrived at in a non-autonomous way then this 
would call into question the equal validity of the primary goods. And if, in 
fact, agents do act non-reflectively then we must be able to show that they 
are not acting in a fully rational way. Agreement in the primary goods 
depends upon sustaining the claim that self-reflection and the revisability 
of preferences is a rational requirement. It is, therefore, my aim in this 
chapter to show how the revisability of preferences is, in fact, a rational 
requirement.
As should be dear from my discussion in Part II the task must be to 
develop an adequate conception of prudential rationality understood in 
terms of the temporal transcendence of a person's ends, ie. we must show  
how it is possible for a person to form a good over time in the face of intra­
personal plurality. And herein lies the problem: no empirical self is
2SANDEL (1), pp.15-24.
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discernible behind the perceptions "had” by a person. I have argued that the 
enduring self cannot be reduced to its perceptions3--I reject Parfitian 
reductionism—but I have yet to develop an argument to show how a 
prudential stance can be well-grounded. That means, how one can both 
attach value to one's ends and yet be capable of transcending those ends4.
The difficulty involved in establishing the conditions for the 
endurance of the self over time and showing how those conditions can 
generate a concern for self derives, I believe, from certain empiricist 
assumptions. So far I have assumed that once we have a conception of the 
self, ie. when we have overcome Humeian scepticism regarding personal 
identity, we can develop a notion of prudential agency. But I think that an 
alternative approach is required. We must assume that we are already 
acting prudentially, without having a conception of ourselves as enduring 
beings5, and we should ask what this presupposes about the nature of the 
self. This does not demand a psychological answer, such as what the person 
believes about himself (his beliefs may, after all, be false), but rather it 
requires a logical response: what is necessarily presupposed  in self- 
interested action? Since my argument may appear somewhat complex and
3See chapter 5.
4To reiterate, we must show how value can, as it were, flow in two apparently opposing 
directions. On the (me hand, I value my ends because they are my ends, and hence I invest my 
subjectivity into those objects that consequently become my ends. On the other hand, I value 
my ends because I believe that they are valuable independently of me, ie. they have intrinsic 
value. The way to overcome this apparently incoherent view of the relationship between a 
self and its ends is to distinguish between two forms of subjectivity-ontological and 
epistemological. We must combine ontological subjectivity with epistemological objectivity 
and this can be expressed in the idea of agent-relative value. If I have an agent-relative 
reason for acquiring, say, a Rembrandt then it is relative to me as an ontological subject but 
can be recognized as valid for me from an objective standpoint. To achieve this recognition I 
must be capable of observing my ontological subjectivity from a third-person standpoint, 
without undermining the first-person standpoint of my subjectivity.
5That is, we need not assume that an agent is conscious of himself as an enduring being. But as 
I shall argue we must assume that the agent possesses a (primitive) sense of his own 
subjectivity.
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could be open to misunderstanding I shall outline it in section 6.1 before 
engaging in a more detailed explication.
6.1: The Argument Outlined
As I have just suggested there are two ways of making sense of 
prudential rationality. One way is to attempt to develop a conception of the 
self and then elaborate a theory of trans-temporal concern based upon that 
metaphysics of the self. Alternatively, we can ask what w e are already 
presupposing when we pursue our self-interested aims. Correspondingly, I 
believe that there are two epistemological sources from which to form a 
belief in personal identity (or develop a criterion of personal identity) 
neither of which is sufficient in itself to explain prudence, but when 
combined in a coherent way can serve as a basis for trans-temporal concern 
without any appeal to highly controversial claims about the nature of the 
relationship between mind and body. One epistemic source may be termed 
MempiricalH whilst the other is "presuppositional"6. These sources do not 
generate competing conceptions of the self, for I assume that there is but 
one conception of the self corresponding to a real entity in the world: an 
embodied self-conscious mind7.
From the empirical standpoint we can view  the self as spatio- 
temporally located and manifesting various behavioural traits. We perceive 
the self from a third-person, objectifying standpoint. G iven the
6My argument here follows that of Peter Strawson in STRAWSON (4). He distinguishes 
between "hard naturalism" (which I associate with empiricism) and "soft naturalism" 
(which corresponds to the presuppositional argument). Soft naturalism embraces hard 
naturalism but supplements the daims of empiridsm with certain unavoidable 
presuppositions. It is very important to recognize that soft naturalism does not exclude hard 
naturalism. See STRAWSON (4), pp.1-3.
7The distinction is epistemological rather than ontological.
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sophistication of language we can advance many plausible/ and potentially 
refutable, claims about the way persons think or behave. The "empirical 
s e lf  is the object of enquiry for the natural sciences, as well as those social 
sciences modelled on the natural sciences. However, what the empirical 
standpoint cannot grasp are the subjective features of the mind, and 
correspondingly, it cannot explain various aspects of self-concern. In other 
words, if w e are empiricists then we have no choice but to concur with 
Hume's scepticism regarding the existence of the self8: there is no self to be 
observed.
The presuppositional standpoint focuses upon what we must assume 
to be the case, rather than what we can observe, with regard to the nature of 
the self. Kant's argument for the existence of the self as a necessary 
condition for the "transcendental unity of apperception" (that is, the ability 
to synthesize conscious experiences) is a presuppositional understanding of 
the self9. However, Kant did not claim that the noumenal properties of the 
transcendental self corresponded to any of the phenomenal properties that 
could be attributed to "empirical" selves10. Consequently, there is created in 
the Kantian account a bifurcation of the self and difficulties for prudential 
rationality.
I have already sought to distance my argument from an orthodox 
Kantian position by arguing that personal autonomy can be understood as 
the structure of self-interest, and moral autonomy is an abstraction from 
that. I shall now develop this argument with a further digression from the 
Kantian argument, by basing prudence on the linguistic conditions for the 
formation and vindication of validity-claims, as opposed to an appeal to a
8HUME, pp300,675-7.
9KANT (1), p.135.
10KANT (1), p.382.
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self that generates validity through the synthesis of conscious experiences. 
However, it should be made clear at the outset that subjects must be 
presupposed to exist prior to language, in the sense that there is a 
fundamental aspect of mental activity that cannot be accounted for in terms 
of language: the subjective fact of my mental states being mine. As I shall 
argue human beings possess a primitive, pre-linguistic subjectivity. The 
proof of this lies in the inability to conceive of perception as not being 
spatially and temporally located. As such, we must presuppose that the 
subject exists in the natural order, but necessarily not as an object, for the 
subject is a condition for the ordering of objects in perception. This is, I 
think, the kernel of truth in Kant's argument for the presupposition of 
selves11.
The acceptance of this argument—and its negative implications for 
reductionism—does not, however, furnish us with a way of identifying the 
subject as an entity in the world. The fact of the spatio-temporal continuity 
of the body does not show that subjects are bodies or that subjectivity 
supervenes upon bodily identity. As I shall argue, as pre-linguistic subjects 
w e act on objects in the world (and other subjects) and in the process acquire 
a secondary means (beyond mere perception) of grasping those objects: 
language. It is through language that we become conscious of ourselves as 
subjects.
The steps in my argument are as follows. I begin from a minimal 
assumption concerning human practical rationality—individuals have a 
basic drive, or desire, for survival in the sense that they desire that their 
lives go as well as possible. As with the assumption of a moral sense this 
drive does not translate into a commitment to s u b s ta n t ia l  ends.
11KANT (1), p.135.
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Furthermore, I do not assume that a person will act in the knowledge that 
he endures over significant periods of time, but merely that he possesses a 
primitive subjectivity and with that a sense of endurance beyond the 
present. My aim will be to show how a more complex self-understanding 
unfolds from a more primitive one in a dialectical fashion. At the most 
basic level an agent desires objects and states of affairs in an unreflective 
way, but given the complexity of his enviroment, if the agent is to achieve 
the ends which he has set himself as a primitive being he must advance to 
a more complex, reflective mode of reasoning.
It follows that the second feature of my defence of prudence is the 
claim that self-interest is complex; it involves levels. I, as an agent, may 
approach a situation in an unreflective way, but the failure to achieve my 
ends may require a more sophisticated and reflective criticism of the objects 
of my unreflective desire. So we can imagine that a person who genuinely 
seeks pleasurable states of mind may be forced to constrain his present 
enjoyment in order to gain a greater enjoyment at a later date, and, 
furthermore, may be forced to reflect upon which activities will bring him 
the greatest pleasure. He might conclude that whilst a certain degree of 
physical pain is involved in, for example, sport, the pleasurable experiences 
that arise from training one's body far outweigh the pain. At a more abstract 
level, experience may demand that the agent reflect upon the concept of 
"pleasure" itself; is it a single good? Is it synonomous with happiness, or 
contentedness? As I shall argue this process of abstraction involves 
adopting a more global attitude towards one’s life12, and hence the move to 
higher levels of reasoning corresponds to the realization of a full prudential 
rationality.
12See DWORKIN (1), p.26.
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Whilst my argument owes something to the cognitive psychological 
theories of Piaget13 (and Kohlberg14) I am not offering a development 
theory. The only developmental "stage*' in the process is the acquisition of 
language, which is clearly an empirical process in the life of a human being. 
I will, however, go on to delineate three "levels" of language—semantics, 
pragmatics-as-intentionality, and pragmatics-as-inter-subjectivity. These are 
not stages in the development of a natural being, for pragmatics is central to 
language such that the young child who utters his very first sentences is 
already assuming a pragmatic competence. For ease of reference I shall set 
out the structure in diagramatic form.
Linguistic 
Agency
Intention 
ality
Semantics
Pre- Primitive
linguistic Subjectivity
Agency
What should be noted is that each level incorporates the lower levels, and 
as I shall argue the requirements of one's enviroment—the need to flourish 
relative to that enviroment—dictate that one should acquire those higher 
levels of reasoning. But as I have suggested the only real development is 
the acquisition of language which is marked on the diagram by the broken 
line between pre-linguistic agency and linguistic agency.
In order to understand the relationship between the development of 
a full communicative rationality and the realization of a prudential 
rationality we need to recall the discussion of chapter 4 . 1 argued that there 
are two elem ents in prudence—trans-temporal concern and agent-
Inter-
Subjectivity
13PIAGET, chapter 3.
14KOHLBERG, pp.130-47; for a useful discussion of Kohlberg see WREN, chapter 5.
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relativism15. I further argued that different conceptions of prudence could 
not account for these two features. Conativism involves an appeal to a basic 
desire for one's future good, but since desire is rooted in the present this 
undermines the idea of trans-temporal concern16. Conativism does 
however appear to give due weight to agent-relativism, for the immediacy 
of desire seems to reflect the presence of subjectivity, but this cannot be the 
basis of a reflective self-concern unless we can appeal to the enduring self as 
the ground for trans-temporal concern17. Cognitivism is likewise incapable 
of accounting for the two requirements of prudence. Trans-temporal care 
must be derived from the objective value inherent in the objects of desire. 
Consequently, no grounds can be provided for pursuing the particular 
projects that one does pursue—cognitivism cannot provide an adequate 
account of the subject18.
What I argue is that both conativism and cognitivism represent a 
false conception of practical rationality, but nonetheless elements of both 
can be incorporated into a more adequate account. As pre-linguistic agents 
w e are moved by immediate desires and act as if the value of the objects we 
pursue is a product of desire alone (I associate conativism with primitive 
subjectivity). As linguistic agents we recognize that there is a distinction 
between the desiring subject and the objects of desire, and it appears as if 
objects determine value thus calling into question the role of the self in the 
formation of value. We then have a tension between objectivity and 
subjectivity in practical rationality—that is, do the objects of desire 
determine value or does the desiring subject endow objects with value? 
This tension is present in the second level of my diagram (the semantic
15See sections 4.4 and 4.5.
16See section 4.3.
17See section 4.3.
18See section 43  and 4.4.
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level). I believe that this conativist-cognitivist dichotomy will only be 
resolved if w e move to a higher level of reasoning--an appeal to the 
pragmatic dimension of language. Intentionality enters at this stage. 
Intentionality is not mere desire, for as intentional agents we represent 
objects as having desirability-characteristics19. Nevertheless, there remains a 
tension between objectivity and subjectivity, which I discuss in section 6.4.
If we have advanced to the inter-subjective level what w e discover is 
the idea of the self as an enduring entity, for this is a presupposition of 
inter-subjectivity. I do not intend it to be understood that language creates 
subjects. Rather language (at its highest level) reveals the subject to itself 
and what it reveals is an empirical entity. As a speaker I recognize myself as 
a subject who acts upon the world as well as an object of language. I can use 
language, and through language achieve my aims. As I argued in Chapter 5 
the best criterion of personal identity is that of the spatio-temporal 
continuity of the body. If we study the use of language we can see how as 
bodies w e are objects in language whilst as speakers we are subjects of 
language and the unity of the person as a body and as a speaker is achieved 
through the acknowledgement that language is a physical, empirical 
activity (this requires a great deal of expansion—see section 6.5).
In sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 I consider the relationship between the 
four levels of practical rationality. What I attempt to show is how one level 
presupposes a further level until we reach a level of what I’ve called "inter- 
subjective validityM, which I associate with the highest level of prudential 
rationality. In section 6.5 I argue that once we have come to the conclusion 
that the formation of a trans-temporal good is dependent upon a process of
19ANSCOMBE (2), pp.84-5; see also section 4.2.
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inter-subjective validity then w e can recognize that a plurality of enduring 
selves must necessarily be presupposed to exist.
6.2: The Advance to Language
The aim of this section is to show how it is possible to act rationally 
even in the absence of a linguistic consciousness, but further to argue that 
such a form of reasoning will become rapidly dysfunctional as the agent 
attempts to achieve more complex tasks in the pursuit of his self-interest. 
The virtue of defending a basic, non-linguistic rationality as the starting  
point of reasoning is that we do not need to assume that a person already 
has a conception of himself as an enduring being or of certain objects or 
states of affairs as being intrinsically valuable. My strategy is to "uncover" 
the self as a necessary presupposition of practical reasoning. It should, 
however, be stressed that subjects must be presupposed to exist prior to, and 
independently of, language. The rational ground for maintaining such a 
claim rests on the impossibility of reducing the subject to its perceptions. 
My argument against reductionism was based upon the observation that 
the subjective features of mind (mental states) could not be explained in 
impersonal terms—psychological states are not free-floating. But the 
argument is largely negative, for I provided no grounds for identifying the 
subject. In this chapter I begin with the minimal assumption that subjects 
exist and that they will their own survival.
What I shall argue is that self-consciousness, and hence a deliberative 
rationality, is only possible through language. But I also want to argue that 
subjectivity is presupposed by language. As linguistic (communicatively 
competent) agents w e come to a consciousness of our subjectivity, and we
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recognize that this primitive subjectivity must exist if we are to form agent- 
relative values. It is important to be clear about the role of subjectivity in 
communicative rationality, for it is commonly argued that the reliance 
upon language means that the subject has been "surpassed" and that 
therefore any claims that I, qua subject, make on others must be valid from 
an agent-neutral standpoint, ie. valid for all other agents20. With these 
remarks made I shall proceed to outline the transition process from 
primitive subjectivity to self-consciousness.
Wittgenstein, in his Philosophical Investigations, argued against 
what has become termed a "private language" and, inter alia, the notion 
that there might be private objects of mind21. My consideration of the 
question of rational self-interest will draw upon the (Wittgensteinian) 
linguistic conditions for holding well-grounded beliefs. However, as I have 
just suggested it is possible to identify what might be termed a "pre- 
linguistic rationality". A person can have immediate feelings and 
perceptions and these can form the basis for quite simple or quite complex 
rational actions. It is tempting to associate this kind of perceptually-based 
rationality with very young children as well as with non-human animals. 
But I believe that even in fully developed adults many actions are, and 
must be, instinctual. That is, we must be careful not to assume that all non- 
reflective actions are simple or "primitive". I do not reflect upon the fact 
that I walk and talk, but these are not primitive actions, rather they are 
highly complex activities. These activities—essential not only to survival 
but also to a "full life"—must, at first, be consciously acquired (young 
children learn to walk and talk by forming intentions to do so) but then, in 
the interests of efficiency, the rules underlying these activities are pushed
20HABERMAS (4), p.96.
21WITTGENSTEIN (2), propositions 269 & 275.
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into what Searle calls the ’’background" of tacit skills22 and, therefore, it can 
be said that the unreflective activities of walking and talking mark a very 
high level of rational action.
For reasons that I shall go into later, a person cannot reflect upon his 
actions in the absence of language; that is, he cannot form beliefs about 
beliefs and hence—in terms of practical reason—intentions for intentions. 
Nevertheless, I believe that it is possible to recognize that an action is 
rational even in the absence of reflection upon it. It seems reasonable to say 
that a baby is acting rationally when it seeks milk, or when it avoids objects 
which it perceives to be pain-inducing. Likewise, as adults we can act 
instinctively to avoid dangerous situations even when w e do not form a 
reflective intention to act.
I admit that in making these claims I am appealing to common 
sense. The identification of a basic desire for self-preservation is an 
empirical claim rather than a claim based upon any logical considerations. I 
do not think however that anything in Wittgenstein's arguments against a 
private language rules out such primitive reasoning (his argument was 
directed at the logical privacy of mental states rather than their 
psychological privacy23). The problem is whether we can really dignify 
primitive, unreflective desires with the label "rational”, for reasoning 
implies a statement independent of action. That is, an action is not in itself 
rational but rather it is the ability to justify (relative to some standard) the 
action that renders it rational. Of course, from an external standpoint we 
can say that the pre-reflective strivings of children are rational, but this is 
not to say that they are rational agents in the sense that they engage in a
^SEARLE (3), pp.19-20, 65-71.
^WITTGENSTEIN (2), proposition 263.
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reasoning process, ie. it doesn't imply that they are rational "from the 
inside"24. What I claim is that the rationality of pre-reflective action is 
retrospective. In the case of young children the rationality of pre-reflective 
desires becomes apparent when they are in a position to reflect upon their 
actions, ie. when they have advanced to a later stage, and this, of course, 
presupposes that they are the same entities across the different stages of 
their development. In the case of adults the rationality of an action is 
conferred at a later moment of reflection. The difference between the child's 
strivings and an adult's instinctive activities, such as walking and talking, is 
that the latter are only made possible because the agent has already engaged 
in more complex forms of activity.
At this basic, non-linguistic level, it is possible to concur with 
Wiggins that there is something unanalysable about concern for oneself25. 
Nevertheless, as a person seeks to achieve his aims he is forced to engage in 
increasingly complicated forms of reasoning, and thereby we move from 
identity being of fundamental value to identity being of derivative value as 
well. The first step is the linguistification of practical reason (with language 
understood at this stage to be a semantic-formal structure).
The difficulties associated with the pre-linguistic level are, in fact, 
closely related to the problem of conativism which I discussed in Chapter 4. 
Conativists assume that there is a class of desires that explain and justify 
action such that I have a basic, or unmotivated desire to quench my thirst, 
or to own a Rembrandt. But every desire presupposes an object or state of 
affairs onto which it is directed with the consequence that no desire can 
exist without the concept of a desirable object26. Now, if we are acting pre-
24STRAWSON (2), pp.16-17.
^WIGGINS (2), pp.308-9.
^See pp. 113-14-
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linguistically w e cannot have a conception of the object of desire; our 
relationship to the object is immediate27 (unmediated by any conceptual 
framework). Yet to justify the action we need to be able to say that the action 
is worth doing or serves our good and in order to say that we need to reflect 
on what we are doing. A child’s instinctive striving for milk can only be 
recognized as rational from a reflective standpoint.
Given the failure of pure perception, the child must find a new  
mechanism for accomodating the increasingly complex demands of his 
enviroment. The grammatical and symbolic structure of language allows 
the child to gain a more adequate understanding of his enviroment. 
Language allows a person to re-identify objects even when they are outside 
of mind. But the child must first act in order to advance to this higher level 
of reason. A child engages in what Piaget terms "concrete thinking" before 
he can verbalize (explain) it28. Reflective, linguistically-mediated thought 
unfolds from non-reflective, pre-linguistic action.
The claim I want now to make is that reflective action cannot 
proceed on the basis of a private  language and hence mere perception. 
When a person feels pain, or sees a blue object, or grasps that ”93+76=169" 
the tendency is to say that a person has a unique mental state, in the sense 
that he is fee lin g  pain, or see ing  blue, or g r a sp in g  a mathematical 
operation29. My claim has been thus far to say that there are psychological 
states that correspond to such phenomena. The problem is that we cannot 
say with certainty that "93+76=169". All we have to go on is past experience 
and that experience is made up of a finite number of cases and no number
27That is, whilst we may have a perceptual awareness of object we cannot have 
propositional knowledge about those objects.
28PIAGET, p.117.
follow Kripke's discussion of Wittgenstein’s private language argument. See KRIPKE (2).
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of those particular cases can determine the application of a rule for future 
u se30 (likewise with sensations such as pain or pleasure~my particular 
instances of pain and pleasure provide me with no rule for future use). Of 
course, we are often psychologically certain that ”93+76=169" or that we are 
at a particular time feeling pain or pleasure but is this a sufficient basis for 
rational action?
The question then is whether, from the standpoint of self-interest, 
appeal must be made to rules. The case of self-interest does not entail a 
requirement to convince other agents (eg. a sceptic) of the rational validity 
of one's ends: w e could ignore the sceptic. The problem is whether we 
should become sceptical about our own immediate perceptions (is it in our 
interests to be sceptical?). What is at issue in the rejection of a private 
language is whether or not the symbolic structure required to manipulate 
the world must involve appeal to a community of speakers who determine 
usage31, or whether a private language is possible. In other words, must the 
agent overcome his solipsism if he is to successfully prosecute his aims?
There is a somewhat mundane answer to this question and it is that 
a person must communicate his demands and this requires a shared 
symbolic system. This is not, however, an adquate argument, for the sounds 
and symbols of a language can be treated like objects in the world to which 
they are supposed to refer. A child might learn to say "milk” (to make a 
certain sound) without applying a rule (much like when a dog responds to 
the command "sit!"). What we need in order to sustain the argument 
against a private language is the idea that language is a second-order means
^KRIPKE (2), p.245.
31KRIPKE (2), p.289.
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of manipulating the world, independently of perception. Language is 
something qualitatively different from perception.
Intuitively, w e know that language is qualitatively different to 
perception and this w e can observe when a child makes noises that are 
meaningful as opposed to noises that are "just noises". The difficulty lies in 
showing how some sounds (and shapes on a page) are meaningful and 
some are not, and, therefore, why it is that some actions achieve their 
objectives and some actions do not. An answer to this will require a 
recognition of the double-structure of language: the distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics32. It is to this distinction that I now turn.
6.3: The Pragmatic Dimension
Semantics is concerned with the relationship between signs and their 
designata, and derivatively, with the relationship between signs themselves 
(syntactics). Semantics allows us to form propositions that may be true or 
false regarding states of affairs. Those who claim that language is essentially 
semantics assume that it is possible to set up an "ideal language" in which 
every sign has a determinate meaning and the only things that change are 
the combinations of these signs (signs being atomic). I associate such a view  
of language with the early Wittgenstein (by which I mean, with his 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus). But semantics either underdetermines 
m eaning or else overdetermines it. There exist sentences that are 
grammatically correct and employ words that do in some context refer to 
objects (that is, they make sense in a particular context) but the combination
32There is a vast literature on pragmatics. My understanding of the topic is taken from the 
following works: WUNDERLICH, ch.9; HABERMAS (1), chapter 1; APEL (1), chs.l, 3 & 7; 
AUSTIN; SEARLE (l)/(3); GRICE (3); STALMAKER.
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of words is insufficient to render the sentences meaningful. Searle cites as 
an example the command "go cut the mountain!" as semantically valid but 
nonetheless meaningless33. Alternatively, a speech-act may be semantically 
overdetermined in the sense that there exist too many possible meanings. 
This is often the case with particular words, such as "book", which can 
mean the Bible ("the Book"), financial accounts ("the books"), and a verb 
meaning to fine somebody, or to reserve something ("to book").
For somebody not inclined to accept that language requires more 
than an adequate semantics the likely response is that such ambiguity is 
merely apparent. To disambiguate a sentence all we need do is employ 
more fine-grained terms. So we say the book to refer to the bible, or w e talk 
of "fining somebody" rather than "booking" him. Indeed, in order to 
understand anything this is what we in fact do. Each person has recourse to 
a universal grammar and vocabulary and adds onto the basic statement 
elements of this universal language. A person capable of doing this 
possesses communicative competence, and if rational action is dependent 
upon language then this amounts to communicative (practical) rationality. 
The implication of the semanticist rejoinder is that the more complexity 
that w e add to the original statement the closer we shall come to a fully 
determinate understanding of reality (in terms of practical rationality that 
means a clear understanding of the objects of desire). My objection is that 
the ambiguity inherent in language (at the semantic level) is radical. 
Ambiguity arises because language does not have the atomic structure that 
it is portrayed as having in the Tractatus but rather, as Wittgenstein argued 
in his later work34, the meaning of a word must be derived from the context 
in which it is used. There is no point in using more fine-grained terms if
^SEARLE (3), p.147.
^WITTGENSTEIN (2), proposition 686.
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those terms themselves only have a meaning within a particular context, 
adding further levels of language (meta-language) will not enable us to get 
to an original meaning. The command "go cut the mountain!" is simply 
unintelligible.
The recognition of the inadequacy of semantics to generate meaning 
has significant implications for how we ought to think about rational 
action. If semantics exhausted language then no conception of the self could 
be elucidated from within  language. Insofar as a conception of the self 
existed it would be as a body or brain35. Just as pre-linguistic action gives rise 
to the "conativistic fallacy"--the belief that desire alone generates value—so 
semantics generates the "cognitivistiC fallacy"36, that is, the idea that the 
world is valuable independently of the exercise of subjective powers. This 
means that I, qua rational agent, can develop no conception of myself from 
within language and my subjective aims are placed outside language37. 
Being "outside language" meant for the early Wittgenstein existing in a 
mystical realm at the limits of language38 (a solipsistic standpoint) or for 
logical positivists, inspired by Wittgenstein, it meant nothing at all. 
Consequently, the aims that a person pursues are completely beyond 
rational assessment, all we have are concrete acts and if those acts should
35As Wittgenstein argued in the Tractatus:
If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include a report on my 
body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were 
not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an 
important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book 
(WITTGENSEIN (1), prop.5.631).
The subject does not belong to the world; rather, it is the limit of the world 
(WITTGENSTEIN (1), prop.5.632).
36See 4.3.
37We can talk about pain or pleasure in "objective" terms, but not as subjective states, for such 
states are beyond language. This creates a tension between conativism (pure perception) and
cognitivism.
^WITTGENSTEIN (1), proposition 6.45.
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bring (subjectively felt) negative consequences then we have no grounds for 
explaining why39.
However, if semantics is inadequate then there can be said to exist a 
pragmatic deficit by which I mean that we need an account of language as 
an activity, or a practice, through which usage of terms is fixed relative to a 
particular form of life. It is the fact of pragmatics that marks the distinction 
between perceptual knowledge and linguistic knowledge and, crucially for 
my conception of rational prudence, allows us to reflect upon perception 
itself: communicative interaction provides us with an insight into the 
acting subject, an insight denied to us by a purely formal (semanticist) 
understanding of language.
I think there are three grounds for maintaining that a pragmatic 
deficit exists. Firstly, the meanings of words are dependent upon their use 
and use presupposes rules. If we are to understand what a particular 
expression means in a particular context then w e must enter into the 
context or practice. Furthermore, in order to generate speech-acts it is 
necessary to have a grasp of certain facts about language, such as the 
application of synonymy, nounhood and syntax, independently of an ability 
to provide criteria for the application of such terms40. The point is that if we 
can only reason through language then there comes a point when we hit 
rock-bottom. Of course, it is possible that an outsider (a non-participant) 
could understand the meaning of a term but the explanation of the 
meaning would require making reference to that practice41.1 shall at a later 
stage attempt to correct the relativistic image that this argument gives to the
39See APEL (1), pp.4-15. Apel argues that Wittgenstein's early work left a "pragmatic 
deficit" that was accomodated in his later work through the idea of a language-gameKs).
40SEARLE (1), p .ll.
41WITTGENSTEIN (3), propositions 245-248.
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nature of meaning. As I shall argue there are principles underlying 
linguistic practices in general and it these that 1 am particularly interested in 
uncovering42.
Secondly, if we are to use language effectively we must assume a 
great deal of knowledge; knowledge that cannot be presented explicitly 
without infinite regress. If the first argument is based on the importance of 
convention, then this argument is based upon efficiency. There exists a 
background of tacit skills, practices, and habits that cannot be represented43. 
Thirdly, people use language to fulfil their aims and consequently when 
they make a statement they intend to achieve something—to secure an effect 
on their audience. Relatedly, the audience may not respond to a speech-act 
in the way that the speaker expects or intends them to do. The facts of 
intention and effect correspond to the "illocutionary" and the 
"perlocutionary" acts of language in Austin’s scheme (the semantic 
element he termed the "locutionary" act)44. Intention carries satisfaction- 
conditions and these are not a part of what is communicated45.
^See section 7.2
43SEARLE (3), pp.65-71.
44AUSTIN, pp.94-103.
45SEARLE (3), p.48.
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6.4: Inter-Subjectivity
The fact is, however, that w e perceive  that our speech-acts are 
successful without necessarily acknowledging the problematical nature of 
those acts; w e don't acknowledge the pragmatic deficit. Some theorists 
would suggest that this is not important, for w e can reconstruct the 
conditions of rational action even in the absence of a consciousness of 
them. The project termed "universal pragmatics", developed over the last 
twenty-five years by Habermas and Apel seeks to do this. Habermas argues 
that "the task of universal pragmatics is to identify and reconstruct 
universal conditions of possible understanding"46. Anyone acting 
communicatively must raise universal validity claims and assume that 
they can be vindicated. The communicative actor implicitly claims that he 
is uttering something understandable; giving the hearer something to 
understand; m aking him self understandable; and, coming to an 
understanding with another person47. Yet Habermas acknowledges that 
"understanding" has two meanings. It can mean an agreement regarding a 
linguistic expression, or it can mean an accord concerning the validity of an 
utterance48.
Habermas has recently taken issue with Searle over the nature of 
pragmatics, ie. what is entailed in a speech-act. Searle argues that at the core 
of a speech-act is the intention of an agent to convince another person that 
he believes something or will act in a certain way49. Habermas and Apel 
argue that the goal of a speech-act is that of coming to an understanding
^HABERMAS (1), p.l.
47HABERMAS (1), pp.2-3.
48HABERMAS (1), p.3.
49SEARLE (3), pp.27-8, 86.
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with another person about an object or state of affairs such that their 
communication will terminate in inter-subjective agreement regarding the 
validity of a statement concerning that object or state of affairs50. Since 
pragmatics is about success, for Searle a speech-act is successful if it has the 
intended effect on the audience, whereas for Habermas and Apel the success 
of the act depends upon certain inter-subjective standards of validity. 
Searle's intentionalist conception of pragmatics entails the weaker notion 
of understanding whilst the Habermas-Apel inter-subjectivist conception 
entails a stronger notion of understanding.
This discussion is central to my pragmatically-based theory of 
prudence and what I want to claim is that intentionality is central to 
pragmatics and this entails that we cannot move directly from language to 
moral claims (I defend communicative rationality but not discourse ethics). 
Nevertheless, there exists a logos to intentional action that presupposes the 
inter-subjective validation (of a non-moral kind) of a person's ends to be in 
some sense superior to intentionality. In other words we must make a 
distinction within pragmatics between intentionality and inter-subjectivity. 
As I shall argue, Habermas cannot accept that there exist central cases of 
speech-acts that conform to the intentionalist model for it would involve 
metaphysical claims that he believes have been surpassed by the "linguistic 
turn"51. But what I want to argue is that inter-subjectivity necessarily entails 
subjectivity, such that the idea of coming to an agreement with another 
involves intentionality. A person must first act intentionally if he is to 
recognize that his actions raise validity-daims.
^HABERMAS (3), p.17; APEL (5), pp.47-54.
51HABERMAS (5), pp.58-9:
In this (intentionalist) conception, the premises of the modem philosophy of consciousness 
are still presupposed as unproblematic. The representing subject stands over and against a 
world of things and events; at the same time, he asserts his sovereignty in the world as a 
purposively acting subject (p.59).
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In order to explain my argument I shall use a somewhat crude 
example (this crudity being necessary to bring out the main lines of the 
argument). Imagine that somebody (Jones) goes into a bank, in which he 
has an account, and writes out a cheque, takes it to the cashier intending 
and expecting to receive some bank-notes in return. There is clearly a 
sem antic content involved here, for Jones em ploys his explicit 
grammatical-linguistic skills in writing out the cheque and the teller 
likew ise must employ similar skills in order to comprehend Jones's 
communicative act, ie. he must read what is written on the cheque. But 
there is also a stock of shared beliefs that are essential to the success of the 
act. The customer and the cashier recognize each other's role and they share 
beliefs about the nature of the banking system. Yet the pragmatic deficit can 
be said to be unproblematical for there is no dispute over the particular 
claim that Jones makes—his demand for cash.
We can now imagine a second scenario. Instead of going into the 
bank and writing out a cheque, Jones enters brandishing what the cashier 
takes to be a gun, and demands a large amount of money. Unlike the 
previous case we can assume that there is a disagreement concerning the 
validity of Jones's demands. Jones believes he has a reason~an agent- 
relative one-for extracting the cash whilst the teller believes that he lacks a 
moral or, at least, norm-governed reason for action. There may however 
still be areas of agreement. The cashier may accept that Jones has an agent- 
relative reason for action—that it is in Jones’s interests to gain the money, 
even through coercive behaviour. Jones may accept that he is breaking a 
norm and even that he has a moral reason to refrain from his action but we 
must assume that his agent-relative reason conflicts with this moral, or
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agent-neutral reason52. The two also share beliefs about the banking system 
such that Jones believes that the cashier is able (ie. physically capable) to 
give him money even if he is not entitled to give it to him.
Let us now turn to the intentional aspect of Jones's action. Jones 
must convince the cashier that he is serious in his threats, that the gun is 
real and that he will use it. Even here there is an inter-subjective level (a 
kind of "understanding"). The two must share certain technical beliefs such 
as a grasp of ballistics, and more importantly, there must be some 
recognition on the part of Jones of the value-system of the cashier. Jones 
must assume that the bank-clerk attaches a sufficiently high value to his 
own survival such that the threat of death carries some weight. The cashier 
may, after all, be a depressive given to repeated suicide attempts, a person 
who may even welcome death. In this case Jones is forced to adapt his aims 
to facts about the other agent and revise his linguistic behaviour 
accordingly. Let us imagine, however, that the cashier does, in fact, attach a 
sufficiently great weight to his life for the threat to be effective. He accedes 
to Jones's demands. From Jones’s standpoint the action has been 
s u c c e s s f u l 53. W hilst Jones may have been forced to adapt his 
comm unicative behaviour to the aims of the cashier this is not 
Habermasian inter-subjectivity—the aims of the other only impinge upon 
the means to Jones's ends and not on the ends themselves.
Despite Habermas's claims to the contrary54 a great number of central 
speech-acts appear to entail the pursuit of one's ends where those ends are 
not themselves open to critical reflection. However, I believe that there is a
52I shall defend the unity of practical reason and these apparent conflicts are problematical- 
-I return to this issue in the final chapter.
53We bracket out the role of the police and the whole system of social sanctions, for we are 
concerned, at this stage, with inter-subjectivity from the standpoint of self-interest.
54HABERMAS (1), p.4.
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way of showing that inter-subjective claims of validity are implicit in  
actions that appear to be merely intentionalist. A prerequisite for my 
argument is that we get away from thinking that validity-daims and inter­
subjectivity necessarily entail moral claims. There are many forms of 
validity-scientific truth, aesthetics, efficiency, etc.. Validity is, in essence, 
concerned with giving reasons for action and these reasons may be agent- 
relative in character, ie. we can be concerned with the validity of a good life 
for a particular person. Inter-subjectivity means, in a strong sense, the idea 
that our ends themselves are brought forward to be analysed on the basis of 
a practice. And a person can be physically isolated and still participate in 
inter-subjective validation of his ends, for once we accept that reasoning is 
possible only through a public language then all forms of rational thought 
are inter-subjective.
As I argued in Chapter 4 reason must be grounded in a structure55. 
That this is so follows from the need to transcend the subject-object 
relationship. Moral reasons, if w e follow  Kant, are grounded in the 
universalization of the act of a free agent56. What then is the corresponding 
structure for self-interested reasons? The obvious answer is that it is 
grounded in the nature of the self as an enduring being57. The inadequacy 
of the intentionalist model of pragmatics stems from the rational 
requirements that are imposed upon us as enduring beings. It will be 
recalled that I defined prudence as the requirement that we treat all parts of 
our lives as having prima facie equal validity58. This means that w e must 
abstract from the immediacy of our desires and take into account desires 
that w e might have. I further argued that neither conativism nor
55See section 4.5
^KANT (2), p.58.
57See NAGEL (1), p.14.
58See pp.4.3.
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cognitivism could account for two fundamental features of prudence: trans­
temporal concern and agent-relativism. What is interesting is that the 
intentionalist model of pragmatics must also presuppose the falsity of 
cognitivism and conativism, even though it fails to adequately integrate the 
subject and the object (it fails to show how a subject can be a reflexive object 
of concern).
As Searle defines it, intentionality is directedness and this involves a 
distinction between the state (desire) and what the state is directed at59. 
Searle follows Grice in arguing that a person means something by an 
expression (or speech-act) by intending to produce certain effects on his 
audience. Consequently, intentional acts carry with them satisfaction- 
conditions60. My imperative "do X!" will be successful if the audience does 
X as a consequence of hearing my command. My truth-daim that "the earth 
is flat" will be successful if I get my audience to believe that the earth is, in 
fact, flat.
What is involved in a speech-act is an agent, a state of affairs and a 
set of satisfaction-conditions. The intentionalist model gives a role to 
conativism in that it is the agent who determines what is to count as a 
successful speech-act, rather than the desirability-conditions of the object 
imposing themselves on the agent. Cognitivism is also accounted for in 
that the satisfaction-conditions will only be met if something obtains in the 
world, independently of desire. The fact that the world is not flat will be a 
causal factor in the satisfaction-conditions of my truth-daim that "the earth 
is flat" not being met.
59SEARLE (3), pp.1-4.
S earle (3), pp.86-7.
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I think, however, that the intentionalist conception reveals rather 
than resolves the tension between desire and object. Surely, the satisfaction- 
conditions for a claim must be inter-subjective if we are to avoid the absurd 
conclusion that I could so construct the conditions for holding that the 
earth is flat that it turns out that my truth-claim is successful. Different 
types of speech-acts will carry different satisfaction conditions but that does 
not mean that they are subjectively determined. Subjectivity enters in at the 
stage at which we are entitled to make claims that we sincerely believe are 
valid. Every speech-act carries this subjective aspect. The inter-subjective 
aspect of a speech-act is revealed when we insist that the agent himself does 
not determine the validity-conditions themselves.
It is plausible to maintain both an egoist position and an acceptance 
of the notion of inter-subjective validity. To be an egoist is to have an 
exclusive interest in oneself, such that I could, as an egoist, be concerned 
simply with experiencing pleasurable states. What counts as a pleasurable 
state will be objectively determined, ie. relative to a linguistic practice that 
fixes the correct application of the word '’pleasure” and cognate terms. The 
difficulty is that to be both an egoist and an inter-subjectivist involves a 
tension between the self and its ends. On the one hand, my reason for 
pursuing pleasurable states is premised upon my subjectivity, and yet what 
is to count as a pleasurable state for me is inter-subjectively determined. 
That is, whilst there can be a diversity of sources of pleasure it must be the 
case that the pleasure-seeking agent can provide reasons as to why a certain 
object generates pleasure. We are not requiring that he justify himself in 
moral terms, or indeed that he publicize his reasons, but in the interests of 
the formation of a good the agent must be capable of comparing different 
forms and sources of pleasure. To achieve this he must reflect upon the 
objects of his desire and that reflective process is dependent upon one or
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several linguistic practices. The problem then is how does the agent 
maintain his egoism? It is not essential that the ends he pursue be shared 
with others but rather he must recognize that his capacity to reflect upon 
those ends is dependent upon inter-subjective practices. What I want to 
argue is that as prudential agents w e must be committed to social co­
operation (albeit on non-moral terms).
If self-interest presupposes a form of inter-subjective validation to 
which a person submits his ends, what would this entail in concrete terms? 
A person must, first of all, be assumed to have a set of beliefs that have not 
been subject to critical assessment. These include beliefs that we must just 
assume if we are to be capable of any action, eg. an implicit belief in the laws 
of gravity, and these presuppositions form a part of the pragmatic 
background61. A person has, therefore, a general conceptual framework that 
he shares with all other agents. In addition, he has a personal framework of 
beliefs that are not necessary to action in general but is the basis of his 
conception of the good. In terms of self-interest it is an agent's particular 
framework that is of the greatest significance. With regard to this 
framework we can say that there are two important factors: perturbance and 
coherence.
We can say that a person seeks coherence in his beliefs relative to a 
general framework, and this is imposed upon the agent by his nature as an 
enduring subject. But w e can also say that this framework is constantly 
challenged through the influence of other belief-frameworks. We must 
assume that the agent has preferences and desires which may be rational 
but which have not been arrived at through a process of critical reflection. 
The particular desires that a person has will have been determined by that
61SEARLE (3), pp.65-71.
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person's life-history which is rooted in his nature as a spatio-temporally 
continuous psycho-physical entity. The influence of his enviroment 
(including other agents) will cause the agent to act in certain ways, but as a 
rational agent he is capable of critically reflecting upon those preferences 
and, crucially, of reforming them in accordance with the conception that he 
has of himself as an enduring being; a self-conception that has been 
acquired through language. The fact of personal identity imposes upon the 
agent the requirement that he achieve coherence in his beliefs and actions. 
Inter-subjectivity is the apparatus through which he can rationally order his 
preferences, but as an enduring being the agent must assume that he exists 
across the different language-games. In section 6.5 I want to draw together 
the threads of my argument by suggesting that we can become reflexively 
self-conscious agents if we presuppose that we are members of an abstract 
"communication community" that transcends all particular linguistic 
practices.
6.5: The Self and Communicative Rationality
It is now time to consider how the self can be both a condition for the 
formation of a prudential good and the reflexive object of concern in a 
person’s rational deliberations. That is, in order to form a good I must reach 
out into the world of objects (that which is independent of, and opposed to, 
my subjectivity) and Midas-like endow certain objects with value; a value 
that is relativized to me. Consequently, "I" (this subject) must precede the 
objects that I value and I cannot thus be constituted by those objects62. 
However, if my actions are not to be arbitary then I must already have
62This contrasts with Parfitian reductionism and Sandelian "eneumberedness".
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reasons as to why certain objects are valuable-for-me and hence I must 
already have a conception of myself as an an object of concern.
We must assume that w e are subjects prior to language and not 
constituted by, or through, language. It has been an important thread 
running through my argument in this chapter that there is a primitive 
subjectivity and that the real problem is reflexivity: how do w e become 
conscious of ourselves as subjects and thus the locus of prudential concern?
In an important sense Kant was right to argue that the self was a 
presupposition of experience, and it is useful to begin my exploration of the 
self in communicative rationality with his argument against Hume. Kant 
argued that we cannot attribute mental states at all unless we acknowledge a 
relation of existential dependence among them63. The crucial mechanism 
that is at work is "synthesis”: mental state M l is synthesized with M2 to 
create M3. M3 is a product of, and dependent upon, M l and M2, but it is not 
reducible to either. The dependence of M3 on M l and M2 is one of content, 
by which it is meant that M3 brings together two otherwise unrelated states 
by comprehending the contents of both64. So, for example, at time tl I think 
the thought that ”1 would like to go for a walk" (Ml) and at t2 I perceive 
that it is raining (M2), and at t3 I decide against going for a walk (M3) as a 
consequence of reflecting upon M l and M2. The "I" doesn't just accompany 
thoughts M l-M3 but conjoins them: the "I" is a synthesizing subject.
The difficulty with the argument is that it provides no sortal proviso 
for reidentifying the synthesizing subject over time. We cannot assume that 
it is a single body that carries a single series of mental representations, for
63KANT (1), p.136.
^For a discussion of Kant's argument see KITCHER; VENDLER; AMERIKS, pp.156-64;
POWELL, pp.11-33.
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mental states could be transfered from one body/brain to another like 
batons in a relay race. Alternatively, a single body could carry many 
different series of mental states. We, therefore, seem to be stuck with a not 
particularly helpful conception of the self as a substrate. I believe however 
that the "turn to languageN (from pure consciousness) provides a means of 
bringing together the presuppositional self and the empirical self. If we say 
that self-conscious mental states are logically dependent upon a public 
language then w e have found a way of representing mental states in an 
empirical manner. The necessary unity of perception is made public 
through the necessary representation of those states in speech-acts.
It may be argued that the shift from consciousness to language means 
that the concept of the subject ceases to be foundational to reason (be it 
practical reason or theoretical reason). If we follow the development of 
Wittgenstein's thought it could be argued that in the Tractatus the Kantian 
transcendental subject was replaced by the "world as the totality of 
propositions"65, whilst in the Philosophical Investigations, the world was 
replaced by "language-game(s)"66 (or in hermeneutic terms lebenswelt(en)). 
In the discourse ethics of Habermas and Apel the requirement that all 
(central) speech-acts carry agent-neutral conditions of validity means that 
the self has no role in the formation of value67.
However, I believe that it is the complexity of language that allows us 
to talk of selves as a presupposition of language, as well as objects in 
language. The primitive, pre-linguistic subject is capable of rational action 
but not of self-conscious, deliberative reason. In order to achieve that the 
self must find a means of viewing itself from a third-person standpoint and
^WITTGENSTEIN (1), propositions 5.631-5.633.
^WITTGENSTEIN (2), proposition 7.
67HABERMAS (5), p.96.
202
this is brought about through language. Vet if language were merely a 
formal, semantic system of signs and rules then the subject, qua subject, 
could not be represented. Of course, linguistic subjects would have a 
conception of ’’perspective"--of being the subject or object of a sentence—for 
that is central to grammar. Furthermore, the (semantic-)linguistic subject 
could have immediate psychological states such as fear or pain or pleasure, 
and the subject could associate such states with objects in the world and use 
his linguistic skills to describe those states. But he would not have made 
any advance at all in representing subjective states as subjective states. That 
is, the agent has no language for describing the subject that has such states.
It may be argued that as linguistic agents we soon come to realize that 
our bodies play a fundamental role as the "bearers" of psychological states, 
and indeed a child soon learns that if he, say, stands too close to the fire he 
will suffer unpleasurant sensations. The difficulty is that because semantics 
is not a developmental stage in the life of a human being, but rather a 
logical aspect of a person’s communicative competence, w e can never 
abstract from the full structure of language and imagine what it would be 
like to have recourse only to semantics. Consequently, the following claim 
must be speculative: the confidence that we have in our bodies as bearers of 
mental states is borne of being intentional agents and being treated as 
intentional agents by others. When w e act, w e discriminate between 
animate objects and inanimate objects; between subjects and objects. 
Through this interaction we come to have a conception of ourselves as 
subjects.
Intentionality is central to language and fundamental to the 
development of self-consciousness. But prudential rationality requires 
objective standards of validation; that is, whilst prudence presupposes
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ontological subjectivism  it also requires epistemological objectivism . To 
achieve this (what I have termed agent-relativism) we must retain the role 
of intentionality in language alongside inter-subjectivity. What this 
requires is the ability to have interests in oneself—desires for one's exclusive 
good—but allow that one is not the sole arbiter of that good. The recognition 
of personal identity is crucial to agent-relativism. Once I am in a practice 
then I cease to be the sole arbiter of the validity of the particular ends which 
have brought me into contact with the practice, but the fact of having a 
particular end is dependent upon being the particular person that I am. The 
particular person that I am is determined by my being an embodied entity, 
bom in a time and place and surviving through time and space as a natural 
kind. Given this fact I develop special ties with other persons, acquire 
beliefs and attributes, and come to view the world from a particular angle. 
Now, the subject is not these things, for the subject cannot be identified in 
empirical terms, but rather it is a presupposition of the unity of these 
things. However, as agents who must translate their subjective desires into 
intentional action w e must as it were present ourselves to the world as 
flesh-and-blood beings and language provides us with the means to do so. 
In short, the capacity to make demands upon others—the ability to act 
intentionally—is an indication of our own subjectivity. But is only through 
the medium of language that we can make demands on others, and reflect 
upon those demands, for all claims presuppose objects in the world and 
those objects must be represented in a public language. This public 
dimension generates the conception that we have of ourselves as embodied 
subjects and so furnishes us with a ground for believing that we are 
enduring beings.
A further difficulty does, however, present itself. As a spatio- 
temporally continuous embodied being I am identical through time, for as I
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argued in chapter 5 bodily continuity is a reliable indicator of survival. And 
as a linguistic agent I must necessarily be embodied, for this is a 
requirement for acting intentionally and being acted upon. But there is a 
problem for prudence, for since prudential rationality presupposes the 
capacity of agents to transcend their particular desires and preferences and 
form a trans-temporal good it follows that an agent must also be capable of 
transcending the particular language-games in which he participates. In 
other words, as prudential agents we need a meta-language-game from 
which to arbitrate between particular games. The problem is not a 
metaphysical one, for we know ourselves to be self-conscious, embodied 
entities, but rather it is a problem of rationality. I participate in many 
language-games and I know that I can survive the transition from one 
language-game to another, but am I capable of taking up a ’’prudential 
m eta-standpoint” that corresponds to a linguistic community? In other 
words, must prudential rationality—which involves the capacity to 
transcend all of one's preferences—be located beyond language?
I believe that there is a way of viewing our particular linguistic 
practices such that a person can form a prudential good. The idea is thatall 
particular language-games are limited either by the fact that they represent a 
special practice that is insulated from other practices (eg. the religious 
standpoint is insulated from the community of natural scientists and vica- 
versa) or else the language-game is subject to revision (eg. one scientific 
community may supplant another). We must, therefore, always presuppose 
the existence of a meta-game, and following C.S.Peirce and Apel I term this 
the "indefinite and unlimited communication community". Since this 
notion is bound up very closely with the possibility of reconciling prudence 
and morality I have postponed discussion of it to Chapter 7 (section 7.2).
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Chapter 7
The Foundations of Rights
I began this dissertation by suggesting that there was an apparent 
problem with rights, for whilst they permitted the pursuit of self-interested 
aims they placed constraints on those aims. I shall conclude by arguing that 
this dual structure of prudence and morality is what recommends rights as a 
basic principle of a rational society.
The tension between prudence and morality involves a conflict between 
imperatives: prudence directs me to do X, whilst morality directs me to do Y, 
yet X and Y are incompatible actions. We might be inclined to agree with Nagel 
that there are two distinct standpoints—the "personal” and the "impersonal"— 
each with its rational imperatives and there is no way that w e can reconcile 
them or eliminate one without loss to the other1. However, I argue that the 
possibility of grounding rights does depend upon a reconciliation of prudence 
and morality. The idea of a construction procedure incorporates a conception 
of the self as both a moral and a prudential agen& My aim in this chapter is to 
try to show how such a procedure can join together prudence and morality 
without sliding into egoism.
My strategy involves arguing that liberal rights (along with other liberal 
principles) can become goods for us, as well as being binding upon us. Persons 
can develop an interest in the kind of society which rights express—a society in 
which there is reasonable disagreement regarding conceptions of the good and 
where all truth-daims are in prindple revisable, but nevertheless one in which 
persons can come to value certain beliefs and life-forms with a degree of
1 NAGEL (6), p.ll.
^See section 2.1
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confidence. This interest does not explain the moral force of rights, in the sense 
that I do not respect rights because they are ends for me, ie. accept their 
bindingness—that would undermine their moral objectivity-but I can develop 
an interest in rights because the moral agent that I am in the choice-situation is 
an abstraction from the Mfull agent” that I am outside the choice-situation. To 
put it another way, moral autonomy is an abstraction from personal autonomy, 
for the ability to determine the principles of justice independently of any prior 
conceptions of moral goodness expresses the same form of agency as that of a 
prudential agent capable of standing back from his preferences at a particular 
time and attempting to form a trans-temporal good. What is missing in moral 
agency is, of course, knowledge of one's particular ends, and much of my 
argument in this final chapter will be concerned with showing that this lack of 
self-knowledge does not undermine constructivism.
I begin with a discussion of the unity and plurality of reason (section 
7.1). I argue that "reason” should be conceived of as an internally differentiated 
whole. Different forms of reason exist without necessarily coming into conflict 
at a deep level. So there is, for example, a distinction between theoretical 
reason and practical reason, and a sub-division of practical reason into 
prudence and morality. Analogous to these distinctions there is a difference 
between types of good (or goodness). I shall discuss three—the moral good, the 
prudential good, and the social good. My claim is that w e should not be 
concerned to eliminate any of these categories, but rather to show how they 
stand in particular relations to one another, such that in certain circumstances 
one category is dominant whilst in another a different category is. Now, of 
course, morality always overrides self-interest (prudence) but that does not 
mean that morality is dominant in every situation, for there are circumstances 
where morality is inappropriate. Furthermore, although morality is overriding, 
in order to arrive at substantial moral conclusions, eg. to elaborate a system of
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rights, it will be necessary to appeal to non-moral forms of reason. My 
argument has involved a denial of the independence of moral theory (and even 
more so a denial of the independence of political theory^). In order to move 
from the formal moral sense to the possibility of substantive principles requires 
a conception of the human good, or of general human interests. The idea of the 
Rawlsian primary goods involves a conception of human interests that 
presupposes a form of non-moral rationality^. My aim is to use the idea of 
primary goods as the bridge between morality and prudence.
To defend the primary goods I shall make appeal to the model of 
prudential rationality developed in Chapter 6. I shall argue that the inter- 
subjective conditions for the formation of a prudential good will lead a person- 
-on reflection—to value those goods that permit free association with others, 
participation, the exchange of ideas, the independence of certain institutions 
from state control, and a decent minimum level of income^. Given the nature 
of these goods, a necessary product of the choice-procedure will be rights. 
What I am keen to stress, however, is that the recognition of the inter- 
subjective preconditions for the formation of one’s good does not translate 
directly into a commitment to moral principles. In other words, whilst my 
arguments draw upon the idea of a communicative rationality I am not 
advancing a discourse ethics**. What we require is a robust understanding of 
self-interest, and likewise of the moral standpoint.
^See RAWLS (3) for the opposing argument, ie. for the independence of moral theory. In 
particular, Rawls argues that the conception of the self in constructivism does not commit us to 
a particular position on the problem of personal identity (pp.15-20).
^See section 2.1.
^For a discussion of the idea of inter-subjective validation see section 6.4. See also section 72  
*This is in contrast to Habermas and Apel. My argument is that the concept of "communicative 
rationality" should be applied to the raising and settling of validity-claims in general, and that 
Habermas and Apel are right to argue that all speech-acts (central cases of speech-acts) imply 
at some point an appeal to inter-subjective validity. Moral validity is something much narrower. 
Apel has acknowledged that the boundaries of discourse ethics are narrow. See APEL (3), p.6.
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Self-interest is accomodated in the choice-situation through the idea that 
individuals desire a greater rather than a lesser share of the primary goods. But 
self-interest does not turn the moral choice-situation into one of rational choice. 
This is because agents have a moral sense, and this moral sense is reconciled 
with the prudential drive through a recognition of the "unlimited 
communication community"?. That is, every particular speech-community 
presupposes (counterfactually) an ideal community such that an agent who 
insists that his self-interest cannot be accommodated with morality can be 
shown that implicit within the idea of self-interest is the notion of an unlimited 
community in which there are operative principles of freedom and equality. 
N ow , the point of this argument is not to show how self-interest leads to 
morality but rather that there exists a standpoint from which moral reason and 
prudential reason are joined. The claim is that a person is not acting irrationally 
by accepting the constraints on the pursuit of his self-interest entailed in a 
system of rights, not that morality is grounded in, or reducible to, self-interest.
It is at the level of the social good (as opposed to the prudential or moral 
good) that the state plays a crucial role with regard to rights. The state can be 
defined as that entity which commands a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
coercion within a particular territory. Since rights must be coercively enforced 
we can conceive of the moral grounding of rights as involving an explanation 
of our obligation to obey the state (our political obligation). Whilst the 
commitment to respect another's rights is derived from the operation of 
morality, as prudential agents we recognize the value of social cooperation and 
the importance of a conditional commitment to obey the legal authority that is 
charged with implementing the moral principles that are generated.
^For a discussion of the concept of the "unlimited communication community" see APEL (1), 
chapters 5 & 7.
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I shall begin, however, with a discussion of the pluralistic nature of 
reason and then go on to discuss the concept of the indefinite community of 
interpretation (section 7.2) and argue that it is of great importance in joining 
together moral and prudential agency in the choice-situation. From there I 
discuss the status of the choice situation in a constructivist defence of rights 
(section 7.3). In particular, I argue that the credibility of that choice-situation 
depends upon showing that the primary goods are of equal value for all 
persons, and in order to do this I will appeal to the concept of the autonomous 
person that I have developed in chapter 6 and in section 7.2. I contrast my 
conception of fairness with that of "neutrality" (neutrality between conceptions 
of the good) advanced by Rawls and others®. In the final sections I argue that 
rights are a fundamental element of a rational society (and of "modernity") and 
can be understood to be universally valid in a way that does not presuppose 
their existence as "natural". I conclude with a comment on the role of the state 
in the grounding of rights.
7.1: The Plurality of Reason
It has been argued that there is an ineliminable conflict between 
different reasons for action, such that no strategy of reconciliation will be 
successful. My defence of constructivism as the basis for rights not only entails 
a rejection of this view but, in fact, makes appeal to the plurality of reasons. In 
this section I want to set out what I understand by "the plurality of reason" and 
in subsequent sections I will argue for a strategy of recondlation based upon a 
recognition of this plurality.
8RAWLS (6)/(8); KYMLICKA, pp.76-85; DOPPELT; LARMORE, ch3.
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Practical reason is an internally-differentiated unity^. That is, we must 
assume that reasons form a unity, for this is a requirement of the intelligibility 
of the concept of a "reason”, but we must avoid reducing all reasons to one 
type, be it a moral reason, a prudential reason, or some other kind of reason, 
eg. an aesthetic judgement*®. in particular, I wish to distinguish between three 
types of good-the moral good, the prudential good, and the social good. What 
I argue is that the social good is a mediatory form between morality and 
prudence in rights. My argument will depend upon drawing on the conception 
of prudential rationality that I advanced in Chapter 6**.
I have defined morality as an overriding action-directive. My 
understanding of moral rationality is that it has a formal structure. If I make a 
moral-ought statement then the rational validity of that claim will be assessed 
by reference to its universality, which can be understood as the ability to stand 
in the shoes of all other a g e n t s *  2 .  But it is dear that if universality were the 
only test then many competing and conflicting moral claims would be 
generated. Therefore, whilst morality is a distinct form of reason the ability to 
generate concrete moral prindples depends upon an appeal to certain non- 
moral facts, which for constructivism are facts about the self.
1^ take this differentiation of the spheres of reason to be a mark of modernity and something to 
be defended. Other writers talk of a "fragmentation" of value where fragmentation is 
understood in negative terms. See MACINTYRE, chs.l & 2; and, Nagel’s essay "The 
Fragmentation of Value" in NAGEL (2).
l®My argument bears some relation to that advanced by M.Walzer in WALZER, pp.6-10. 
Different spheres carry different conditions for determining the validity of an action or 
statement. So, for example, at the level of the state (which I take to be a particular sphere) we 
may operate a substantive principle of equal treatment regardless of natural endowments, 
whereas in a university we will operate a principle of merit (desert) in terms of entry 
requirements and (hopefully) a particular principle for determining the truth-content of 
statements made in academic discourse.
11 See section 6.4 
l^See section 2.1
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It should be added that there could be a plurality of types of moral 
principle. There may exist consequentialist principles that take end-states to be 
the appropriate test of validity, and "deontological" principles that judge moral 
performance in terms of respect for a ru le^ . it is not my aim to discuss the 
relationship between these types of principle except to say that they are not 
intrinsically conflictual if understood as separate principles. That is, if one has 
defined the area in which one type of principle operates.
The second kind of reason—prudence—I have already discussed at 
length. To summarize my arguments, it can be said that prudence involves the 
rational capacity to form a conception of the good over tim e^. It shares with 
morality a formality, for it involves the ability to abstract from the preferences 
that one has at a particular time, and this is comparable to the formal capacity 
to abstract from the identities of agents in morality. It also shares with morality 
the weakness of such formality—it provides no guidance as to what good should 
be p u r su e d ^ . As I have argued constructivism attempts to render moral 
principles determinate by making appeal to the notion of the autonomous 
agent, but this is an appeal to prudence as the formal structure of self-interest. 
That means moral autonomy is an abstraction from the full autonomy of the 
agent, and full autonomy involves the ability to form a conception of the good. 
This is the connection between the two different forms of reason—prudence 
and morality. But herein lies a problem. It is a requirement of morality that we 
abstract from the particular features of the agent, and that means that a 
fundamental element of prudence must be bracketed out, viz. disproportinate 
concern for self. However, my understanding of autonomy involves a concern
I ^ Charles Larmore makes the, perhaps banal, comment that any adequate moral theory must 
reconcile deontological and consequentialist principles. I shall not have anything to say on this 
topic but I hope that nothing in my argument precludes the possibility of combining both types 
of principle into a single theory. LARMORE, pp.132-3.
I^See section 4.3 
l^See section 4.4
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for oneself and an appeal to personal identity. The problem is that whilst a 
person may have a moral sense it may not be rational for him to accept the 
constructivist procedure if it involves an incoherent appeal to personal
autonomy! 6.
In order to resolve the difficulty involved in Mmoralizing" personal 
autonomy we need to appeal to a third kind of reason, or good—the social 
good. In Chapter 6 I tried to show how an agent can pursue ends which he 
believes to be both intrinsically valuable and also valuable for him. That is, an 
object can have both objective and agent-relative value. My argument has 
involved an appeal to language, and particularly to the idea of a pragmatic, or 
inter-subjective level, as the highest form of practical reason. What I want now  
to argue is that a person who pursues his good is implicitly committed to 
attaching value to certain institutional pre-conditions for that pursual. In 
concrete terms, rights to free association, the free communication of ideas, a 
minimum level of education, and certain ("enabling") welfare rights, are all 
essential to the formation of a good. The "social good" can be understood as 
that complex of institutions and relationships that allow persons to form 
prudential goods. The social good is to be distinguished from the moral good 
by virtue of the fact that persons come to value the social good from the 
standpoint of full self-knowledge, and relatedly, from the recognition that the 
social good is a good for them.
I have been at pains to stress that the idea of inter-subjective validity is 
not to be understood to involve moral validity. In section 7.2 I shall further 
clarify this question. When I pursue my prudential good I am seeking out
"incoherent" I mean that it does not make sense to say that moral agency is only made 
possible because of non-moral facts about human beings—ie. their ability to pursue an agent- 
relative good over time—but that a fundamental aspect of that non-moral capacity must be 
eliminated in order to ensure that the principles that are chosen are moral.
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features of the world that are valuable for me. My participation within a 
particular practice, be it implicit or explicit, is conditional upon having certain 
desires or intentions and these will be determined by my life-history (that my 
life-history is particular to me follows from my nature as a spatio-temporally 
located being). Inter-subjectivity involves different forms of rationality, some of 
which may conflict with moral rationality. Indeed, this conflict may be as 
serious as that which would be generated by a monistic, individualist form of 
reasoning. For example, social practices that stress self-denial are incompatible 
with practices that stress the pursuit of pleasure; practices that emphasize 
challenging religious doctrines, say through novels or films, may be regarded 
as blasphemous from a religious standpoint. The picture that I want to paint is 
of a social system composed of a multiplicity of practices—"language-games"17- 
-many of which are plainly incompatible with one another. As prudential 
agents we must necessarily participate in some practices, and which practices 
we participate in will depend upon what our ends are.
It should, however, be added that there is at least one practice in which 
all must be presupposed to have an interest in being members of: the political 
community (the state). On the one hand, the state is just another practice, for it 
has a particular function and criterion of validity. On the other hand, its 
function is (or should be) to allow the pursuit of alterior interests and the 
development of other practices, eg. universities, family relations, other 
personal relations, the free market. The state is special because it is assumed to 
provide the necessary and sufficient goods for the realization of the primary 
interests of individuals and groups. The problem is that the dependence of all 
individuals on the state does not, and cannot translate into a moral 
commitment to respect the authority of the social norms which the state
l^See WITTGENSTEIN (2), propositions 7 & 65, for a definition of a language-game.
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upholds. Respect for the state is derived at best from motives of personal 
advantage, which is understood, at a collective level, to be mutual advantage.
If inter-subjectivity terminated at the level of particular practices—even 
that of the state—then I think that my strategy for reconciling prudence and 
morality through the idea of social goods would be unsuccessful, but I believe 
that w e should not be content with this model of apparently interminable 
social conflict. It will be my aim in the next section to show how the idea of the 
"indefinite and unlimited communication community" is presupposed in all 
forms of communicative action, ie. all existing language-games, and how this 
notion provides us with a model of moral autonomy.
7.2: The Indefinite Community of Interpretation
My argument concerning the linguistic basis of prudential rationality 
has led me to the view that individuals must participate in certain, necessarily 
limited, "language-games" if they are to be in a position to form a good over 
time. That is, when I, as a prudential agent, desire to have certain things or 
bring it about that certain things happen to me, I must have a conception of the 
desired objects or states of affairs (including, of course, a conception of their 
desirability-characteristicslS). So, for example, if I desire to acquire a cellar of 
vintage wines then the belief that it is worthwhile pursuing that project must 
be imputed to me. If that belief were to be made explicit then it might entail the 
view that it is "pleasurable" or "satisfying" or "fulfilling" to attempt to acquire 
that cellar. These concepts will necessarily be context-bound, even if that 
context is shared by all users of them. The rejection of a purely semantic view  
of language means that in deliberating over the validity of the desire to own a
l®See sections 4 2  and 6.4
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cellar full of fine wines I must make appeal to the inter-subjective 
understanding of various terms (albeit an implicit one) and those terms as it 
were "hang together” within a particular conceptual framework. The 
relationship between a self and its ends is not immediate but mediated through 
pragmatics.
The recognition of the pragmatic conditions of rational will-formation 
entails a further recognition of the limitedness of the particular language-games 
in which w e participate. This lim itedness stems from the fact that 
linguistically-mediated knowledge can only be acquired from within a 
practice, in contrast to the view that knowledge can be acquired from an 
objective standpoint, such as the Kantian transcendental standpoint. To have 
recognized that words only have meanings in context is to have a conception 
that there are standpoints outside of that context. The idea of being inside a 
practice or outside of it can be expressed in different ways. Firstly, a person may 
recognize that a particular practice is limited by its substantive content. An 
example might be religious belief. A Christian, say, will read passages of the 
Bible in a way that necessarily makes reference to concepts that can only be 
understood from within a particular context. Those concepts cannot translate 
over into a different language-game, such as a community of natural 
scientists^. Secondly, concepts may be capable of being carried over from one 
language-game to another but only hypothetically so. The presently- 
constituted community of natural scientists, if they are being sincere, will hold 
that their language-game(s) represents the best understanding of a particular 
subject-matter but they must also accept that a not-yet-existing language- 
game(s) might have a better grasp of reality.
^WITTGENSTEIN (2), proposition 65.
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The latter distinction between existing and not-yet-existing language- 
games involves a (potential) problem. Inter-subjective practices must "fix" 
value, for we are not assuming scepticism, but at the same time we are obliged 
to accept that the practices in which we are engaged are limited. To square 
these apparently contradictory beliefs requires appeal to the idea of "universal 
pragmatics" or the "indefinite community of interpretation"^, w hat we can 
say is that it is a universal fact that truth claims, and reasons for action, must be 
mediated through the pragmatic level of language. That is, whilst I, as a 
particular spatio-temporally located being, must participate in these practices 
in order to form a good, it is the case that human agency in general requires 
pragmatics in general. In other words, we can abstract from the particular 
practices in which a person participates and say that there are certain 
principles that underlie all language-games. These principles involve the duty 
to be sincere in the expression of one’s intentions and the recognition of all 
other participants as equals in the search for validity2*.
However, this universalization of pragmatics may appear paradoxical. 
The claim is that all validity-claims are bound to a context and it is 
"universally" the case that this is so. But to say this is not to demonstrate that 
there is a community that is universal, for it is simply a theoretical truth-daim 
(not a practical imperative), ie. particulars presuppose universals. 
Nevertheless, I think that the recognition of the prindples of pragmatics entails 
more than a theoretical truth-claim. Partidpants themselves are necessarily 
committed to the universal community of interpretation as a "counterfactual 
presupposition" of their own activities. The values that we hold have been 
formed through no-longer-existing language-games and are subject to 
improvement through yet-to-exist language-games. This means that all
20APEL(l),p.255. 
21HABERMAS (1), pp.2-3.
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language-games stand in relation to one another insofar as a transformation 
from one game to another is possible. Consequently, all the participants across 
all generations are participants in the unlimited (infinite) community of 
interpretation.
This argument depends upon the acceptance that values are open to 
improvement. It must be the case that language-games stand in some kind of 
rational causal relation to one another. That is, we cannot assume that there 
just exist competing "vocabularies”, but rather one language-game must 
supersede another as a better representation of reality^. Those who argue that 
we cannot improve our beliefs, but merely change them, fail to recognize that 
whilst language requires pragmatics it requires semantics toc>23. As language- 
users we suppose that there is a reality independent of language and the aim of 
language is to overcome ambiguity in the representation of that reality. 
Pragmatics and semantics are not competing conceptions of language but both 
are necessarily part of the same structure, and exist for the same end.
Language-game relativists argue that all language-games are equal 
whilst maintaining that one cannot cross from one game to another; that is, 
there is no standpoint from which one can compare language-games. This is, of 
course, a contradiction, for to argue that all language-games have equal 
validity is to have taken up a standpoint outside of a particular practice. What I 
wish to argue is that the commitment to the idea of the truth-boundedness of 
value manifests itself in the belief that the values that one holds as a 
consequence of participating in this particular practice are the best available,
^This involves accepting the claims of universal pragmatics against those of radical 
hermeneutics as advanced H-G.Gadamer. See GADAMER, p.247.
^Richard Rorty argues that one language-game cannot be superior to another, for there are 
merely "competing vocabularies". However, the recognition of the pragmatic dimension of 
language involves the acceptance of the inadequacy of semantics to render meaning 
determinate, not the rejection of semantics. Pragmatics takes on die task of semantics and 
attempts to do better. Language has a complex structure. See RORTY (3), chapter 1.
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even though they are in principle subject to revision. This is not therefore a 
solipsistic position^. The commitment to one's particular practices means that 
the ideal community of interpretation is counter-factual, but the recognition of 
the possibility of the improvement of one's beliefs means that it is also a 
necessary presupposition.
What then is the role of the indefinite community of interpretation in the 
moral grounding of rights? Unlike the advocates of discourse ethics—Habermas 
and Apel—I do not believe that the indefinite community of interpretation can 
be equated with the moral standpoint^ . On one level the indefinite 
community is too strong whilst on another it is too weak. The idea of the 
indefinite community is that of the ultimate standpoint from which all claims 
are assessed. It is not a specifically moral conception even if equal rights to 
participation are taken to be implied by it. Given this generality it is unlikely 
that we are going to agree to determinate moral principles, simply because of 
the counter-factuality of the community. What we need is a specific moral 
standpoint; a language-game in which the task is to reach agreement on moral 
principles.
The indefinite community is too weak in the sense that despite its 
bindingness and universality it is only entered on condition that individuals 
have prudential desires. In Kantian terms it is a hypothetical imperative that 
underlies commitment to the indefinite community, and this undermines the 
overridingness of morality^, What is required is an independent moral sense.
By solipsistic I mean the inability to recognize that there may exist other language-games— 
other ways of seeing the world. Of course, the rejection of a private language means that we 
have overcome one form of solipsism. It is important to avoid this new form.
^HABERMAS (1), pp.63-5; APEL (1), p.277.
26ft is binding in the sense that to have any interests we must presuppose the indefinite 
community, but this depends upon having a basic desire for survival.
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What the indefinite community does provide is a model of human 
autonomy that does not abstract from the empirical particularity of persons. As 
I have argued, in constructivism we appeal to the idea of a moral sense but in 
order to render that sense substantive (without appeal to intuitions) we need a 
conception of human (non-moral) goods. I have argued that the idea of 
prudential rationality underpins the commitment to the Rawlsian primary 
goods, but prudence involves the idea of personal identity—and hence of 
disproportionate concern for self—and this must be squared with the 
unconditionality of moral commitment. The indefinite community resolves this 
conflict not through the dissolution of the distinction between morality and 
prudence, but through the recognition that the conditions for the formation of 
one's good involve a commitment to open institutions. Nagel's argument in The 
Possibility of Altruism for a structural identity between prudence and morality is 
indirectly achieved through the indefinite community^.
It should be stressed that the indefinite community represents a highly 
abstract standpoint from which to view one's allegiance to liberal rights^®. 
Indeed, it is essential to my argument that it be a counter-factual—perpetually 
postponed. This is because we need to connect together the idea of a person as 
a spatio-temporally located being with the notion of autonomy; that is, the idea 
of adopting a standpoint apart from one's ends. In Kant's philosophy we are 
faced with the phenom enal/noum enal distinction and no means of 
overcoming this bifurcation. In many ways, one's ability to imagine oneself as a
2?Nagel argues that there is a structural similarity between the abstraction involved in 
prudential reasoning and the abstraction involved in moral universalization. The ability to see 
the present as just one time among many is structurally similar to the ability to see one's life as 
just one among many. Of course, as argued in section 4.4 Nagel fails to take agent-relativism 
seriously (his more recent work might be understood as a corrective to this). I have tried to 
incorporate agent-relativism into the defence of rights, and I am arguing that as a consequence 
the reconciliation of morality and prudence can only be obliquely achieved through the idea of 
the counter-factual communication community. See NAGEL (1), p.100.
2®The relationship of the indefinite community to the particular community that is the state is 
a complicated one. I touch upon this question in section 73.
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member of the indefinite community is analogous to the noumenal standpoint, 
but unlike the noumenal realm the indefinite community is anchored to 
empirical practices through the idea of communicative competence.
I believe that this argument overcomes the "unencumberedness" of the 
liberal self. We can hold fast to beliefs and life-forms and at the same time 
stand in a critical and reflective attitude towards them. Our ends can be both 
objectively valuable and yet their value can be predicated upon them being our 
ends. As spatio-temporally located beings we are en cu m b ered ^ , but that 
encumberedness presupposes a community in which all our ends are 
potentially revisable. The point is that the ability to conceive of ourselves as 
both encumbered and autonomous (or unencumbered) can only be achieved if 
the indefinite community is both an unavoidable presupposition of 
communicative action and a counter-factual. This counter-factuality doesn't 
render the indefinite community useless for it is the device that we employ to 
demonstrate that self-interest and morality do not conflict at the most abstract 
level.
29ie. encumbered by our linguistic practices. Which practices we participate in will be 
determined by our life-histories, see section 6.5.
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7.3: Neutrality and the Choice-Situation
In the "Dewey Lectures" Rawls argues that the citizens of a well-ordered
society are "self-originating sources of valid claims for whom the institution
and revision of life-plans constitutes one of their highest powers"3  ^but:
given their moral power to form, to revise, and rationally to 
pursue a conception of the good, their public identities as moral 
persons and as self-originating sources of claims are not affected 
by changes over time in their conceptions of the good.3*
There are two ways of interpreting this last statement. It may be understood to
be a rejection of the metaphysical conception of the self, such that the problems
that I have discussed concerning the nature of prudence and personal identity
are deemed to be irrelevant to the conception of the moral person in the
original position. In other words, we should make a distinction between a
"public conception" and a "private conception" of the p erson 3^. However, it
may be interpreted as an implication of the acceptance of the idea of personal
autonomy. A person's commitment to moral principles is unaffected by his
own shifting conceptions of the good, for the content of the principles
themselves are determined by the nature of the person as an autonomous agent
and not by the particular ends that the person has.
This raises the issue of whether the conceptions of the person and of 
prudential rationality that I have advanced in this dissertation are just too 
strong. After all, the reconciliation of prudence and morality will not be 
achieved if we posit a controversial conception of self-interest. The ability to 
accept the moral bindingness of the choice-situation depends upon showing 
that all participants are treated fairly. It seems to me that if the ideas of the self
30RAWLS (4), pp.521-2.
31RAWLS(4),pp544-5.
3^This I think is Rawls's position. See RAWLS (6), footnote 15, p.232.
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and prudence are not widely accepted then the choice-situation cannot be 
described as fair.
I have discussed at length the nature of prudential rationality and the 
task, therefore, is to connect that notion to the idea of a moral sense. The veil of 
ignorance is the representation of the moral sense and ensures that the choice is 
not based on self-interest^. However, my aim has been to use the idea of self- 
interest as a way of modelling personal autonomy and hence justifying the 
primary goods. Agents in the original position know that they will have to 
constrain their interests, but in order for them to do this they need an 
assurance that they will be treated fairly in the formation of moral principles. 
Therefore, it is essential that the primary goods be of equal worth to all 
persons^. This, however, is a matter of some contention. It is argued that the 
equal liberties are of unequal worth. For the worst-off and those with a strong, 
non-reflective conception of the good, the worth of, say, the liberties, is less 
than for the better-off and those with a less fixed conception of value. To 
illustrate the objection, we can contrast Rawls's set of primary goods with an 
alternative set that stresses a particular religious ideal as central to the human 
good. Let us imagine that this religious ideal involves a conception of social 
organization that stresses hierarchy, the importance of received (religious) 
belief, sexual inequality, and consequently a low priority on overcoming 
unequal treatment and encouraging freedom of thought.
33RAWLS (2), pp.12,139-40.
^The primary goods must be of equal worth in terms of their content. Clearly, the better- 
endowed will lose out by accepting the conditions of the choice-situation, but so long as they 
can agree with the lesser-endowed that wealth, freedom and opportunity are valuable for the 
pursuit of one’s good then the situation can be desribed as fair. Obviously, not every unit of 
wealth is of equal value so that a £50-per-week increase in income will have a far greater 
"utility" for an impoverished person than for a wealthy person. The marginal value of wealth 
does not enter into the conditions of the choice-situation since all are equal, and this it will be 
recalled is simply the working out of the formal conditions of morality (see section 2.1) and 
does not represent a substantive intuition.
Difficulties arise when one party maintains that wealth or freedom are intrinsically less 
valuable, and it is therefore Rawls's abstraction from the different conceptions of the good which is 
so controversial.
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Let us assume that individuals seek a greater rather than a lesser share 
of these primary goods, and consider the possibility that after the veil is lifted a 
person discovers that "he” is a woman. Each person knows that "he" has a 
fifty/fifty chance of being a woman and given that w e are (for Rawls) low risk 
takers one can assume that a principle expressing the equal treatment of men 
and women would be chosen. This, however, would create a tension, for it 
would run counter to the religious ideal and hence call into question its status 
as a basis for moral principles. Now, let us assume that only a minority 
subscribe to this religious ideal. Clearly, the principles that emerge from the 
original position will be incompatible with their ideals. But it seems to me that 
the objectivity of the choice-situation is not called into question by the fact that 
it serves some conceptions of the good less well than others. This is because 
constructivism must make appeal to certain reasonable truth-claims among 
which is included the idea that we must be autonomous agents. This means 
that those who enter into a particular practice, such as a religious one, are only 
acting rationally if they recognize (or could recognize) that this life-form 
presupposes certain principles of communicative rationality that are universal. 
It is this universal conception of communicative rationality that grounds the 
primary goods.
Clearly the choice-situation will generate liberal principles, such as 
sexual equality, non-discrimination against hom osexuals, a strong 
presumption against censorship, (probably) the availability of legal abortion, 
and so on. It may also be the case that given certain individuals’ conceptions of 
the good these liberal implications will be troubling. But if we abstract from all 
particular practices, and take up the standpoint of the indefinite 
communication community, then these individuals will be forced to accept that 
the preconditions for coming to value anything with confidence requires a form
224
of social organization that allows for a diversity of life-forms. We do not 
require individuals to sacrifice their beliefs^ but rather to accept that they are 
revisable (and if they are beyond reusability then to accept that they cannot 
form the basis for any public policies^).
It might still be objected that the primary goods stress a particular, 
controversial model of the person: the possessive individualist^?. Autonomy 
does not, however, lead to "atomism"^, for the notion of autonomy that 
underlies the original position is reconstructed from the idea of communicative 
rationality. This means that we can distinguish between three kinds of 
relationship: egoism, tuism3^  and altruism. Egoism is the idea that a person 
has an exclusive interest in himself*^. Altruism represents the moral attitude: 
validity is determined from the standpoint in which I treat my life as just one 
among many. Tuism, on the other hand, involves taking into account the 
interests of others. But in my—perhaps non-standard**—usage of the term, 
tuism involves the recognition of a concrete other. Tuism is not the abstract 
standpoint of altruism but rather the acknowledgement that the relation of 
oneself-to-oneself is mediated through a relationship to others*?. This 
mediation is not total, for tuism still involves a strong notion of prudential
35To "sacrifice" one's beliefs is to give up those beliefs in an altruistic way. It would involve 
accepting that it is in the interests of social order that one cease to believe, but that there can be 
no compensation for the loss of the personal standpoint of belief.
^See section 7.2 for the two ways in which a particular linguistic practice can be "limited". 
3^This term was coined by GB.Macpherson. See MACPHERSON, p.3. See also TAYLOR (2). 
38TAYLOR(2),p.l87.
3^The term "tuism" is used in welfare economics to indicate that the motivations of persons in 
a free market is undetermined by ties of affection. It is also the condition that underlies 
Gauthier's "morals by agreement", see GAUTHIER (2), p.87; see also CHARVET (2), pp.113-14. 
^^These interests might include a concern for others, such as family or friends, but the ground 
of that concern must be the fact that they are my family or my friends. This is, of course, 
incoherent, for the agent is not really taking the otherness of the other seriously. I discussed this 
problem in chapter 4 and argued that there is a tension between desire and object—does the 
object (in this case, family and friends) ground value or does the desire?
**I have followed the Oxford Dictionary in defining tuism as a recognition of a second person. 
^Tuism  is, therefore, the attitude that is associated with the recognition of the inter-subjective 
conditions for the formation of a good. It is not a moral attitude, but it is compatible with the 
moral standpoint (with altruism).
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rationality. The motivation for entering into relations with others is determined 
by one's intentions and desires, but once a person acts intentionally the process 
of inter-subjective validation touches upon ends and not just means.
The idea of participating in certain practices (tuistic relations) means 
that the notion of autonomy that we assume to be true and which underlies the 
choice of primary goods is sufficiently wide to incorporate a large number of 
belief systems within a liberal society. Take the idea of a religious ideal, that of, 
say, Christian belief. What we require is not that a person suspend his religious 
belief but that he accept that such an ideal cannot form the basis of moral 
principles. Ultimately, what is required is a reflection on the concept of the 
"religious", and what we must say is that the very particularity of language- 
games means that religious concepts cannot be transferred from one subject- 
domain to another. For a Christian it would involve accepting that Christian 
doctrines have such an ultimate nature that they are beyond discussion from a 
moral standpoint. So long as the state does not repress or impede religious 
worship, or the disemmination of Christian belief a Christian can recognize 
that the adoption of the original position is compatible with, and indeed 
facilitative of, his beliefs. The virtue of appealing to the idea of personal 
autonomy~in contrast to the overlapping consensus—is that we can take 
pluralism seriously, for it is the very lack of a common denominator between 
conceptual frameworks that supports liberal rights.
7.4: The Rationality of Rights
It is now time to connect together in a more explicit way the conception 
of rights that I developed in Chapter 1, and the construction-procedure that I 
have invoked to ground that theory. As I have argued the standard problem in
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the moral grounding of any principles is how w e reconcile the demands of 
morality and self-interest. This problem is particularly acute in the case of 
rights for they involve the legitimate, or "moralized", pursuit of self-interest. 
Indeed, some writers have characterized rights as permissions or prerogatives 
to ignore, under certain circumstances, the requirements of m o ra lity ^ . Whilst I 
believe that this is a mistaken view—rights are themselves moral forms—I shall 
argue that rights do involve what may be termed "the self-limitation of 
morality".
Rationality I have described as a "differentiated whole", by which I 
mean that there are a plurality of types of reason but in order to retain a grasp 
of each type of reason we must assume that they fit together. Each form of 
rationality has an appropriate sphere and the reconcilation of the different 
forms involves the recognition of the limits of each^. I would daim that it is a 
mark of a rational society that it recognizes the plurality of reason(s) and 
engages in the task of recondliation. In such a sodety rights will play a big 
part, for they mark the self-recognition by moral reason of its own limits, that 
is, the limits of the appropriate sphere of morality. Or, to put it another way, as 
moral agents we recognize the limits of moral agency. Certain validity-daims 
are just not appropriate subject-matter for moral judgement, and such claims 
indude those of self-interest. It should be added however that morality can 
recognize the collective rationality of non-moral relations, such as those 
operative in the free-market. Persons can be permitted to pursue their self- 
interested aims if it can be shown that collective gains will accrue^.
^^See, for example, BENDITT, p.47.
^ See WALZER, pp.6-10.
^^Some would argue that people have basic rights to buy and sell labour and capital, or, 
alternatively, the free-market is a morally-free zone. I am arguing that the free-market is not 
intrinsically moralized and that there are no basic rights to operate in the market, but that non- 
morally-motivated market actors can be recognized as acting in ways which are not 
incompatible with the requirements of morality. I think that this kind of argument is implicit in 
the writings of Adam Smith. For a defence of the idea of basic rights to trade see NOZICK,
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The idea of the self-limitation of morality through rights gives the 
impression that rights have a purely negative function, in the sense that they 
define—from the moral standpoint—that which is beyond morality. But this 
purely negative idea would not I think be sufficient for a reconciliation of 
morality and prudence in constructivism. We should bear in mind that 
prudential rationality underlies the appeal to the primary goods which affect a 
person's motivations in the original position. What we require, therefore, is a 
stronger notion of rights as enabling a person to pursue non-moral goods. 
Rights, among other principles, set the framework within which these goods 
can be pursued, and that framework must involve "developmental" rights, 
such as the right to education. In Chapter 1 I argued that the unity of rights 
presupposed a conception of the right-holding agent as enduring through time 
but also following a developmental path^G. That is, w e are concerned not 
merely with an abstract self but rather with a natural being who must realize 
his linguistically-based autonomy. That autonomy I have defined in terms of 
the ability to raise validity-daims concerning one's ends.
Given this developmental model of the autonomous self we can see how  
constructivism connects up with the autonomy theory of rights. That is, the 
first-order theory of the content of rights dovetails with the second-order 
justification of those rights. The idea of the prudential agent underlies both of 
them. Of course, it might be argued that it is no coincidence that constructivism 
connects up in such a neat way with the autonomy account of rights, for we are 
just taking up to a higher level of abstraction the concept of the person implicit 
within the moral practice of rights (the claim is that my argument is after all
pp.28-9; for a defence of the notion of the free market as a morally-free zone, see GAUTHIER 
(2), chapter 4.
4^ 1 support the idea of welfare rights, as advocated by GWellman (WELLMAN (1), chapter 5); 
see also PLANT (2).
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intuitionist). But this criticism is invalidated by the fact that we are not 
appealing to contingent beliefs that are held with regard to the concept of the 
person but to the presuppositions of practical reason (reason presupposes 
language which in turn presupposes subjects of language). This shows once 
again how rights grounded in constructivism recognize the plurality of reason 
in way that intuitionism and utilitarianism do not. If rights (and other moral 
principles) are to provide a framework within which persons pursue a good 
then they cannot fail to make appeal to non-moral facts. Utilitarianism fails to 
respect the non-moral sphere whilst intuitionism is committed to avoiding 
making claims about it.
A related advantage of appealing to non-moral claims regarding the 
nature of the self is that it allows us to arbitrate between two conflicting 
models of the self within the liberal moral sphere. On the one hand, there is the 
’’possessive individualist”, whilst on the other hand there is the more 
developmental model of the self associated with egalitarian liberalism ^ ? In 
chapter 1 I suggested that there was a conflict between such rights as the 
freedom to buy and sell labour, and the right to education or to some forms of 
welfare. I argued that a developmental conception of personal autonomy 
allows us to integrate these4**, but I believe that there is a deeper problem of 
justification involved. I, qua market actor, can ask why I should not value 
market rights over those rights that imply cooperative relations. The problem is 
not that there is a direct conflict between morality and self-interest, for I assume 
that in presupposing a moral sense we are accepting the force of morality.
47See DOPPELT, pp52-9. Doppelt advances what I take to be an intuitionist defence of justice 
as fairness, but admits, in conclusion, that such an understanding of the foundations of the 
theory is incapable of arbitrating between the competing models of the individual implicit in a 
liberal culture.
4®See section 1.4
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Rather, the conflict is between different models of self-interest and indirectly this 
creates a problem for the recondlation of morality and prudence^.
The appeal to a presuppositional self involves a reconstruction of the 
linguistic preconditions for the formation of a good. The involvement in a free- 
market raises validity-daims that cannot be bracketed off when a person 
makes appeal to the concept of self-interest. Market rights must be located 
within a structure of other rights, such as rights to free partidpation, freedom 
of speech, and the right to education.
The recondlation of morality and self-interest is achieved when rights 
and other liberal institutions are not only the objects of moral duty but also the 
focus of the allegiance of the citizens of a liberal polity. The stress that I have 
placed upon communicative practices is significant here. Consider, for 
example, the primary goods of "money" (or wealth) and "freedom". Money can 
be distributed with clear trade-offs, such that I as an individual can calculate 
my loss or gain under different distributive arrangements (even though this is 
not necessarily a zero-sum game). Freedom on the other hand has an 
indivisibly collective aspect, even though it still involves conflict. My right to 
free speech, if respected is intimately related to the rights of my audience to 
hear me, and my right to freely associate assumes, by definition, that others 
have similar rights. Tuistic ties bridge the gap between egoism and altruism.
7.5: The Scope of Rights
To ground rights is to claim that they are objective moral facts. The 
question that is raised is whether they are universal facts; that is, can a set of
4^See section 7.3, footnote 33.
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social arrangements be judged to be irrational if it does not contain rights as a 
fundamental element? I believe that it can, but this claim must be handled with 
care. My aim in this final section is to clarify the relationship between 
constructivism and human rights. I shall begin by distinguishing a 
constructivist conception of objectivity from that of a natural rights view, and 
then show how rights can be universal even if, at a sociological level, they 
appear to be absent.
If w e are to keep constructivism and intuitionism apart then the 
possibility must exist that the moral choice situation will generate principles 
other than rights. Does this fact undermine the objectivity of rights? I do not 
think so, because the strength of constructivism lies in its emphasis upon 
practical rationality and the idea of free agents together constructing the 
principles that will govern their behaviour one with another. If we say that 
rights are objective then we must assume that they are objective in a different 
way to that of, say, scientific truth-claims. Theoretical rationality entails 
conformity of belief to a statement concerning a fact or state of affairs in the 
world. Practical rationality entails a conformity of behaviour to an action- 
guiding principle. Those action-guiding principles are not themselves 
substantive moral principles, but rather the structure or form that such 
principles should take. The move from form to substance is achieved through 
an appeal to certain non-moral facts, ie. the structure of human agency. This 
means that the choice situation is not "rights-based"50, in the sense that we do 
not and w e cannot assume the prior validity of rights (nor can we assume the 
prior validity of the more abstract principles of freedom and equality). This 
generates a different conception of objectivity to that associated with ’’natural 
rights”. Natural rights must assume that objectivity inheres in concrete norms
50See J .Mackie "Can There be a Rights-Based Moral Theory?" in MACKIE. Mackie thinks that 
we can adopt a rights-based morality. But we need to show that this isn't arbitary.
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themselves—in some original attribute of the right—rather than being endowed 
in the form via a procedure that can be described as "morarSl. The problem 
with natural rights is that they cannot account for the practical nature of rights 
as a moral form.
We do not assume the existence of any universal moral facts and neither 
do we assume the validity of agent-relative ends, which include beliefs defined 
as moral. The objection might then be raised that constructivism fails to take 
into account the existence of sittlichkeit, that is, the idea of morality as 
expressive of, as well as expressed through, particular social forms. If we  
ground moral principles in the structure of human agency, and hence abstract 
from any particular ends (particularly, a communal good) then we exclude 
other forms of morality, such as concern for family and friends, or concern for 
one’s political community. Such an abstraction weakens the bonds that tie 
people together and allow them to conform their behaviour to civilizing norms. 
Just as the morality of rights must be rendered compatible with prudential 
rationality so the unity of practical reason demands that we reconcile different 
forms of morality. The abstract moralitaet of rights must cohere with the 
sittlichkeit of personal, Hconcrete” bonds, and yet the moralitaet of rights appears 
to assume a complete priority over other forms of morality. The question is, 
therefore, whether in asserting the objectivity of rights I must also claim their 
universality where the latter concept has two dimensions. The first dimension 
concerns the role of rights within a society that is already governed by rights 
whilst the second concerns the claims of rights in societies that appear not to be 
right-governed (this touches on the status of "human rights").
I believe that rights are universal in scope but that this is not 
incompatible with other forms of morality. Let us consider the first case, that of
SlSee section 2.1 for a discussion of the formal requirements of morality.
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a rights-govemed society. Insofar as rights constitute a major element within 
the principles of justice they have priority over other moral forms. Of course, as 
agents of construction we should be concerned to advance other principles 
alongside rights and, therefore, we would have to introduce subsidiary 
principles that would be employed to show when and where rights can be 
overriden. So, for example, the right to buy and sell labour in a market is 
constrained both by other rights and by a general concern to ensure a fair 
distribution of wealth. The next area of conflict is between the moral status of 
the principles of justice and the moral principles that are held intuitively 
outside the original position. Examples of intuitively-held moral principles 
might include a theologically-based prohibition on certain forms of sexual 
behaviour, vegetarianism; pacificism; particularistic concern for one’s family; 
and, norms based on aesthetic judgements of an action as being 
HdeanH/ Mundean" rather than based upon duty ("right”/"wrong"). These beliefs 
form a patchwork in the sense that some express a comprehensive conception 
of the good whilst others are more limited.
The particularistic concerns fit into a rights-based morality as long as 
one accepts that morality overrides self-interest. The comprehensive 
conceptions are more difficult, but I believe that there is a response. What we 
say is that such conceptions must form part of the search for a general sodal 
good, so that in my tripartite division of morality, the sodal good, and 
prudence, we treat sittlichkeit as an aspect of a daimed sodal good. This means 
that it is treated as being on the same level as prudence but as not redudble to 
self-interest. In a conflict between moralitaet and sittlichkeit the former must 
prevail, but since the purpose of rights is to fadlitate the formation of a sodal 
good, rights cannot deny the importance of concrete moral norms. Rather, 
what rights do is to encourage a reflective attitude to our moral intuitions and
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whilst this reflection may be uncongenial to certain beliefs and life-styles it is, 
nevertheless, grounded in the nature of the self as an autonomous being.
A person cannot prejudge moral principles by asserting that a certain 
form of behaviour is right or wrong independently of that behaviour being 
invalidated via a certain procedure, ie. the choice-situation. So, for example, a 
person cannot assert that his moral preference that abortions be illegal is being 
ignored if the choice-procedure generates different co n clu sio n s^ . However, a 
person must be entitled to advance a position as potentially moral, but then the 
demands of the choice-procedure take over. This is indeed a prerequisite of 
moral objectivity^.
This raises the second aspect of universalism: the question of human 
rights. It is the case that there are societies that do not recognize liberal rights 
as I have characterized them in Chapter 1. It should be noted, however, that 
there are very few societies that do not recognize rights in any form, so that, for 
example, a feudal society would recognize that a peasant has certain things 
that he is entitled to. The point is that in a liberal society individual 
entitlements are not tied to one's role in the social structure. Nevertheless, even 
if there exists a nascent concept of rights in most societies, we still have the 
problem of cultural relativism to contend with if we want to maintain the 
objective status of liberal rights. The difficulty can be said to lie in the 
conception of the self that exists across different societies. I have tried to argue 
that, notwithstanding Sandel’s criticisms, liberal rights do assume an agent
52SeeHARE(2),p.l78.
is probably the case that over time an "overlapping consensus" will develop as persons 
attempt to fit together their "private convictions" with the demands of the moral standpoint. 
Empirical evidence suggests that societies which pursue liberal public policies tend to generate 
an attitude of tolerance that transcends the liberal distinction between the public and private. 
Consider, for example, the cases of Denmark and The Netherlands. This consensus is not the 
foundation of liberal rights but rather the means by which persons bring into line their 
prudential (understood in the widest sense) good and the moral good.
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capable of reflecting upon his ends. This reflection depends upon a process of 
inter-subjective validation, and the particular communities through which a 
prudential agent forms his good are both limited, by which I mean that they 
must just take certain beliefs as given, and at the same time they presuppose a 
Peirceian indefinite community of interpretants that embraces the entire world 
and future generations. This I believe to be a necessary corrective to those who 
have drawn relativistic conclusions from the idea of hermeneutics or 
Wittgensteinian language-games. The point is that the recognition of rights 
represents the highest level of collective rationality for any society even if as 
real, historical entities their communicative practices are distorted. To argue 
otherwise would require showing that human beings in general do not share 
the potential for autonomy.
The difficulty is that there is a gap between the person as a spatio- 
temporally located ("situated") being and the person as an "abstract” member of 
the indefinite community for whom all ends are revisable. The autonomy of 
the person is located in a counter-factual idea that regulates behaviour in actual 
communities. Consequently, we must show how all persons, regardless of their 
sodo-cultural background, are members of the indefinite community. At the 
collective level, this means showing how liberal rights have validity in 
communicatively-distorted societies. I cannot develop a fully adequate 
response to this problem, but what I would say is that it requires the 
recognition of an "ethics of responsibility" which determines what actions are 
valid in the pursuit of a fully rational, rights-govemed society. This ethics of 
responsibility must take into account the conception of the good which 
underlies the choice-situation; that is, agents must recognize that they have a 
commitment to social organization and that entails enforceable norms and 
sanctions. Whether this abstract commitment to the state translates into
235
allegiance to a particular state will depend upon the degree to which agents 
believe that a liberal society is realizable through that state.
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